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Förord 
När jag tog ut mina magisterspapper i statskunskap från Åbo Akademi efter fem år i 
Åbo, och flyttade tillbaka till min gamla hemstad Borgå sommaren 2014, hade jag ingen 
aning om att jag snart skulle vara tillbaka vid ÅA och än en gång studera, fastän denna 
gång på doktorandnivå. Jag hade inga som helst planer på att doktorera. Inte heller då 
jag strax senare på hösten blev ombedd att hålla föreläsningarna i en kurs på basis av 
temat i min magistersavhandling (demokrati och korruption), vilket jag tackade ja till. 
Detta blev min första erfarenhet av att få undervisa. 
Efter att ha fått ett litet smakprov av arbetslivet under den återstående delen av året 
fick jag nyåret 2015 ett erbjudande som jag inte kunde tacka nej till. Professor Carsten 
Anckar, som fungerat som min handledare under min pro gradu process, skrev till mig 
och erbjöd mig möjligheten att komma och jobba i hans projekt om koloniala arv som 
projektassistent. Han nämnde även möjligheten att kunna så småningom börja 
doktorera. Och på den vägen blev jag, när mina doktorandstudier formellt började 
hösten 2015. Utan Carsten vet jag inte var jag skulle vara just nu. Kanske jag skulle 
fortsättningsvis sitta i KSF-medias kundservice i Jorvas och ta emot arga kundsamtal 
gällande uteblivna morgontidningar. Därför är jag evigt tacksam för allting som 
Carsten har gjort för min skull, inte minst för all finansiering som Carsten har hjälpt 
mig få, så att jag inte har behövt oroa mig ekonomiskt under denna långa process. Tack 
även för alla råd och all uppmuntran som jag har fått och alla möjligheter att utveckla 
mig själv och mitt kunnande, bl.a. genom min kurs ”Corruption and development” 
som jag har fått hålla varje vår sen jag började. Utan Carstens stöd skulle jag aldrig ha 
fått denna avhandling färdig. 
Jag vill även passa på att rikta ett stort tack till min andra handledare, docent Krister 
Lundell. Tack för att du har tagit dig tid till att läsa och kommentera mina utkast och 
tack för alla inspirerande luncher tillsammans. Många tack även till mina andra 
underbara kollegor på fjärde våningen i ASA-huset för allt det professionella, tekniska 
och mentala stöd som ni ger på jobbet, under pauser, seminarier, luncher och fikor, 
samt under fritiden och mer festliga tillfällen. Ni är alltför många för att jag skulle 
kunna nämna er vid namn men ni vet vilka ni är. 
Jag står även i djup tacksamhetsskuld till Åbo Akademi och Stiftelsen för Åbo 
Akademi som har bidragit mig med generösa mängder av finansiering så att jag har 
kunnat slutföra mina doktorandstudier. Utan all denna finansiering skulle jag inte ha 
kunnat gå på de internationella konferenserna NoPSA och ECPR, Summer School i 
Essex, forskarskolan samt andra arbetsrelaterade resor. Tack även för att jag har fått ha 
mitt arbetsrum till förfogande. 
Ett stort tack till mina två förhandsgranskare, docent Staffan Andersson och 
biträdande professor Gissur Erlingsson, för att ni har delat med er av er värdefulla tid 
och er omfattande kunskap. Era kommentarer var mycket nyttiga och användbara, och 
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jag har försökt att ta dem i beaktande så mycket som möjligt i slutförandet av denna 
avhandling. Tack även till Ream Barclay som språkgranskade avhandlingen samt alla 
andra som har läst igenom och kommenterat mina manuskript. 
Viktigt i denna process har även varit Finlandssvenska forskarskolan som har hjälpt 
mig att vidareutveckla mina idéer och resonemang. Flera tack går därför till alla som 
har deltagit i forskarskolan och särskilt de som har kommenterat mina utkast samt de 
som har möjliggjort själva forskarskolan. Samma sak gäller alla andra 
forskarseminarier där jag har deltagit under min doktorandtid. 
Sist men inte minst vill jag tacka min familj: Pappa Rolf, mamma Dorita, lillebror 
Johan och vår siameskatt Disa, för allt det stöd som jag har fått av er. Ett särskilt tack 
riktas till min biologistuderande bror Johan som ofta har hållit mig sällskap under min 
tid i Åbo. Stort tack till hela familjen för alla bastukvällar, utsökta middagar, resor samt 
andra aktiviteter som vi har gjort tillsammans under våra besök i Borgå då vi har länsat 
era skafferier samt kyl- och barskåp. Utan allt detta skulle jag knappast ha orkat 
slutföra denna avhandling. Därför tillägnar jag den er.  
Åbo den 16 oktober 2019 
Fredrik Malmberg 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Tolerance of bribery, tax evasion, and other forms of what can be considered a type of low-level (societal) 
corruption or an indicator of civic morality, or rather the lack thereof, has been a much-debated 
phenomenon within the social sciences. Are some societies or cultures more accepting of corrupt 
practices, and if so, why? Do dysfunctional structures and corrupt elites generate dysfunctional citizens 
who tolerate free riding behavior (the so-called rotting fish thesis), or is corruption tolerance part of a 
“larger culture” that affects the quality of public institutions (the so-called raccomandazione thesis)? The 
central question examined in this study is hence “Do dysfunctional societal contexts generate 
dysfunctional citizens with a higher tolerance of corrupt behavior?”.   
This overarching research question and the subsidiary research questions derived from it are 
approached using multilevel analysis of World Values Survey data from over 80 different countries from 
around the globe. The aim of these analyses is to empirically examine the relationship between both 
subjective and objective measures of societal dysfunctionality and corruption tolerance, operationalized 
using an index of corruption tolerance. A key individual-level factor is argued to be trust in the 
institutions that exercise government authority and are tasked with the implementation of public policy, 
namely the police, the courts, and the civil service (bureaucratic distrust). Public administrations and 
individual civil servants are generally expected to perform their duties in an evenhanded and efficient 
manner. Failure to meet these expectations may have deleterious consequences for the legitimacy and 
utility of the formal norms that citizens and firms are expected to follow, possibly resulting in wider 
acceptance of “uncivic” free riding behavior. The focus of this study lies partly on the conditions under 
which bureaucratic distrust influences corruption tolerance, and if/how the nature of this relationship 
varies depending on country characteristics such as the level of socio-economic development and 
economic inequality, the extent of public-sector corruption and government efficiency, and economic 
performance. However, this study is also interested in the potential direct effects of these contextual 
factors. 
The results of the analyses in this study suggest that citizens who distrust the implementing 
authorities and perceive public officials as corrupt generally have a higher tendency of tolerating 
corruption. Moreover, out of the five previously mentioned main macro-level variables, only economic 
inequality is significantly related to corruption tolerance. Societies with a high level of economic 
inequality tend to show a higher tolerance of practices that can be understood as corrupt. Finally, the 
results suggest that the effect of bureaucratic distrust tends to be significantly weaker in highly unequal 
and highly corrupt societies, possibly due to varying expectations among citizens in different societies. 
Citizens in relatively equal societies with low levels of corruption are argued to have higher hopes and 
expectations of public institutions and officials, which can have negative consequences in the form of a 
higher corruption tolerance if they feel that they have been unfairly treated by the state. 
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ABSTRAKT 
  
Tolerans gällande tagande av mutor, skattesmitning och andra former av vad som kan anses vara en typ 
av (samhällelig) korruption på låg nivå eller ett mått på medborgerlig moral, eller snarare avsaknaden 
av det, har varit ett omdebatterat fenomen inom samhällsvetenskaperna. Är vissa samhällen eller 
kulturer mer accepterande av korrupt praxis, och i så fall varför? Genererar dysfunktionella strukturer 
och korrupta eliter dysfunktionella medborgare som tolererar fusk och snålskjutsåkande på 
allmänhetens bekostnad (den s.k. rotting fish-tesen), eller är korruptionstolerans en del av en ”mer 
övergripande kultur” som påverkar kvaliteten på de offentliga institutionerna (den s.k. raccomandazione-
tesen)? Den centrala frågan som undersöks i denna studie är därmed ”Genererar dysfunktionella 
kontexter dysfunktionella medborgare med en högre tolerans angående korrupt beteende?”. 
Denna övergripande forskningsfråga och de forskningsfrågor som är härledda från den granskas 
med hjälp av flernivåanalys av World Values Survey-data från över 80 olika länder världen runt. Målet 
med dessa analyser är att empiriskt undersöka förhållandet mellan både subjektiva och objektiva mått 
på samhällelig dysfunktionalitet och korruptionstolerans, operationaliserat med hjälp av ett 
korruptionstoleransindex. En nyckelvariabel på individnivån argumenteras vara förtroendet för de 
institutioner som utövar statlig auktoritet och har till uppgift att implementera offentlig policy, nämligen 
polisen, rättsväsendet, och statsförvaltningen (byråkratiskt misstroende). Den offentliga 
administrationen och de individuella tjänstemännen förväntas generellt utföra sina plikter på ett 
opartiskt och effektivt sätt. Ett misslyckande i att uppfylla dessa förväntningar eller krav kan ha skadliga 
följder för legitimiteten och nyttan av formella normer som medborgare och företag förväntas följa, 
vilket möjligtvis kan resultera i en mer omfattande acceptans av fusk och korruption. Studiens fokus 
ligger delvis på omständigheterna under vilka byråkratiskt misstroende påverkar korruptionstolerans, 
och om/hur detta förhållandes natur varierar beroende på ländernas strukturer när det kommer till 
socio-ekonomisk utveckling och ekonomisk ojämlikhet, graden av offentlig korruption och statlig 
effektivitet, samt ekonomisk prestanda. Dock är den även intresserad av de potentiella direkta effekterna 
av dessa kontextuella faktorer. 
Analysresultaten tyder på att medborgare som misstror de implementerande myndigheterna och 
uppfattar offentliga tjänstemän som korrupta generellt tenderar ha en högre korruptionstolerans. 
Dessutom verkar ekonomisk ojämlikhet vara den enda av de fem tidigare nämnda makrovariablerna 
som har ett signifikant samband med korruptionstolerans. Samhällen med en hög nivå av ekonomisk 
ojämlikhet tenderar ha en högre nivå av tolerans gällande praxis som kan uppfattas som korrupt. 
Slutligen så tyder resultaten på att effekten av byråkratiskt misstroende tenderar att vara märkbart 
svagare i samhällen med hög ojämlikhet och omfattande korruption, möjligtvis på grund av varierande 
förväntningar bland medborgare i olika samhällen. Medborgare i relativt jämlika samhällen med låga 
nivåer av korruption argumenteras ha större förhoppningar och förväntningar på offentliga institutioner 
och tjänstemän, vilket kan ha negativa konsekvenser i form av högre korruptionstolerans ifall de 
upplever sig ha blivit orättvist behandlade av staten.  
 
 

  
PART ONE 
Theory and conceptualization
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1. Introduction 
“The Fish Rots from the Head Down” – old proverb 
The 18th century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778) expressed the 
thought that men and women are born good and pure of nature only to be corrupted 
by society and the prevailing institutions1 at a later stage (Lane & Ersson 2000, 1). A 
similar notion is repeated in the very old proverb cited above, where “the fish” can be 
viewed as a metaphor for the general society and “the head” for the institutions or the 
elites that comprise or shape these institutions. In other words, the moral sturdiness of 
the broader layers of society is to some degree a function of the perceived behavior and 
morality of those at the top and those that represent the state.  
A central objective of this dissertation is to test this claim with a focus on a specific 
category of institutions and a specific societal phenomenon that many would label a 
serious threat towards social order and political stability, namely the bureaucratic or 
order institutions that comprise the state apparatus itself and corruption tolerance, i.e. 
citizen views of corrupt and uncivic behavior. How confidence in public authorities 
interacts with contextual factors central in theories of modernization, such as socio-
economic development, economic inequality, or institutional quality and economic 
performance, in shaping attitudes toward corrupt practices is largely unexplored in the 
relevant literature. This is where the current monographic research piece hopes to 
make its most significant contribution in the fields of good governance and citizen 
opinion concerning norms of civic behavior. 
There are several strong reasons why it is important to examine which factors 
generate a higher corruption tolerance.2 For instance, it may illuminate why the 
willingness to behave corruptly is significantly stronger in some groups or societies, or 
why the willingness to oppose corruption or act as whistleblowers is weaker (Moreno 
2002; Lavena 2013; Lascoumes & Tomescu-Hatto 2008). In other words, it may facilitate 
the building of a “corruption-resistance” by giving policy makers and anti-corruption 
practitioners additional empirical data on the factors that produce the kinds of 
“uncivic” attitudes that may ultimately result in corrupt behavior. This in turn could 
result in more efficient and well-functioning states that are ready and able to meet the 
demands of ordinary citizens.   
Bribery, an act commonly regarded as the most typical form of what is often 
considered to be “corruption”3, and other related behaviors that aim to provide private 
benefits at the expense of the wider community and the public good, is widely seen as 
unethical, immoral and deplorable in all societies due to the uncivic betrayal of trust, 
                                                 
1 See section 1.4 in this chapter for a brief discussion on the use of the word “institution”. 
2 See section 1.3 in this chapter for a more extensive discussion on this topic. 
3 See discussion on “what is corruption?” in section 1.2 of this chapter. 
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waste of resources, and other negative externalities commonly associated with these 
types of behavior. In spite of a broad agreement on the undesirability of these types of 
free riding behavior, previous studies have found significant cross-country and cross-
regional variation in what some scholars call “low-level corruption tolerance”4 
(Pozsgai Alvarez 2015), i.e. in attitudes regarding the justification or acceptance of 
corrupt or free riding behavior such as bribe taking or tax evasion (e.g. Moreno 2002). 
For instance, while value-mapping surveys show that a large majority of respondents 
(70-80 %, WVS 2015) claim that they find someone accepting a bribe completely 
unacceptable, there still remains a significant portion of survey respondents who say 
that they consider it acceptable praxis, at least under some circumstances. 
A short clarification, which is expanded upon in later sections, is in place regarding 
the exact meaning of the term “corruption tolerance”, as it is generally used here. This 
dissertation does not intend to focus solely on attitudes regarding the abuse of public 
office or power, so-called “public corruption”, which is the contemporary conception 
of corruption. Due to both practical and theoretical reasons, it has adopted a relatively 
broad definition of corruption. A definition that is not focused on any specific forms of 
behavior (e.g. bribery or nepotism) but more on corruption as a wider “syndrome”5, a 
decay of civic duty among citizens of a society, that can potentially be caused by the 
widespread malfeasance of public officials or some other factors. Moreover, the study 
intends to utilize the extensive literature on corruption as a theoretical starting point 
for explaining variations in the attitudes of interest in this dissertation.  
The great majority of the current literature on corruption and good governance has 
focused on the input, i.e. the political, side of the government, and has explored the 
significance of the political system and various kinds of institutional configurations 
such as the electoral or the party system (Dahlberg & Holmberg 2013). One major 
recurring research theme has been the impact of democracy on corruption, and a 
growing number of empirical studies have depicted a non-linear relationship between 
these two concepts (see e.g. Malmberg 2014). These studies have therefore concluded 
that the introduction of democratic elements such as free competitive elections is not 
enough; something more is needed if one hopes to get corruption under control and 
wishes to generate a relatively good and civic citizenry. This “more” requires, 
according to some calculations made by scholars, a period of several decades (at least 
40 years according to Lambsdorff [2006]) for the democratic system to “consolidate” 
enough, during which “new” kinds of (political) corruption may run rampant, 
                                                 
4 Throughout this study, it will mainly be using the term low-level corruption tolerance or just corruption tolerance when 
discussing this phenomenon. When discussing its results, it will refer to low-level corruption tolerance, however, 
for the sake of brevity it will leave out the low-level part. For a discussion regarding the difference between low-
level and high-level corruption tolerance, see section 1.2 in this chapter.  
5 Compare with Johnston (2005) and the discussion in Chapter 2, section 2.1.2. 
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resulting in losses of faith in the democratic system and possibly in a return to various 
forms of authoritarianism.    
A growing number of empirical studies have linked trust, both interpersonal and 
institutional, to corruption and unethical behavior. Enrico Colombatto (2003, 363), for 
instance, argues that under several circumstances corruption may be “a rational and 
understandable reaction to institutional failures” and/or even a legitimate tool to 
achieve widely shared goals. This view is shared by Donatella Della Porta (2000, 205), 
among others, who claims that the “lack of confidence in government actually favors 
corruption insofar as it transforms citizens into clients and bribers who look for private 
protection to gain access to decision-makers”. Trust is often argued to influence 
behavior and the willingness to cooperate in a pro-social manner and is thereby very 
likely to have an impact on individual tendencies of resorting to both illicit means of 
influence and other malfeasance that serves self-interest (Sööt & Rootalu 2012, 82).   
Susan Rose-Ackerman and Bonnie J. Palifka (2016, 236) meanwhile argue that the 
large majority of people in societies perceived to have extensive amounts of corruption 
view corrupt behavior such as bribery, nepotism, and cronyism as “a detour around 
the constrictions of a dysfunctional state”, even though they largely condemn such 
behavior. If this statement is true, there should be a greater prevalence of voiced 
corruption acceptance in so-called “dysfunctional states”6 with low-quality public 
services that are unable to meet the demands of ordinary citizens, or at least in the 
minds of those who perceive the state as dysfunctional and, therefore, unworthy of their 
trust. However, is there sufficient empirical evidence to support the prevalence of a 
rationalization and justification of corrupt behavior in the minds of individual citizens 
based on institutional quality or perceived social injustices? Alternatively, are there 
some “cultural” explanations that can be traced far back in time that explain any 
current cross-country differences in views on malfeasance? These are some of the 
questions explored in this study. 
Utilizing an immense quantity of high quality, individual level survey data, 
accumulated over more than three decades, this study examines the link between 
confidence in the implementing institutions (the police, the courts, and the civil 
service), and why some members of society find corruption to be justifiable, while most 
do not. Furthermore, it also examines why some societies seem to be more tolerant of 
corrupt and uncivic behavior. Additionally, it also examines the potential impact of 
public sector performance, measured using different indicators of institutional quality, 
and other so-called “ecological” effects in a multilevel framework, while also 
considering possible cross-level interactions. One of the main questions that this study 
seeks to answer is therefore: What is the role of public institutions and social structures 
in explaining individual and societal differences in corruption tolerance? According to 
                                                 
6 See section 1.4 in this chapter for a brief discussion on the use of the word “dysfunctional”. 
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Maria Kravtsova, Aleksey Oshchepkov and Christian Welzel (2014, 8), “[t]here is a 
small but growing body of papers that analyze factors determining individual 
willingness to engage in corruption or propensity to justify it […], but they do not pay 
much attention to social values”. This study therefore builds on these relatively few 
previous studies on the individual determinants of the propensity to justify corrupt 
behavior with a focus on the relationship between the citizens, the state, and the civic 
culture. 
The structure of this dissertation is as follows: This dissertation is divided into two 
main parts. The first part (Part I), of which this introduction chapter (Chapter 1) is a 
part of, lays out the theoretical and conceptual foundations for the present study, 
building on previous research on corruption, civic attitudes, trust, social capital, 
inequality, and other related research areas. First, the research questions are presented, 
after which the central concepts of this study, “corruption” on one hand and 
“corruption tolerance” on the other hand are discussed and clarified conceptually. The 
distinction between these two concepts is central to the theoretical discussion that 
comes later in this study. Following this, the reasons why corruption tolerance should 
be studied are discussed, and this introduction is wrapped up with a short discussion 
regarding the often used ambiguous words “institution” and “dysfunctional”, words 
included in the title of this dissertation that play central roles in the theoretical 
discussion to come.  
The following chapter (Chapter 2) starts by providing some general theoretical 
arguments as to why a rational citizen or a group of citizens could perceive corruption 
and bribe taking as justifiable in some cases or contexts. This chapter also presents a 
few typologies of corruption that are useful to bear in mind when thinking of how 
attitudes may vary and how different kinds of societies experience different kinds of 
corruption. Next, some arguments are provided as to why and how institutional trust 
or confidence in the public authorities, especially in the bureaucratic implementing 
institutions that constitute the state apparatus itself, and the general (perceived) quality 
of the public sector are linked with the individual tendency to justify corrupt or 
unethical behavior. The focus here is on individual- or micro-level (subjective) factors 
that may influence attitudes towards deviant behavior. The next section moves up the 
ladder of abstraction to consider potential contextual country- or macro-level predictors 
of corruption tolerance. Do dysfunctional societies produce equally dysfunctional 
citizens? In the final two theoretical sections, this study considers potential cross-level 
interaction or moderating effects and the hypotheses are summarized. It is argued that 
the level of economic inequality in a society and the institutional quality has a 
modifying influence on the effects of confidence that depends on prevalent 
expectations of fair and impartial treatment from public officials. 
Part II is the empirical part of this study and begins by presenting the research 
design (Chapter 3), which includes the operationalization of the variables, an 
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illustration of the research model, and descriptions of the method of analysis and the 
data sources used in this study. The following chapter (Chapter 4) presents the results 
of the empirical analyses. It also briefly discusses the implications of the results for the 
hypotheses presented in the previous chapter and concludes with a few robustness 
tests. The final chapter of this study (Chapter 5) summarizes and discusses the results 
and the conclusions that can be inferred from them based on the theoretical discussions 
in Part I. This final chapter also considers the limitations of this study, and touches 
upon a few policy recommendations based on the conclusions, while providing some 
recommendations for future studies. Finally, this chapter concludes with some remarks 
on the discussions in the previous chapters. 
 
1.1 Research questions 
After this introduction to the themes of this study, this study moves on to discussing 
the precise research questions that are examined here. The dissertation operates with 
one main research question, which in turn is divided into three subsidiary or “sub”-
research questions concerning the impact of more specific factors. The overarching 
research question that sets the whole theme of this dissertation reads as follows: 
Main research question: Do dysfunctional societal contexts generate dysfunctional 
citizens with a higher tolerance of corrupt behavior?   
This overarching research question sets the main theme of this dissertation and is in 
turn divided into the following three subsidiary research questions that structure the 
theoretical and empirical parts of this dissertation: 
Sub-research question 1: Do bureaucratic distrust and self-perceived public sector 
corruption affect corruption tolerance? 
Sub-research question 2: Do dysfunctional social contexts affect corruption tolerance? 
Sub-research question 3: Is the relationship between bureaucratic distrust and corruption 
tolerance moderated by the self-perceived extent of corruption and/or different social contexts? 
If so, how? 
The theoretical foundations for these research questions and the hypotheses derived 
from them are laid out and presented in the next chapter (Chapter 2). In the next 
section, the two central concepts of this study, “corruption” and “corruption 
tolerance”, are examined closer.   
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1.2 What is corruption tolerance? 
The phenomenon encapsulated in the terms “corruption tolerance”, “corruption 
permissiveness” or “corruption acceptance”, whichever term one chooses to use, is 
utilized in a number of different ways in various studies and contexts (for a review, see 
e.g. Pozsgai Alvarez 2015). There is even an ongoing scholarly debate regarding if it is 
even rational to apply these terms in many of the cases where they are applied today.  
The main goal of this section is to clarify what exactly this study principally refers 
to when discussing corruption tolerance, which is the most frequently used term for 
this phenomenon in this particular study. Before moving on to discussing this topic, 
however, we first need to take a brief general look at the first part of this concept, 
namely “corruption”. What is it exactly? 
What is corruption? 
Providing an exact and uncontroversial answer to this question is no easy task. 
Corruption is a multidimensional phenomenon and probably one of the most complex 
and oldest concepts in the social sciences, as we will see. There is no universally agreed 
upon definition of corruption, and there are both extremely broad and extremely 
narrow definitions, however, these various definitions will not be elaborated upon here 
beyond a few examples (for a more comprehensive discussion, see e.g. Mikkelsen 
2013).   
The word “corruption” itself has its roots in the Latin verb corrumpere, where a 
translation could read to break up, annihilate, destroy, spoil, make worse, or weaken.7 These 
translations reveal an intrinsic negative connotation that gives a good idea of how 
much (or rather how little) people value activities viewed as corrupt and those 
individuals who engage themselves in such activities. In a literal sense, when 
something becomes corrupted it comes apart into considerably smaller, weaker, and 
vulnerable pieces of a whole (Mikkelsen 2013, 358-359). Hence, corruption is often 
metaphorically described as a cancer or an infectious disease on society and the root of 
many of the misfortunes that can befall an organized society, including, among other 
things; poverty, inequality, political instability, and a general atmosphere of distrust 
towards both other members of society and the governing institutions (Groop 2013, 
21). 
The early pre-modern conceptions of corruption, originating from great thinkers 
such as Plato, Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau (see e.g. Friedrich 1972), were 
very broad and focused mainly on the moral character of individuals, societies and 
cultures. Corruption, when referring to people, was understood as the decay or 
                                                 
7 University of Notre Dame Latin Dictionary (2019). 
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unravelling of communities, and as a deviation from moral duty or loss of virtue, which 
was believed to manifest itself as behavior contrary to public or civic duty (Mikkelsen 
2013, 359). This broadness in turn meant that these conceptions were arguably of 
limited use in the institutional engineering that followed the liberal revolutions where 
the new social engineers strived to limit the types of behavior that had earlier often 
been the norm in absolutist monarchies, such as, for instance, the sale of public offices 
to the highest bidders (known as venal office) or close acquaintances. Niccolò 
Machiavelli, whom Mark E. Warren describes as “the period’s most perceptive student 
of corruption”, regarded corruption primarily as a moral condition, “measured by the 
distance between a people’s collective character and moral standards of everyday 
conduct as defined by their Christian context” (Warren 2004, 329). Rousseau, whose 
ideas were briefly touched upon in the beginning of this dissertation, meanwhile 
claimed that all human beings were born good and pure, but became corrupted by 
civilization and their surrounding society. Corruption has therefore historically been 
seen in political thought as a “decay of the body politic” or societal corruption, a 
dangerous impurity or damaging infection in the moral fabric of a political community 
(Dobel 1978).  
The old Romans, whose success in the accumulation of wealth and power was 
argued to have resulted in a general moral decay that contributed to the eventual 
downfalls first of the Roman Republic and then the subsequent Roman Empire, is often 
used to exemplify this (Hindess 2012). One common theme also explored in the 
sociological literature is how “success” and socio-economic development, or rather 
various forces of modernization may engender feelings of normlessness and alienation 
(what Durkheim [2013 [1893]] calls “anomie”) that may prove fertile for both self-
damaging behavior8 and various forms of malfeasance and corruption. However, the 
limitation of corruption specifically within the politico-administrative sphere, or in the 
gray area between the public and private spheres, craved by the new societal engineers 
required conceptions centered on specific standards of conduct within this particular 
sphere, and a prerequisite for this was the existence of commonly agreed upon rules 
that regulate the public sphere. 
Warren has identified two historical developments that according to him were 
essential to the development of politically practical concepts of corruption. The first 
innovation was i) rationalized bureaucracies with clearly written rules and codes of 
conduct, while the second was ii) the idea that an institution can be superior to the 
individual constituting it (Warren 2004, 329). These two developments together gave 
birth to guidelines that enabled an identification of corruption in behavioral terms, 
rather than purely as moral decay, and this in turn gave the conceptual tools needed in 
order to limit and combat behavior identified as corruption within the public sector. 
                                                 
8 Émile Durkheim (2006) associated anomie with suicide in one famous study from 1897. 
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The “modern” narrow and most frequently utilized definition of (public) corruption as 
“abuse of public office or power for private gain” originates from these developments and 
focuses on (public sector) elite conduct that is contrary to the rules and demands of a 
public office and often aims at self-enrichment. 
Many of the contemporary studies of corruption proceed from a variant of the 
aforementioned narrow definition of corruption. However, there are some notable 
exceptions. Michael Johnston (2005, 12), one of the most prominent scholars in the field 
of corruption research, for instance, defined corruption as “the abuse of public roles or 
resources for private benefit” (italics in the original, see also Chapter 2, section 2.1.2 of this 
dissertation and Johnston’s “syndromes of corruption”). The main difference between 
this definition and the previous one is that while the former holds that a public office 
holder or authority always must be involved for it to be considered corruption, the 
latter does not hold the same requirement. The latter can be interpreted as a somewhat 
broader definition, including the abuse of public resources for private benefit as an 
attribute of corruption. This definition could therefore arguably also cover various 
forms of embezzlement that involve public resources such as taxpayer money or public 
property.  
J. Patrick Dobel (1978, 960), in his “theory of corruption”, uses a similarly broad 
notion of what he calls societal or state corruption (contrast with individual corruption) as 
“the moral incapacity of citizens to make disinterested moral commitments to actions, 
symbols and institutions which benefit the common welfare”, i.e. disloyalty towards 
the state and the common good. He further argues that “[t]he corruption of states and 
the corruption of people proceed hand-in-hand [,…t]o take corruption seriously is to 
take civic virtue seriously” (Dobel 1978, 972). Focusing exclusively on the behavior of 
public officials would then not only be insufficient but also futile when examining the 
“corruption of states” and its causes.  
Johnston (2005, 12) in turn argues that instead of focusing on specific actions (e.g. 
bribe taking), or sporadic corruption, i.e. corruption that occurs irregularly, it is more 
fruitful to focus on what he calls systemic corruption, i.e. corruption that is primarily the 
result of weaknesses of institutions or processes. The reason for this is the varying 
degree of ambiguity involved in the words “abuse/misuse”, “public”, “private”, and 
“benefit”, which are often widely contested both academically and elsewhere. Many 
actions, especially those that can be found in the gray zones between public and 
private, are extremely difficult to categorize with absolute certainty as either “corrupt” 
or “not corrupt”. It can for instance be very difficult to identify the exact moment when 
private resources become public resources (or vice versa).9 Is it after your money has 
                                                 
9 In many states, the boundaries between public and private resources or between public and private actors have 
become somewhat fuzzy, to say the least, during the last few decades. The emergence of the so-called “post-
modern state” and New Public Management (NPM) is argued to have led to “a blurring of conventional 
divisions between different spheres of activity, notably the public and private sectors” (Heywood 2018, 
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actually been transferred to the tax authorities, or is before, when you are bound by 
law to pay the taxes?10 Johnston furthermore argues that the previously mentioned 
ambiguity or contention regarding the exact meaning of corruption can be turned into 
an advantage at a systemic level as “useful indicators of difficulties or change at the 
level of participation and institutions” (Johnston 2005, 12). Frequent abuses of public 
resources by private citizens, or acceptance thereof, could for instance be a sign of 
disputed boundaries between “public” and “private”, and signal critical institutional 
weaknesses such as frequent abuses of power by the public officials themselves. 
Due to this inherent conceptual ambiguity of corruption and the broad definition of 
corruption tolerance utilized in this dissertation (see below), this study has decided to 
adopt Johnston’s (2005) broader definition of corruption as the abuse of public roles 
or resources for private benefit. 
Paul Heywood (2018, 9), among other scholars, points out that the word 
“corruption” is generally treated as if its meaning is self-evident. He argues that this 
practice “acts as an obstacle to moving the anticorruption agenda forward” and that 
“[a] main drawback to discussing “corruption,” without any adjectives, is that we 
cannot reach any kind of consensus, other than at an abstract or generic level, over 
what it comprises” (Heywood 2018, 10). Furthermore, it is important to distinguish 
between different types and forms of corruption so that we may examine how they 
relate to both one another and to other factors. There are a multitude of different 
corruption typologies in the corruption literature, some of which were already 
mentioned (individual/societal corruption and sporadic/systemic corruption), and we 
will continue to briefly examine a few of them here and a few later on in this study.  
To start off, corruption can be divided into public(-sector) corruption on one hand and 
private(-sector) corruption on the other hand. Public corruption embraces the earlier 
discussed duty of public officials as its starting point, while private corruption consists 
of malfeasance that takes place in the private sector without the public sector or any 
government officials involved (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016, 7). Private corruption 
may involve workplace malfeasance such as sexual harassment, unethical decision-
making, workplace theft, insider trading, business-to-business malfeasance such as 
corporate espionage, bribery of other businesses or their employees, and other forms 
of behavior that break the rules of a workplace and/or the law, or are perceived as 
unethical business practices (Mikkelsen 2013, 360). This latter type of corruption falls 
outside the scope of this study because it involves neither public roles nor (at least in 
most cases) resources. Corruption, as it is generally used in this dissertation, does not 
include all types of malfeasance or deviant behavior such as ordinary theft or fraud. 
                                                 
15). Heywood (2018, 15) further claims that in many states “there no longer exists a clear separation 
between the respective remits of public and private providers: not just in terms of policy delivery, but 
increasingly in terms of policy design, especially in relation to financial and regulatory matters”.  
10 “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's” (Biblehub 2019). 
10 
 
Another vital distinction that has been made in the corruption literature is that 
between political, elite or grand corruption on one hand and bureaucratic or petty corruption 
on the other hand (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016, 11).  
Grand corruption involves fewer but more powerful actors (e.g. top-level 
politicians, bureaucrats, and businesspersons) and substantial sums of money and 
other valuable benefits such as public procurement contracts and favorable legislation. 
Petty corruption, meanwhile, involves ordinary citizens, grass-root-level bureaucrats 
and smaller sums of money and less valuable benefits such as a driver’s license or 
business permit (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016, 11). Moreover, petty corruption, 
which is considerably easier for citizens to observe than the distant and opaque grand 
corruption, is said to be more common in less wealthy societies while grand corruption 
is argued to be the dominant form of corruption in wealthy consolidated democracies. 
 This distinction is highly relevant, as we will see later in this dissertation, due to the 
observation made by some scholars (see e.g. Uslaner 2008) that the type of perceived 
corruption (petty or grand) has important implications for how it affects attitudes 
concerning, for instance, the general trustworthiness of fellow citizens.  
A large majority of prior corruption research has focused on the causes and 
consequences of corruption as a general phenomenon in contemporary societies (see 
e.g. Treisman 2000; Montinola & Jackman 2002; Lambsdorff 2006). These studies have 
met quite a lot of criticism largely due to a) the difficulties involved in the 
conceptualization of this phenomenon, and b) the substantial difficulties involved in 
operationalizing it and observing it directly due to its highly illusive nature. 
What is corruption tolerance?  
The notion in the present study to empirically analyze and compare attitudes towards 
corruption is far from a novel one. There have been quite a few case or area studies of 
how citizens in different societies perceive corruption and the criteria they use to judge 
the acceptability of illegitimate behavior (see e.g. López López et al. 2017; Lascoumes 
& Tomescu-Hatto 2008).  
One groundbreaking study of variations in public opinions on corruption was 
written by Arnold Heidenheimer (1970), who divided corruption into three different 
types: Black, white, and grey corruption. Black corruption indicates according to this 
typology actions that a majority consensus of both elite and mass opinion would 
condemn and punish on grounds of principle. White corruption meanwhile indicates 
actions that this majority consensus would not condemn nor punish as vigorously due 
to the perceived costs involved in enforcing such rules. Grey corruption, on the other 
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hand, indicates a lack of consensus or a dissonance in elite contra mass opinion on 
whether certain actions should be condemned and/or punished (Heidenheimer 1970).11    
However, there have been relatively few previous studies that have examined the 
connection between various country- and individual-level variables and the 
willingness to accept or tolerate corrupt behavior across multiple societies (see e.g. 
Lavena 2013; Kravtsova et al. 2017; Pop 2012).  
There have been some related empirical studies concerning “the roots of civic 
morality” (Letki 2006) or so-called rational-choice corruptors (Bohn 2012, 2013). 
However, none, to the best of my knowledge, has focused specifically and 
systematically on the relationship between a) confidence in the implementing 
institutions12, b) institutional quality, and the attitudes of interest with the scope and 
scale of the present study. 
Previous literature on corruption tolerance can be divided into two categories based 
on the definition of corruption tolerance and the type of corruption involved, i.e. high- 
or low-level corruption (Pozsgai Alvarez 2015; see earlier discussion).  
As was already discussed, high-level (or grand) corruption involves senior 
politicians, administrators, and other elites, and concerns relatively large sums of 
money or other valuable benefits, while low-level (or petty) corruption involves mostly 
lower level officials and ordinary citizens, and concerns smaller sums or benefits. One 
key differentiating factor between these two categories is the accessibility of corrupt 
dealings to ordinary citizens: The average citizen tends only to have access to relatively 
low-ranking public officials and petty resources, and can therefore only engage in 
corrupt actions with them.  
The first category includes studies that define corruption tolerance as “citizens’ 
support for corrupt politicians” (Pozsgai Alvarez 2015, 102). The studies belonging to 
this category examine why citizens continue to give their support to corrupt 
governments and politicians even though they are often aware of the fact that the 
public actors are likely to be involved in corrupt dealings (e.g. Chang & Kerr 2009; 
Manzetti & Wilson 2009; Pani 2011). Meanwhile, the second category includes studies 
that define corruption tolerance as “citizens’ willingness to engage in corruption” 
(Pozsgai Alvarez 2015, 102). The focus of the present study lies mainly on this second 
category of definitions, of which one example is Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro 
                                                 
11 Usually elites want to see an action punished while others do not, and the majority is ambiguous on the subject 
(Lascoumes & Tomescu-Hatto 2008, 24). Examples of grey corruption are (certain types of) lobbying or political 
appointments for non-political offices, which tend to be formally legal but are sometimes perceived as morally 
questionable practices by certain groups. 
12 In a similar fashion to Kravtsova et al.’s (2017, 14) study of postmaterialism, this study will not interpret the 
relationship between institutional trust and corruption tolerance as a causal relationship, but rather as a correlation. 
Institutional trust will function more as a sort of individual-level proxy of perceived institutional quality, because 
both confidence and attitudes towards corruption are likely to be simultaneously determined by a third factor.  
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Moreno’s (2006, 42) definition of what they call corruption permissiveness as “the 
willingness to justify acts of corruption in society”. 
 “Corruption” is in this context understood in the previously discussed older and 
considerably broader sense as a decay of the body politic or citizen misconduct 
involving public resources, as opposed to the more narrow (political) elite misconduct, 
which may involve various types of low-level corruption or “free riding” activities 
involving the public sphere or the public good. This broader perspective of corruption 
thusly resembles somewhat the one adopted by Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel 
(2007, 1022), who examined the “corrupt” behavior of UN diplomats with regard to 
parking violations, and interpret it as “reflecting their underlying propensity to break 
rules for private gain”. 
Ordinary citizens are arguably more likely to be willing to accept such acts in which 
they themselves or their family can personally engage and benefit from, which 
excludes most forms of elite or high-level corruption where the corruptors tend to be 
economic agents with repeated interactions with government officials. This would 
thereby suggest that an individual could have both a high tolerance of low-level 
corruption and a low tolerance of high-level corruption or vice versa. Eric Uslaner 
(2008), for instance, has argued that ordinary people blame growing inequality on the 
immoral and corrupt behavior of elites, which they condemn and criticize, while at the 
same time excusing and justifying low-level or petty corruption in which they 
themselves willingly participate.  
However, one could also imagine there to be some spillover effects where a citizen’s 
support for corrupt government officials (i.e. high-level corruption tolerance) could 
influence his or her own willingness to engage in “grass root corruption” or vice versa. 
Factors that explain high-level corruption tolerance, such as the occurrence of 
widespread clientelism and vote buying, could therefore also potentially contribute to 
predicting low-level corruption tolerance.       
The index used to measure low-level corruption tolerance in this study is very 
similar to the “civic morality index”13 used by Natalia Letki (2006, 312) to study 
attitudes regarding “the acceptability of certain types of public good related behavior”. 
Only one (acceptability of bribe taking) of the four items included in Moreno’s (2002) 
corruption permissiveness is excluded from Letki’s index (see Chapter 3, section 3.1.1). 
This study’s dependent variable can therefore also be understood in a broader sense as 
not just acceptance of (public) corruption in the strict modern public office-centered 
sense14 that we saw earlier, but also as the opposite concept of civic morality. A concept 
                                                 
13 Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (1997, 1256-1257) used a similar index to assess the “strength of norms of civic 
cooperation”. However, this index also included WVS items asking about the justifiability of “keeping money that 
you found” and “failing to report damage you´ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle”, i.e. questions that capture 
honesty in general, rather than attitudes toward free riding behavior and the public good.     
14 I.e. as “abuse of public office or power for private gain”, which may include such practices as bribe taking, 
nepotism, etc. 
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that Letki (2006, 306) describes as “honesty in the context of the public good […that] 
leads citizens to maximize public rather than private gains, therefore deterring them 
from engaging in corruption and free-riding”.  
Following this logic and combining the two previously discussed definitions with 
the earlier adopted definition of corruption, this study has chosen to define corruption 
tolerance as the willingness to justify the abuse of public roles or resources in order 
to maximize private gains.   
The average citizen rarely has the resources (money, contacts, etc.) needed to take 
advantage of the system in such a way that he or she can extract large benefits from it. 
This observation in turn suggests that he or she often has to settle with “minor” or 
“grass-root” forms of corruption, such as claiming undeserved government benefits, 
avoiding fares on public transports, or cheating on taxes. The key similarity between 
“grass-root” and “elite” corruption is therefore that it involves individuals or groups 
striving to maximize private benefits at the expense of the rest of society or the public 
good, i.e. acts of disloyalty towards the state (Dobel 1978).  
However, this dissertation will address both low- and high-level corruption 
tolerance in order to give a more complete and nuanced picture of corruption tolerance 
as a broader phenomenon, and how these two tolerances could potentially interact 
with each other. 
 
1.3 Why study corruption tolerance? 
What determines individual- and country-level variations in attitudes toward abuse of 
power and other related “social order norms”? Why are some individuals, societies 
and/or cultures perceived to be more tolerant of both high-level and low-level 
corruption compared to others? The answers to these questions may aid in explaining 
why the general willingness to oppose corruption, for instance by acting as what is 
called a “whistleblower”15, might be weaker, and why the willingness to participate in 
corrupt exchanges might be stronger, in some social groups and societies compared to 
others (Moreno 2002; Lavena 2013; Lascoumes & Tomescu-Hatto 2008).  
Take for instance France as an illustration due the notably high corruption tolerance-
level observed in this advanced European democracy (see Figure 4.3 in Chapter 4, 
section 4.1). Survey evidence concerning “ambiguities” in attitudes toward corruption 
in France reveal that French citizens have a higher overall tendency of tolerating both 
corruption and tax avoidance compared to the average European citizen (European 
                                                 
15 Whistleblowing entails reporting practices that attempt to “reveal fraudulent inside behavior to internal or 
external authorities” (Lacoumes & Tomescu-Hatto 2008, 30). 
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Social Survey [ESS] in Lacoumes & Tomescu-Hatto 2008, 36).16 The authors’ own 
survey finds, among other things, that “a large number of French citizens consider it 
normal to solicit the help of elected officials in seeking solutions  to personal problems” 
(Lacoumes & Tomescu-Hatto 2008, 36).  
Moreover, the survey also reveals that, in the authors’ own words, “[…] what 
resembles a chain reaction, the high level of tolerance of corruption makes the practice 
of whistleblowing appear almost unethical. Reporting is often seen as an uncivic 
practice and provokes negative reactions among a large part of the population” 
(Lacoumes & Tomescu-Hatto 2008, 37). High levels of tolerance regarding modes of 
behavior linked with the phenomenon known as corruption could therefore be 
deleterious to any efforts to control it efficiently if it makes ordinary citizens less likely 
to report it and less likely to take an active stance against malfeasance. On the contrary, 
they may instead take active measures to try to sabotage anti-corruption measures by, 
for instance, ridiculing those who resist demands for bribes and are willing to “blow 
the whistle” on such practices.  
In some endemic cases, many may even show admiration towards those who dare 
exploit the system using corrupt methods. There is for instance a 1997 report from an 
anti-corruption commission in the Philippines where the head of this commission, 
Eufemio Domingo, laments that 
[w]e have all the laws, rules and regulations and especially institutions not only to curb, but 
to eliminate, corruption. The problem is that these laws, rules and regulations are not being 
faithfully implemented…I am afraid that many people are accepting (corruption) as another 
part of our way of life. Big-time grafters are lionised in society. They are invited to all sorts of 
social events, elected and re-elected to government offices. It is considered an honor – in fact a 
social distinction – to have them as guests in family and community affairs (Balgos 1998, in 
Quah 2004, 65).  
Hence, it is of considerable importance that policymakers are provided with further 
empirical evidence concerning different factors that might conspire to make citizens 
more inclined to accept these types of “anti-democratic” and “illiberal” behaviors and 
which particular social groups are most susceptible to these kinds of dispositions.     
The ambition of this study is thus to develop a model of the impact of the 
performance of public policy implementing institutions, measured using both 
subjective individual-level measures and objective country-level measures, on 
corruption tolerance, while taking into account various contextual or “ecological” 
                                                 
16 Sixty-seven percent of Europeans judge it completely unacceptable for a public official to accept a bribe, while the 
corresponding percentage for French citizens is 49. Similar patterns can be seen concerning tax avoidance: While 
fifty percent of Europeans perceive it as completely unacceptable to pay cash to avoid the VAT, the corresponding 
percentage for French citizens is 32 (Lacoumes & Tomescu-Hatto 2008, 36). The average score on the corruption 
tolerance index used in this study is approximately 49 for France compared to 38 for all included cases (see Figure 
4.3 in section 4.1). 
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factors such as the extent of economic inequality. The purpose of this dissertation is 
thus to contribute to the existing research in this area by examining the potential effects 
of a number of different variables that characterize the relationships between citizens 
and administrators of public policy on the tendency to condone corrupt behavior 
within varying contexts. 
What do we have to gain in learning which individual- and country-level factors 
affect the level of tolerance toward corruption? One answer already hinted at in the 
previous paragraphs is that these types of studies enable us to identify structural 
weaknesses in our institutions that shape and influence individual views, values and 
behavior, spawning so-called “cultures of corruption”. This in turn might empower 
policymakers to reform these institutions and structures, influencing the degree to 
which citizens perceive corruption and their willingness to justify illicit actions. In 
short, it could be of use in detecting, strengthening, and sustaining a general 
willingness in society to combat corruption and refrain from participating in it (Lavena 
2013, 345-346). 
Moreover, as stressed by Eric Chang and Nicholas Kerr (2009, 6), “anti-corruption 
policies can be most successful if geared toward removing institutions that induce 
corruption tolerance”. One study of high-level corruption tolerance, for instance, 
demonstrates that those who are more tolerant of bribery are significantly more likely 
to be supportive of governments perceived as corrupt17 (Manzetti & Wilson 2009). 
Corrupt governments are unlikely to promote (effective) anti-corruption legislation 
and if the citizens are less likely to “throw out the rascals”, it could indicate that a 
significant change in a country’s corruption situation is doubtful.  
Finally, it deserves to be emphasized that studies in psychology have demonstrated 
that individual attitudes can be good predictors of de facto behavior in moral dilemmas. 
Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein (1977, 912), in their review of 109 investigations18 into 
the association between attitudes and behavior, conclude that “[a] person’s attitude has 
a consistently strong relation with his or her behavior when it is directed at the same 
target and when it involves the same action”. Studies have also indicated that so-called 
“rational-choice corruptors”19, i.e. individuals that are prepared to justify bribe giving 
as a practical necessity, are more likely to experience corruption, possibly due to their 
higher willingness to participate in acts that “expedite” transactions with public 
officials (Bohn 2012).  
                                                 
17 However, this effect is found to be smaller than both the economic variables and government effectiveness, i.e. 
factors that are argued to predict clientelism (Manzetti & Wilson 2009).  
18 Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) found that the inconsistencies in statistical significance of earlier studies often were a 
result of low or partial correspondence between attitudinal and behavioral entities (action and target), i.e. inadequate 
measurements.     
19 Rational-choice corruptors were respondents who answered “Yes” (15.9 %) to the survey question “Given the way 
things are, sometimes paying a bribe is justified” in the Americas Barometer survey 2012 administered in 24 
countries (Bohn 2012, 75).   
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However, with all of this said, it is important to bear in mind that attitude is only 
one of several components that factor into how a person actually behaves. Many other 
factors, such as the perceived probability that the official will accept the bribe and 
withholds from reporting it, the discretion and capacity of the official to meet the 
wishes of the bribe giver, the bribe giver’s willingness to take risks and the size of his20 
social stakes, or the perceived social approval or disapproval of “cheating the system”, 
tend to have a decisive role to play in situations where bribe giving is an option 
(Klitgaard 1991; Lee & Guven 2013; Pop 2012; Corbacho et al. 2016). The same generally 
goes for other forms of illicit behavior. Positive attitudes towards illicit acts are 
therefore not necessarily always related to actual deviance, which begs for a closer 
examination of these associations. 
 
1.4 On the use of the words “institution” and “dysfunctional” 
A short clarification regarding to what exactly this dissertation refers to, when it talks 
about “institutions” on one hand and “dysfunctional” on the other, is in order before 
moving on to the next chapter. This section starts by briefly examining the concept of 
institutions. 
The title of this dissertation includes the words “institutional trust” and various 
forms of the word “institution” are used throughout this study, however, what does 
the word actually mean and how is it used here? The word itself is quite an ambiguous 
and much-debated concept21 with basically two fundamentally different senses. An 
institution can either be defined as “simple rules or norms [that] constrain the actors, 
who take the existence of institutions into account when they orientate their 
behaviour”22, or as organizations with interests and behavior patterns of their own such 
as banks (financial institutions) (Lane & Ersson 2000, 36-37).  
In this dissertation, the term “institution” is used in the latter, wider, holistic 
sociological sense where institutions are composed of not only rules and norms but 
also activity, values, and beliefs. The study contemplated on using the words “actor” 
or “organization”, but found them ultimately to be too narrow and opaque for its 
purpose, which is to take into account what the public institutions actually do or how 
they perform in the eyes of the general public.  
In contrary to the political actors, the modern bureaucratic ones tend to be fairly 
universal and governed by the same basic principles, which are discussed later, out of 
the necessity to preserve social order. What matters here is therefore how well the 
                                                 
20 This study says “his” because many studies have shown that men are more likely to participate in corruption than 
women. 
21 See Lane and Ersson (2000) for a more thorough discussion of institutions. 
22 The so-called rational choice approach to neo-institutionalism (Lane & Ersson 2000, 37). 
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institutional arrangements (the organizational part) of these institutions comply with or 
conform to the institutional environment (the formal rules and norms), in the terms used 
by Lance Davis and Douglass North (1970). 
Another pairing of words included in the title of this dissertation is “dysfunctional 
contexts”.23 But to what kind of contexts does it indicate exactly? According to the 
Merriam-Webster (2019) online dictionary, the word “dysfunctional” refers to 
something “characterized by or exhibiting dysfunction: such as a: not functioning 
properly: marked by impaired or abnormal functioning […or] b: characterized by 
abnormal or unhealthy interpersonal behavior or interaction”. 
Focus here is on the dysfunctional consequences of certain kinds of societies and 
institutions. In this dissertation, the term “dysfunctional” is used in a very broad way 
to mainly characterize societies plagued by extensive corruption, inefficient 
bureaucracies, low levels of socio-economic development, high levels of inequality, 
and/or poor economic growth. Contextual factors that previous studies have argued to 
be the source of much unhappiness and despair among the populations of these 
societies: low social trust, crime, conflicts, oppressive governments, and general social 
instability (e.g. Banfield 1958; Dobel 1978; Rothstein & Uslaner 2005; Uslaner 2008; 
Paskov & Dewilde 2012; Rothstein 2013; Fukuyama 2014), as we will see later on in this 
dissertation. 
  
                                                 
23 I would like to thank one of the reviewers, Gissur Erlingsson, for pointing out the value of adding this part to 
the conceptual discussion. 
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2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
This chapter commences by discussing the phenomenon of corruption tolerance from 
various theoretical perspectives, including philosophical, economic, sociological, and 
ethical views on socially deviant behavior that challenges civic morality and public 
order. This discussion also includes the functional perspective introduced by the so-
called revisionist school of thought, spearheaded by Nathaniel H. Leff (1964) and 
Samuel P. Huntington (1968), among others, who argue that corruption might have an 
important role to play in processes of economic and political modernization in 
developing countries. 
Following this rather abstract theoretical discussion about the potential beneficial 
effects of corruption, the study moves on to a more specific theoretical discussion 
concerning how individual-level institutional trust and perceptions of public 
corruption, country-level socio-economic development, inequality, institutional 
quality and performance, as well as the cross-level interaction between these factors, 
might influence individual attitudes regarding corruption. The hypotheses of this 
study are introduced continuously throughout this discussion. 
  
2.1 When and where is corrupt behavior the rational choice? 
As previously mentioned, social surveys tend to show that there are those who seem 
to have higher levels of tolerance towards behavior that is generally viewed to be 
contrary to widely recognized principles of civic morality24, including bribe taking, and 
that there are wider bases of acceptance in some societies compared to others.  
What explains this observed variation? Are some individuals, groups, societies and 
cultures “by nature, history or tradition” more “morally deviant” or myopic than others 
or is it (in some cases) a rational reaction to certain institutional constraints or societal 
conditions? In other words, is the variation in attitudes toward free riding (“anti-social 
capital”) among citizens explained by “culture” and historical long-term experiences 
of social organization (the raccomandazione thesis; Banfield 1958; Putnam 1993; Uslaner 
2004), by the quality and performance of public institutions and the perceived honesty 
and fairness of elites (the rotting fish thesis; Rothstein 2013; Rothstein & Stolle 2002; 
Rothstein & Teorell 2008), or by some other explanations?  
The economic concept of self-interest, or what critics often call greed, and the 
tendency to free ride is widely considered the cognitive basis of corrupt behavior 
(Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016). Nevertheless, what additional factors regulate the 
                                                 
24 According to Letki (2006, 306), civic morality “refers to the sense of civic responsibility for the public good, and 
thus entails obedience to the rules, and honest and responsible behavior”.  
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propensity of human beings to behave self-interestedly in a societally harmful and 
unproductive manner and how do these various variables interact? This chapter begins 
its exploration of these questions by first delving deeper into the basic nature of human 
beings, or what the great philosophers called “the state of nature”, and the 
prerequisites of social order. 
   
2.1.1 Philosophical, economic, sociological, and ethical perspectives on 
human nature, civic duty, and the role of the state 
On human nature 
The history of political philosophy is characterized by two competing views on human 
nature: the egoistic perspective (Epicureanism) versus the altruistic perspective 
(Stoicism). Both perspectives agree on that human beings are inclined to watch over 
their own interests, but they disagree on whether they are also inclined to care for 
others (Lane & Ersson 2000, 40). 
The Epicurean philosophers on one hand emphasize the importance of self-interests 
and argue that human motivation is ultimately determined by the love of oneself. Rules 
of proper conduct hence become vital in limiting egoism and channeling it along 
specific paths of behavior in order to render social life possible. These rules may be 
divinely inspired as in religion or they may be imposed by the domination of powerful 
rulers with the ability to punish those who break the rules. Alternatively, they may 
originate from mutual consent as a pact or a contract between the subjects and the 
ruler(s) (Lane & Ersson 2000, 40-41). The Stoicist line of thought on the other hand 
emphasizes that human beings have a natural tendency towards virtue. It is claimed 
that human beings know by the use of reason that certain rules are valid and necessary 
for the formation of humanity, a union of mutual respect where members naturally 
take care of one another, i.e. behave altruistically. Some means of controlling egoism 
are still required, however, because reason does not always triumph over other 
instincts. Hence, the mission of Stoicism is first to clarify how much humans have in 
common and second to devise enforcement mechanisms (Lane & Ersson 2000, 41). But 
how would these enforcement mechanisms actually work or how could rules of proper 
conduct be made more self-enforceable, without the need of constant policing by rulers 
or religious authorities?   
The 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711 – 1776) argues that man 
has a natural interest in social order and justice but is inclined towards myopia, i.e. 
shortsightedness, which tends to tip the scale in favor of egoism and the hunt for 
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personal25, immediate advantages, often of a material kind (Lane & Ersson 2000, 43-45). 
If matters of self-interest (governed by particularistic norms) clash with broader societal 
interests (governed by universalistic norms) and if the potential consequences of a 
breach against the latter are believed to lie very remote in a distant future, people tend 
to prioritize the former when forced to choose.26 
The science of economics has traditionally viewed humans as homo economicus, or 
economic man, a consistently rational, calculating, and self-interested atomistic 
creature who always tends to act according to what is best for his or her own 
particularistic interests, following a basic cost-benefit calculation that contains all the 
relevant situational facts (Rational choice theory [RCT]; see e.g. Becker 1976).27 One 
consequence that follows from this particular view of basic human nature is argued to 
be the so-called free rider problem. Corrupt actors are argued to bear a close resemblance 
to so-called free riders from a collective action scenario (Schweitzer 2004, 27). A free 
rider is a person who refrains from contributing to a common good due to a cost-benefit 
calculation in which he concludes that his individual costs outweigh the actual benefits 
of participating; he reckons on that he will be enjoying the fruits of the labor irrespective 
of his own contribution thanks to the contribution of most other people. In the case of 
societal corruption, the common good in question is social order: By refraining from 
behaving corruptly and displaying disloyalty towards the common good, people 
contribute to the preservation of social order (Dobel 1978). However, if a person 
calculates that his particularistic gains from corrupt behavior outweigh the possible 
benefits of abstaining from it, and especially if the risk of detection and potential 
sanctions are miniscule, he is more likely to behave corruptly due to his faith in the 
continuation of the social status quo.  
This is where the issue of myopia, or shortsightedness, enters the picture. The 
corrupt actor fails to take into account how his own actions, or rather perceptions of his 
actions, may influence the cost-benefit calculations of others, i.e. the cumulative 
(contagion) effects of his behavior, which may result in a complete breakdown of social 
order, especially in the long run. Furthermore, a corruptly behaving actor shows no 
regard for the disadvantages (resulting from the deal or act) to those who do not take 
part in the corrupt act (in economic terms, negative externalities), which may result in 
the emergence of distrust and an erosion (or non-emergence) of “socially positive social 
capital”28 or important institutions (Graeff 2004, 52). 
                                                 
25 “Personal” or “self-interest” in this case tends to include family and/or close friends, but may even be extended 
to larger in-groups such as political parties or cliques.   
26 A person may for instance believe that he or she will be punished in the afterlife by divine retribution. 
27 For critique of the purely individualistic, “fully rational” view of human nature and the idea that human beings 
were primordially individualistic (“the Hobbesean fallacy”) see, for instance, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) and 
Fukuyama (2011, 48).  
28 Contrast this “type” of social capital to negative social capital which is beneficial for the one who possesses it (i.e. 
the corrupt actor), due to its corrupt exchange enabling function, but detrimental for the rest of society (Graeff 2004).  
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What then is the key factor that facilitates social order if pure self-interest tends to 
prevail over altruism, or rather feelings of civic duty29, because of myopia? Hume gives 
one simple answer: the State. Legislation sets the boundaries for human behavior and 
enforcement mechanisms (the police, the judiciary) oversee compliance, resulting in 
that “[…] men acquire a security against each other’s weakness and passion, as well as 
against their own, and, under the shelter of their governors, begin to taste at ease the 
sweets of society and mutual assistance” (Hume 2003 [1738], 383). 
 Alas, the mere existence of the State is not enough. There must be clear and 
institutionalized ethical principles that help to guide the behavior of and the 
relationships between and among both ordinary citizens and public officials. From 
where then do these ethical principles originate and how are they related to corruption? 
Modern ethics versus tribal ethics 
Concerning ethics and people’s reactions to corruption, one can claim that they are the 
consequence of a conflict between two different kinds of ethics that have evolved since 
the dawn of humankind (López López et al. 2017, 263). Before the development of large 
modern social structures such as cities, states and empires, humans were (and still are 
in certain cases30) organized into extended families or tribes that offered shelter from 
starvation, natural catastrophes, predators, and other humans and tribes, and 
worshipped common ancestors (Fukuyama 2011). Every action or inaction that 
furthered the interests of the tribe (the in-group) and facilitated its survival and 
prosperity was considered good or “ethical” behavior, including theft from other tribes 
or the killing of members from competing tribes. Commandments such as “Thou shalt 
not steal” or “Thou shalt not kill” only applied within the tribe among tribe members, 
and did not pertain to out-groups or non-members (López López et al. 2017, 263). 
The tribal stage of human history lasted for thousands of years (and, as noted, still 
continuous in some parts of the world) and strongly influenced individual thinking or 
human instincts31, but in the contemporary world most individuals live in considerably 
larger societies where codes of ethics have also evolved as a result of diversification 
(López López et al. 2017, 263). The family (extended or otherwise) still exists as an 
institution, but stealing from others to provide for your own family and kin or other 
in-groups (party, religious or ethnic group, etc.) is no longer considered ethical 
behavior according to the modern ethics that mostly have superseded so-called tribal 
                                                 
29 Altruism, i.e. concern for the welfare of others, could imply simply one or two other persons, but it is used here 
in the wider “civic duty” sense where individuals are motivated by a concern for the wider community or the state 
(Orviska & Hudson 2003, 86). 
30 There are still some places in the world today, such as Papua New Guinea, where humans are still organized in 
tribal ways (Fukuyama 2011).  
31 As noted by Fukuyama on the issue of human nature (2011, 66) “[a]ll human beings gravitate toward the favoring 
of kin and friends with whom they have exchanged favors unless strongly incentivized to do otherwise”. Not 
favoring our own kin and friends does not come naturally for human beings.  
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ethics as the dominant system of ethics. The instinct or desire to favor kin and comrades 
in all situations is far from dead, however its strength relative to modern ethics and 
ideals may vary across different places and contexts depending on such factors as the 
strength of the state, as we will see later. Where state institutions are weak, clans, tribes, 
mafia families, or other similar informal institutions tend to take their place and 
perform the duties formally assigned to them, such as keeping order and adjudication.   
Sometimes a conflict may still arise between modern ethics on one hand and tribal 
ethics on the other, which may cause a power holder to, for instance, favor an in-group 
member or accept a bribe in order to support their family. Moreover, conflicts may also 
arise among different types of modern ethics, such as duty-based ethics and 
consequentialist ethics. We will examine this closer using the act of bribery as an 
example.  
Bribery, i.e. the “use of a reward to pervert the judgement of a person in a position 
of trust” (Nye 1967, 284), is the most common form of what is widely perceived as 
corrupt behavior from the perspective of modern ethics. From a Kantian duty- or rule-
based ethics perspective, corrupt behavior of this sort on the behalf of a wielder of 
(delegated) power is always wrong. It is a breach of duty where the agent (the receiver 
of the bribe) betrays the trust of the principal (who has delegated the power) and acts 
against the best interest(s) of said principal in return for a (often monetary) reward or 
a promise of a reward in the near future (Kant et al. 2002).32 This can be seen as a 
fundamentally moralistic view that unequivocally condemns corruption without any 
regard to its possible beneficial consequences33 (see the critique by the so-called 
revisionists). According to this view, it is not the consequences of a person’s actions that 
determine if they are right or wrong, but the way they comply with the rules designed to 
guide the behavior of the office-holder, i.e. the duty. There are, however, hypothetical 
situations where the use of a bribe could be considered justifiable from a more modern 
ethical perspective. The classic example often used in the corruption literature is the 
“political prisoner-evil regime”-scenario where a prison guard accepts a bribe in return 
for releasing a political prisoner held by a corrupt or “evil” regime.34 
If, on the other hand, an individual would apply a set of ethical principles building 
on consequentialism or utilitarian analysis he or she could argue that a corrupt act is 
ethical if the total sum of winners exceeds the total sum of losers. In other words, if the 
benefits are greater than the losses in that particular situation, at least in a myopic 
perspective. There are at least a couple plausible alternative scenarios where this sort 
                                                 
32 One could argue that the actual results of the bribe may be in the best interest of the principal but this study finds 
it unlikely. In that case, a bribe would hardly be necessary at all. 
33 With “beneficial consequences”, this study mainly refers to more wide-reaching consequences that may even 
benefit society as a whole, not just specific individuals.  
34 This is sometimes called “noble cause corruption”. Authors often give the example of using bribery to save Jews 
from concentration camps in Nazi Germany (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016, 10). 
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of ethical thinking could result in the conclusion that the use of bribes, or indeed some 
other type of corrupt tactic, is morally justifiable.35  
One could imagine, for instance, an entrepreneurial individual who intends to set 
up a firm but he or she requires a business license or a permit for this purpose. It could 
potentially be very costly and time-consuming for the prospective entrepreneur if there 
are many bureaucratic hurdles to pass and if the quality of the public service is 
substandard with long transactional delays. The result could even be that the 
individual abandons the idea altogether. A potential solution to this problem could be 
a relatively small additional payment to the service provider that “cuts” the red tape, 
i.e. bypasses the bureaucratic hurdles and provides a short cut to the business 
license/permit. The “grease money” could result in a new business venture and 
potentially many new job opportunities and new sources of tax revenue, thereby 
ending in a plus-sum situation in the mind of the owner of the newly established 
business if he considers the red tape to be excessive and over-encumbering. The bribe 
would thereby be the lesser of two evils if the other alternative were exit from the 
venture. In cases where the public servant demands a bribe for the service, paying may 
be the only alternative if the individual truly wishes the permit application to be 
successful (see e.g. De Soto 1989).       
The rationalization in the scenario described above is an example of the classic cost-
benefit analysis from economic theory used to appraise the desirability of a certain 
option, in this case bribe paying. In the next section, a useful typology of two distinct 
general forms of low-level corruption is presented, where individuals or firms pay 
bribes to either [a] obtain benefits to which they are not entitled to normally, 
alternatively to skip a certain cost such as a fee or a tax, or [b] to obtain benefits to 
which they are entitled to without additional payments.36 
  
                                                 
35 This argument also holds for other types of free riding, such as cheating on taxes. If a person for instance believes 
that he or she can make “better”, i.e. more efficient, use of the money that otherwise would be paid as taxes, they 
are more likely to try to cheat.    
36 Shleifer and Vishny (1993) divided corruption into two separate types based on the occurrence of direct losses in 
state resources: “Corruption with theft” (tax evasion and fee avoidance) and “corruption without theft” (bribe 
extortion above and beyond official fees).   
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2.1.2 Typologies of corruption scenarios 
Before moving on to discussing ideas concerning the so-called “functionalistic” role of 
corruption, a few additional typologies (see Chapter 1, section 1.2) are presented that 
are useful to keep in mind when analyzing why attitudes toward corruption may vary 
across different scenarios.  
Corruption does not vary only in form (e.g. bribery vs. nepotism) but also in type 
with regard to the individual relationships and motivational aspects of the actors 
involved in corrupt transactions (Bauhr 2017). Similarly, corruption does not vary 
across countries only in quantity but also in substance, meaning macro differences in the 
kinds of corruption that societies experience that result from variations in the extent of 
political and economic liberalization and in the strength of different kinds of 
institutions and influences the consequences of corruption (Johnston 2005).37 The 
section begins by examining the variations in the types of corruption scenarios on the 
individual-level before moving on to the societal-level.   
Corruption is a highly complex phenomenon that can be divided into a multitude 
of different types or forms, each with their own potential causes and consequences. 
Some scholars have argued that corruption can generally be divided into two separate 
ideal types based on either the relationship between the briber (the person who pays 
the bribe) and the bribee (the person who accepts or demands the bribe) or, 
alternatively, the supply side motivations for engaging in corruption: [a] Extortive or 
need corruption and [b] collusive or greed corruption (Klitgaard 1991; Bauhr 2017).38 
 The scenario described in the previous section can be classified as a case of collusive 
or greed corruption. A person in need of a certain public good or service (the license or 
permit) is provided with a short cut that allows him or her to skip some costly paper 
work in return for a relatively small remuneration to the service provider. The public 
official who provides the public good is hence considered to be helping the client reach 
his or her goal by providing a special advantage, which a corruption-free society would 
not allow, even though the official’s own actions are more likely motivated by self-
interest rather than altruism. Extortive or need corruption, on the other hand, can be 
described as a situation where a person or firm in need of a certain public good or 
service is blackmailed into paying a bribe or perform some kind of service to the public 
official in return for something that he or she would have received free of charge or for 
a considerably smaller fee, alternatively considerably quicker, in a corruption-free 
                                                 
37 I want to thank one of the reviewers of this dissertation, Staffan Andersson, for pointing out the value of adding 
this part to the discussion in this section. 
38 Some cultures have their own words for these different types of petty corruption. Bardhan (1997, 1323, cited in 
Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016, 51), for instance, points out that in Russian there is a difference “between 
mzdoimstvo, taking a remuneration to do what you are supposed to do anyway, and likhoimstvo, taking a 
remuneration for what you are not supposed to do”.   
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society. The official in this scenario is erecting barriers instead of pulling them down, 
thereby hindering the attainment of the client’s goals. 
Of course, the collusive corruption scenario is highly dependent on that the public 
official has a relatively large amount of discretion and influence that can open up the 
proposed short cut through the bureaucratic paperwork. This is commonly not the case 
in modern rational bureaucracies, at least not in the lower ranks where monitoring is 
relatively strict, and several officials are involved in the same cases. The extortive 
corruption scenario is therefore likely to be the most frequently occurring scenario and 
this can have especially severe implications for the poor who may lack the resources to 
be able to pay for the basic services that they need. Uslaner (2011, 148) thusly states 
that “[c]orruption acts as a tax on the poor […; t]hose in fortunate financial 
circumstances (the “well-off”) can afford bribes, but the poor often do without basic 
services”. 
It can however be very difficult for the individual or the firm to identify which type 
of bureaucratic corruption characterizes a particular transfer. Scholars such as Gunnar 
Myrdal (1968) and Oskar Kurer (1993) argue that corrupt public officials have 
incentives to create distortions in the economy in the form of new red tape that causes 
additional delays to the transactions, thereby creating new opportunities for speed 
money collection. The barriers that the official “helps” to pull down may originally 
have been raised by the official himself or his accomplices, which means that what may 
seem like collusive or “helping hand” corruption in the eyes of the bribe giver is 
actually a case of extortive or “hindering hand” corruption. It is also highly likely that 
the public official does his utmost to make it seem like he is helping the potential rent 
source in order to increase his chances of securing a bribe. A friendly-minded target is 
(quite naturally) more willing to relinquish the cash and keep quiet about it than a 
hostile minded one who feels threatened by the bribe-extorting official. 
 The nature of and the basic motivations behind these two previously described 
corrupt exchange scenarios are, as we can see, completely different, and it is therefore 
also reasonable to expect the consequences to differ, both concerning the corrupt act 
itself and eventual engagement in anti-corruption efforts (Bauhr 2017). A citizen 
engages in corruption either to get fair treatment (need corruption) or to get a special 
illicit advantage (greed corruption). Both those who engage in need corruption and 
those who engage in greed corruption would benefit from a corruption-free society, 
due to the earlier discussed negative impacts of corruption on, for instance, the national 
economy (Mauro 1998), however, as pointed out by Monika Bauhr (2017, 564), “the 
advantages of a corruption-free society are far from equally distributed between 
citizens”. Citizens engaged in need corruption are likely to be the primary beneficiaries 
of a corruption-free society, while the advantages for those engaged in greed 
corruption are likely to be quite blurry and to occur with a relatively large time-lag. 
Furthermore, there is likely to be very tangible drawbacks for the “greed corrupt” who 
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cannot access the same set of privileges in a non-corrupt society (Bauhr 2017), which 
means that their elite resources become considerably less useful in achieving specific 
goals such as securing a top education for their children. 
Bauhr (2017) argues that it is this distinction in basic motivation that influences a 
person’s inclination to oppose and willingness to fight corruption, where “greed 
corruptors” have a much greater tendency to tolerate corruption and to free ride on 
other people’s efforts to reduce corruption. The next section discusses the so-called 
functionalistic view of corruption that argues that it can under certain conditions 
“grease the wheels of economy”, thereby bringing prosperity and other positive 
societal consequences. Under what conditions can corruption be perceived as positive 
for society as a whole and not just for certain individuals? However, before moving on 
to the next section, as promised, this section will take a moment to consider variations 
in the kinds of (systemic) corruption that societies experience or syndromes of  
corruption, using Johnston’s (2005) terminology (see Chapter 1, section 1.2).  
Johnston (2005; 2014) posits a typology where he divides macro (and meso39) level 
corruption scenarios into four different syndromes of corruption: [1] Influence 
Markets, [2] Elite Cartels, [3] Oligarchs and Clans, and [4] Official Moguls. According 
to Johnston (2014, 32), these syndromes “reflect underlying trends in, and balances or 
imbalances between, participation and institutions: how people pursue, use, and 
exchange wealth and power, and the social, political, economic, and state institutions 
within (or outside of) which they do so”.40  
Hence, the Influence Markets syndrome reflects consolidated democracies with 
highly competitive markets and strong institutions, where wealthy private interests 
seek to use their wealth to influence public decision-making processes by, for instance, 
acquiring exclusive access to decision makers and/or financing their election 
campaigns.41 Elite Cartels meanwhile reflects consolidating democracies in the middle 
of a liberalization process, with only moderately strong institutions, where elites 
collude in networks to share corrupt benefits and stave off rising political and economic 
competition.42 Oligarchs and Clans reflect transitional societies where a small number 
                                                 
39 Johnston (2014, 31) is careful to point out that the syndromes do not reflect “system types”, that there is 
considerable variation within the four groups, that a society can move between these different categories over time, 
and that we can find several different syndromes at work in various areas, regions, sectors, and levels of a society. 
40 Contrast this taxonomy to Rose-Ackerman and Palifka’s (2016, 277) similar, but less comprehensive and more 
bribe-focused one, which posits four types of highly corrupt states based on the location of the bribe recipients within 
government (Many, at bottom vs. Few, at top) and the number of bribers (Few vs. Many). Hence, the following ideal 
types are posited: [1] Bilateral monopoly, [2] Mafia-dominated state, [3] Competitive bribery, and [4] Kleptocracy. 
The bargaining (monopoly) power of government officials versus corrupt private actors is argued to determine the 
overall impact of corruption on society and the distribution of gains between bribers and bribes.  
41 The United States, Japan, Germany, Australia, France, the UK, and Uruguay are given as examples of Influence 
Markets (Johnston 2014, 34). 
42 Italy, South Korea, Botswana, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Israel, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, and Zambia are 
given as examples of Elite Cartels (Johnston 2014, 34). 
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of highly influential and wealthy individuals, backed by personal followings, compete 
with one another (often violently), while striving to take advantage of weak institutions 
in order to further increase their power and wealth.43 Finally, the Official Moguls 
syndrome reflects undemocratic regimes where powerful individuals or small groups 
who wield both state and personal power (often called “kleptocrats”) use this 
unchecked power to enrich themselves with impunity in a context of recent economic 
liberalization and weak institutions44 (Johnston 2014, 30-34). 
The point of the previous discussion was to once again highlight the very important 
observation that corruption does not vary merely in quantity but also in quality or 
substance, in addition to spatial variations subnationally and across government levels 
and sectors (Heywood 2018). This is one thing that the standard cross-country 
corruption indices, such as the Corruption Perception Index or the Control of 
Corruption indicator, have been heavily criticized45 for failing to take into account 
when they measure corruption on a unidimensional scale with single-country scores, 
often with a focus on the occurrence of bribery (Andersson 2017). A Swedish case study 
by Jonas Linde and Gissur Erlingsson (2013), for instance, found that country indices 
have difficulties in capturing the nature and extent of corruption in countries 
characterized by strong local self-government, where corrupt activities are largely 
expected to occur on the local level. The study also showed that a relatively large share 
of Swedes believed their politicians and public officials to be corrupt, and that the 
extent of corruption has increased during the last decades, even though Sweden 
continues to be ranked among the six least corrupt countries in the world by TI. This 
in turn could have serious consequences for general system support in Sweden (Linde 
& Erlingsson 2013, 598-599). 
This focus on bribery of public officials, which tends to be common in the latter two 
syndromes where institutions tend to be weak and disorderly, creates a blind spot for 
the types of corruption that occur in the previous two syndromes where state 
institutions are at least moderately strong and capable and public sector corruption is 
often more about sophisticated ways of gaining access and influence within public 
institutions or elite networks (e.g. conflict of interest) (Andersson 2017). The reason for 
this focus on bribery is of course that every-day payoffs to poorly paid police officers 
or doctors (or “petty corruption”) is considerably easier to observe than cases of 
political corruption in elite networks. This is all very understandable from a practical 
viewpoint with regard to data collection. When you think of corruption, you often tend 
to think of bribery. However, from a theoretical and empirical viewpoint it leads to a 
                                                 
43 Russia, the Philippines, Mexico, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Colombia, India, Malaysia, Niger, and Senegal are given 
as examples of Oligarchs and Clans (Johnston 2014, 34). 
44 China, Kenya, Indonesia, Algeria, Chad, Haiti, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Rwanda, Syria, and Uganda are given as 
examples of Official Moguls (Johnston 2014, 34). 
45 For more critique of the macro corruption indices, see for instance Galtung (2006). 
28 
 
distorted picture of corruption as a global phenomenon. As argued by Staffan 
Andersson (2017, 70), if corruption measures ignore other forms of corruption “[t]his 
can lead to misinterpretation of the prevalence and nature of corruption in the given 
setting, and to a focus on corruption types/problems that are not the most pressing”.  
 
2.1.3 A functionalistic perspective: Can corruption “grease the wheels”? 
Huntington (1968) and several other early theorists from the so-called revisionist46 
school suggested a functionalistic view to help explain the prevalence of corruption in 
transition and developing countries. This group of scholars hypothesized that it may 
make the economies of developing nations run smoother by enabling businesses and 
individuals to escape the smothering effects of inefficient laws and government 
regulations that distort the functioning of these economies. This in turn would allow 
them to cut back on both monetary and temporal costs, enabling more innovation, 
trade, business creation and economic growth (Leff 1964; Leys 1965; Bayley 1966; 
Huntington 1968). In the corruption literature, this reasoning is often called the “grease 
the wheels”-hypothesis, while the opposite view, i.e. that corruption exacerbates poor 
economic development even further, is called the “sand the wheels”-hypothesis. 
Over the next few pages, the arguments on which the “grease the wheels”-
hypothesis is based will be examined more closely, in order to give a clearer and more 
exhaustive understanding of why corruption may be the more rational behavioral 
mode for some individuals or firms when dealing with inefficient and unreliable public 
service delivery. The study will also present a quick overview of the state-of-the-art 
concerning the empirical support for this hypothesis vis-à-vis the alternative one. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that the primary interest of this dissertation 
lies in why some individuals may believe that corruption is a justifiable or even 
preferable alternative, not in the actual, beneficial, or detrimental, consequences of 
corruption. There is also quite a high chance that the act of, for instance, paying a bribe 
really is beneficial for both the giver and the recipient, at least in the short run, but in 
the long run and on a societal level it is likely to do more harm than good when it is 
aggregated (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016, 83-91). The same goes with the act of 
cheating on taxes: The person who evades taxes may have a better idea how to use the 
money than the state, but if many people do it, it can have serious consequences for the 
state’s ability to provide quality services.      
Many corruption theorists tend to assume that the central government is constantly 
and actively pursuing economic development on a countrywide scale, and that a 
                                                 
46 The terms “revisionists” or “functionalists” where coined by their adversaries in order to differentiate them from 
the traditional “moralistic approach”, which they feared may bias the research into the economic consequences of 
corruption and result in cultural relativism concerning the western definition of graft (Méon & Weill 2010). 
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corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy hinders or limits the execution of policies aiming 
at heightened productivity and economic growth, thereby “sanding the wheels” of the 
economy. However, this may not always be the case according to some scholars. Leff 
(1964, 389) argues that corruption may be used by groups that “are more likely to 
promote growth than is the government”, which he also argues is often the case in 
developing country contexts, thereby pushing forward development in these countries 
through this “enhanced participation in policy formulation”. 47 In the words of 
Huntington (1968, 386), “[in] terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a 
society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, 
overcentralized, honest bureaucracy”. It could therefore be expected that a low 
confidence in the abilities of the public servants or the government to deliver quality 
public goods or services, or economic development in general, could result in a greater 
tendency to accept corruption as a personal security mechanism in order to cope with 
insecurity and uncertainty.  
Other theoretical arguments concerning the potential beneficial effects of corruption 
include the claims that corruption enhances bureaucratic predictability and that it 
allows poorly remunerated civil servants to supplement insufficient wages48 with bribe 
money, thereby strengthening their work ethics. Leff (1964, 395-396) asserts that 
corruption can reduce uncertainty and increase investment “[b]y enabling 
entrepreneurs to control and render predictable [the governmental] influence on their 
environment”. Individuals or firms can use bribes to escape taxation if government 
spending is inefficient, thereby freeing up resources for investments. Colin Leys (1965) 
and David Bayley (1966) further claim that informal payments under the table may act 
as incentives for attracting capable and motivated civil servants who otherwise may 
have opted for a better paid job in some other sector. The authors also argue that the 
existence of widespread corruption can provide means of accessing the state apparatus 
to minorities who otherwise would lack any means of influencing policies that affect 
themselves. They may for instance be discriminated due to personal prejudices 
amongst the bureaucrats themselves or because of formal discriminatory decisions 
made by the political elites. Bribes may potentially offer a way around these 
discriminatory practices. 
 
                                                 
47Leff (1964, 389) describes corruption as “an extralegal institution used by individuals or groups to gain influence 
over the actions of the bureaucracy”. 
48 Government employees were paid very little, if anything, in early- and premodern societies, especially on the local 
(village) level, and were often allowed to pay themselves whatever the felt that they deserved out of the taxes that 
they collected (Smith 1971, 427). In tsarist Russia, for instance, there was for a long time a system in place called 
kormlenie (feeding), where the subjects were supposed to “feed” the representatives of the ruler (i.e. the officials) 
with both edibles and material supplies (Suhara 2003, 389). This praxis partially continued in many colonies where 
the colonial masters turned a blind eye on the corrupt behavior of tax collectors, in order to save on wage costs. 
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2.1.4 The raccomandazione thesis: Amoral familism and the historical 
origins of civic virtue 
 While the “rotting fish” thesis (which is elaborated upon in section 2.3.3 of this chapter) 
argues that corruption trickles down from the top from selfish, myopic, and 
unaccountable leaders to the broader bases of society, the raccomandazione thesis in turn 
emphasizes that corruption is an integral part of a larger culture with long historical 
roots (Uslaner 2004, 79). The term raccomandazione refers more specifically to the Italian 
practice of seeking personal favors from influential people in high places.   
The proponents of the the raccomandazione thesis often refer to the concept of amoral 
familism49, a term coined by Edward C. Banfield in his renowned study from 1958 of a 
“backward” village in the southern parts of Italy.50 This term refers to “the inability [of 
a community] to act together for their common good or, indeed, for any end 
transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear family”51 (Banfield 1958, 
10). In order words, loyalty to the in-group is prioritized at the cost of the wider 
community when the interests of these two groups do not meet or if they clash with 
one another. This in turn hinders cooperation and results in an absence of organized 
action for the solving of local problems such as shortcomings in educational 
opportunity, flawed infrastructure, or the lack of a stable and effective party 
organization (Banfield 1958, 30-31). Additionally, it gives rise to nepotism and 
patronage due to the strong feelings of moral duty and social pressure to act in ways 
that favor those closest to you.  
Building on Banfield’s pioneering study, Robert Putnam set out to elaborate further 
on the roots of civic-mindedness and the consequences of amoral familism in his 
seminal work “Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy” (1993). 
This highly influential study, which aimed to explain differences in the performance of 
political institutions in twenty Italian regions, came to the conclusion that differences 
in civic engagement, which could be traced far back in time52, are the main explaining 
factors of why the institutions of the northern regions have performed so much better 
than their counterparts in the south.53 Putnam argues that this long history of civic 
engagement has generated communities rich with social capital and citizens with a 
                                                 
49 Alternatively, amoral individualism, in case if an individual lacks close kin. Banfield also notes that the term is 
somewhat misguiding: The individual does not lack a moral, it is simply restricted to only include one’s family. 
Other counterparts to Banfield’s family-specific concept include amoral clanism, amoral groupism, and amoral 
classism (Huntington 1965, 411). 
50 Banfield (1958) used the fictitious name “Montegrano” to protect the original name of the town. 
51 The author claims that a combination of three factors produces this phenomenon: [1] High mortality rates, [2] 
certain land tenure conditions, and [3] a lack of the extended family-institution (Banfield 1958, 10). 
52 Putnam (1993, 162) traced the regional differences back even as far as to the 11th century. 
53 Putnam tells a little story about a meeting with a reform-minded Italian politician from the south to whom he told 
about his findings. After hearing about the findings, the politician complained: "What you seem to be telling me is 
that nothing I can do will improve my region. Our fate was sealed hundreds of years ago." (Putnam 1993, 188).   
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greater interest in the common good and cooperation, who possess higher levels of 
generalized trust, social tolerance and political interest, are more active politically, and 
are generally endowed with norms of citizenship (Zmerli 2010, 665). In other words, 
resources that the people of Banfield’s “backward” village generally lacked. 
One way to understand this cultural, “alternative” explanation of differences in 
attitudes toward corruption is by relating it to the earlier discussion regarding the 
relationship or conflict between what was called “tribal ethics” on one hand and 
“modern ethics” on the other. Tribal ethics dominate over modern ethics in these 
“backward” societies, but the real question is why. Why have modern ethics failed to 
become the dominant system of ethics in some societies where the interests of the 
family, tribe or clan prevail over the interests of the larger society? Why is there a 
greater lack of solidarity between different social groups, which creates incentives for 
corruption, in some societies compared to others? 
One plausible answer to these questions, which was already briefly mentioned in 
previous sections, has to do with the strength of the state or what in the development 
community often is called “state capacity”. State capacity, which can be defined as a 
state’s “ability to implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential 
opposition of powerful social groups” (Skocpol 1985, 9), can be estimated in several 
different ways. One way is to measure it indirectly, by examining subjective 
evaluations of the level of trust in public institutions. In the next section, the study 
discusses how bureaucratic distrust or a lack of confidence in the impartial 
implementing institutions could be related to corruption tolerance, which is part of the 
aforementioned “rotting fish” thesis. Later, it will also discuss other alternative 
indicators of state capacity and institutional quality. 
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2.2 Bureaucratic (dis)trust and corruption tolerance 
2.2.1 What is institutional trust? 
The level of trust in governmental organizations and agents has received a great 
amount of both academic and non-academic attention during the last few decades, 
largely as a result of the so-called “crisis of confidence” observed by some scholars in 
contemporary democracies (Marien 2011; Catterberg & Moreno 2006). Numerous 
studies have investigated both the causes and consequences of trust or confidence54 in 
various governmental institutions, in addition to the many contributions to the 
theoretical debates regarding how to conceptualize and measure this highly debated 
and complex phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, what exactly does trust in public authorities entail and in what ways 
does it differ from other types of trust? In order to be able to answer these questions 
we first need to briefly elaborate on the more general concept of trust and its different 
varieties. 
Trust is arguably the most valuable resource available to free market-based 
economies and a vital ingredient for well-functioning societies and institutions. It 
enables cooperation between trustor and trustee even though there remains 
uncertainty and risk regarding the future behavior of the different actors involved and 
the consequences of their actions (or inactions!). It enables us, for instance, to board a 
passenger plane and put or lives in the hands of the pilot and the rest of the crew, to 
trust the storage of our money to banks rather than in our mattresses, to lend our 
possessions to friends or neighbors, or to try out new and innovative solutions to our 
problems (Offe 1999). In short, “[t]rust helps us solve collective action problems by 
reducing transaction costs” (Uslaner 2005, 4). 
Early research in human psychology concluded that there are two dimensions to 
trust: Competence and care (or trustworthiness) (Hovland et al. 1953). Trust in the 
competence of a trustee refers to beliefs or judgements regarding the ability of the 
trusted individual or organization to reach stated goals or act in a consistent manner 
(Houston & Harding 2013, 55). Proof of competence, in the form of information on 
previous performances and evaluations of the quality of the provided services, is 
thereby usually required by the trustor. Care or trustworthiness, in contrast, refers to 
                                                 
54 Some authors use the words trust and confidence interchangeably, while others argue that they are separate 
constructs. Sonja Zmerli, Ken Newton, and José R. Montero (2007), for instance, argue that “trust” should be used 
exclusively in interpersonal situations, while “confidence” is appropriate when examining attitudes towards 
institutions. Claus Offe (1999, 44) similarly argues that trust can in some ways be seen as the “opposite” of 
confidence. Misplaced trust is always perceived as the trustor’s own fault, while misplaced confidence is attributed 
to other, exterior factors, such as bad luck, chance, or Providence. The situation is furthermore aggravated by the 
fact that some languages only have a single word that covers both concepts. For an excellent discussion on the 
matter, see Cole and Cohn (2016).  
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beliefs about the manner in how the trustee would consciously manage the given trust. 
Would the trustee take the interests of the trustor into account or is he or she purely 
driven by raw self-interest? In other words, does the trustee have the trustor’s interests 
at heart?   
Scholars commonly call trust in public authorities or abstract systems institutional 
trust in order to conceptually distinguish it from the two other often-discussed varieties 
of trust, interpersonal/particularized trust and generalized trust (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 
2016, 248-249). The concept of institutional trust builds on the notion that citizens 
expect public organizations and government representatives to behave in a neutral, 
competent, and impartial manner while implementing public policies (Rose-Ackerman 
& Palifka 2016, 253). There should be no suspicions whatsoever that personal affections 
or considerations influence the decision making or actions of a public-sector official. 
All business with public administrations should be based on clear, public rules, and 
not on personal feelings or calculations of profit maximization. 
Many authors use the umbrella term “political trust” in their studies, and while there 
is quite a strong consensus about the importance of this concept, considerable amounts 
of disagreement exist concerning the “true” meaning of this concept and its causes and 
consequences (Zmerli & Hooghe 2011, 2-3). Consequently, the theoretical status of this 
concept remains according to Sonja Zmerli and Marc Hooghe “highly dubious”.  
Russell Hardin (1999) argues that the words “trust” and “I trust you” in their 
ordinary meaning implies that a person possesses relevant, specific and sufficient 
knowledge regarding the motivations, actual behavior, and other important factors of 
the individual, group or organization whose trustworthiness is under evaluation. This 
is what we base our trust in our neighbors and colleagues on. We can form personal, 
dyadic, reciprocal, and iterative relations with other people, which are likely to 
produce a relatively clear picture of their competence and trustworthiness. However, 
most or at the very least many citizens lack firsthand experience when it comes to the 
government or public officials in general, and cannot therefore sincerely claim to be in 
possession of knowledge of the kind that is required for trust formation in the 
traditional sense of the word. Scale issues alone make it virtually impossible to learn to 
trust a sufficient number of individuals within an organization. It is therefore illogical 
for citizens to trust institutions, and political trust thereby becomes meaningless, 
following this line of logic (Hardin 1999, 23-24; Zmerli & Hooghe 2011, 3). Hence, there 
is a wide scholarly agreement on a rather clear conceptual difference between trust in 
individuals on one hand and trust in institutions or organizations (abstract systems) on 
the other. 
What do scholars then usually mean when they talk about trust in institutions or 
political trust? Hardin’s (1999, 38-39) answer to the question “what is trust in 
government?” is that it is not realistically possible or even rational to have trust in 
public organizations, but what we can have are strong expectations based on the 
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perceived predictability of the organization and its reputation. A person can have a 
certain degree of confidence, based on general knowledge about the history of the 
organization, in the abilities of the organization or the civil servant to function in an 
expected way. As argued by Hardin (1999, 39), “[i]t is not a relationship of trust or 
distrust […,a]t best, much of the time it is a relationship of inductive expectations”. In 
other words, the basis of institutional trust can be said to lie in normative expectations of 
how a public actor ought to behave. This notion of institutional trust can be traced back to 
the 1960s and David Easton (1965), who argues that citizen attitudes toward the 
political system generate what he calls diffuse support, which can be contrasted against 
specific support, i.e. support for a certain regime or a political decision. Diffuse support 
implies that a citizen sees a certain institution and/or its decisions as legitimate and is 
ready to comply with them even though he himself may not agree with them. 
What becomes clear from this discussion is that political trust is seen by scholars as 
a completely different beast altogether in comparison to interpersonal trust. At best it 
is considered to be very thin and mostly resembles “a general recognition of authority 
and a benign attitude towards political institutions” (Zmerli & Hooghe 2011, 3).  
Finally, it must be emphasized that, ultimately, this study examines two dimensions 
of institutional quality: one subjective (institutional trust), and one more objective. 
Letki (2006, 309) argues that the accuracy of the subjective assessments of institutional 
trustworthiness is “irrelevant”, because what really matters is whether citizens believe 
that they can afford to trust the institutions as “a reflection of institutional legitimacy”. 
This dimension will therefore be complemented and contrasted with indicators of the 
more “objective” dimension, which are discussed later. How well do individual 
perceptions of institutional quality mirror more objective indicators and do they all 
impact civic morality in the same way in different contexts? In the next section, 
however, the study discusses the reasoning behind why it has taken the route of 
focusing specifically on one specific part of the public sector, namely the public 
administration. 
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2.2.2 Why focus on (lack of) trust in the public administration? 
 Many of the previous investigations into the causes and consequences of institutional 
trust have either bundled together both trust in political or representational institutions 
(political parties, the Government, the Parliament) and trust in “non-political” or 
bureaucratic institutions (the civil service, the police, the courts) charged with the 
implementation of public policy, or have solely focused on the former kind of trust (e.g. 
Marien & Hooghe 2011; Sööt & Rootalu 2012; Tavits 2010). However, as this study will 
demonstrate over the following pages there are several strong theoretical and empirical 
reasons to believe that this is not an adequate strategy for the purposes of this particular 
study. This study delimits its institutional trust variable to the implementing or 
bureaucratic institutions due to the following reasons. 
Firstly, this study aims to include as many different countries and political systems 
as possible in the empirical analyses, including both (more or less) democratic and non-
democratic systems. Consequently then, not all countries have an identical set of basic 
political institutions. Some institutions may be entirely absent in certain countries such 
as China, which lacks a de facto multi-party system, while in other countries they may 
be severely restricted or deeply flawed when it comes to fulfilling the purposes for 
which they are intended in representative democracies. Some political institutions such 
as parliaments are only elaborate set pieces or smoke screens designed to give an air of 
democratic legitimacy to extremely centralized authoritarian regimes. In these non-
democratic countries, it would be only natural for the citizens to distrust the existing 
political institutions that mainly represent the interests of the ruling elite(s). Examining 
the relationship between confidence in political institutions and corruption tolerance 
in these particular countries where the political institutions are by definition corrupt and 
lack democratic accountability would thereby be a meaningless exercise.  
While political institutions may radically differ in both structure and function 
between different states, implementing institutions on the other hand resemble out of 
practical necessity their counterparts in other countries to a significantly higher degree. 
No sovereign contemporary state in existence is entirely without a police force, court 
system or civil service of some kind. All states, whether democratic, semi-democratic 
or non-democratic, benevolent or repressive, rich or poor, are in need of civil servants 
with discretionary powers who distribute valuable goods and services or impose 
onerous costs (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016, 51). Inefficient and corrupt 
implementers of public policy contribute to economic stagnation and undermine the 
legitimacy of both democratically chosen and autocratic regimes, potentially resulting 
in civil uprisings55 or military coup d'états. It therefore lies in the best interest of all 
                                                 
55 The Arab Spring, for instance, which began in Tunisia is claimed to have started from the demonstrations that 
followed after the police confiscated a local fruit vendor’s cart, and demanded a bribe in return for the cart, which 
the fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, refused to pay and instead set himself on fire and later died (CNN 2016). 
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regime types to be able to effectively limit bureaucratic corruption in their respective 
countries. 
Some studies have even demonstrated that authoritarian regimes are sometimes 
perceived as better capable of controlling corruption than their more democratic 
counterparts in other countries. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1993), for instance, 
argue that extremely centralized authoritarian governments such as the Philippines 
under Ferdinand Marcos, the Soviet regime or Indonesia under Suharto, were able to 
centralize and monopolize corruption itself, thereby creating predictability and 
certainty (concerning, for instance, the size and frequency of bribes), hence avoiding 
repetitive and competitive bribery that scares away potential investors, financial 
institutions, and other economic actors. Only a limited number of handpicked (loyal) 
officials were given the “privilege” to accept bribes, either directly or through 
intermediaries, and a large share of these bribes went directly to the bank accounts of 
the power holders who in return turned a blind eye on this praxis. This way the rulers 
were able to secure the loyalty of important elites without sacrificing economic growth 
and drowning the country in a free-for-all rent seeking. 
Secondly, Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle (2002, 10), in their study of institutional 
trust as a determinant of generalized trust, argue that there are three main reasons why 
it is essential to distinguish the representational side from the implementation side of the 
political system in these types of studies. The first reason is that institutions dominated 
by politicians have as their basis of trust (or distrust) partisanship, while institutions 
dominated by civil servants in turn build their trust on their own reputation of being 
impartial (Rothstein & Stolle 2002, 10; Rothstein & Teorell 2008; see later discussion on 
impartiality and corruption). A Government consisting of one or a few political parties, 
or a Parliament where the ruling party or parties hold a majority, is expected to pursue 
ideological goals in a partisan way. People with similar ideological leanings as the 
ruling parties are therefore expected to possess a higher confidence in the Government 
or the Parliament, compared to those who support the opposition or otherwise have 
differing ideologies. Political trust influenced by ideological leanings (specific support) 
is thereby less likely to be correlated with attitudes toward the state as an institution 
(diffuse support) and norms of civic behavior (Rothstein & Stolle 2008).  
Rothstein and Stolle’s second reason is that unlike the representational institutions, 
the so-called order institutions (the courts, the police, and other legal institutions) have 
a special task of detecting and punishing those who use opportunistic (or, using the 
authors’ own preferred word, treacherous) strategies, i.e. those who should not be 
trusted due to their tendency to break this trust. The last and third reason is, according 
to Rothstein and Stolle 2002, 10-11), “that the impartiality, efficicency [sic] and fairness 
of street-level political institutions are important dimensions of institutional trust and 
confidence that can be conceptually separated from conventional trust in politicians, 
parties, and “the government””. 
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Thirdly, it should yet be emphasized that the stated focus on confidence in the 
implementing institutions is not due to a wish to deny or downplay the important role 
played by the political institutions, such as the Parliament, in explaining variations in 
corruption tolerance. On the contrary. The representative institutions constitute a 
significant part of the proverbial fish head referenced to in the beginning of this 
dissertation due to their part in both the propagation of and opposition to grand 
corruption, which in turn tends to either feed or constrain corruption on the lower 
levels of government as a sort of institutional spillover effect (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 
2016, 185-186). Kimmo Grönlund and Maija Setälä (2012, 5-6) for instance note that the 
normative expectations towards them are at least partly similar as towards the 
judiciary and the police in a democratic context. Dishonesty and corruption also have 
a tendency to negatively affect people’s trust in the representative institutions, but the 
issue of expected impartiality is arguably considerably more complex in their case.  
Democratically elected representatives are expected to define the public interest by 
responding to political pressures, which means that being partial in favor of their 
constituents and supporters is arguably part of their job description (Warren 2006, 803-
804). Consequently, this makes it harder to justify the application of the traditional 
office-based conception of public corruption, which Warren accuses of not being 
political enough, on the behavior of elected politicians. Warren (2006) has therefore 
suggested an alternative definition of political corruption in representative 
democracies, namely as duplicitous exclusion of those who have a rightful claim of being 
included in a decision.  
Several scholars have even claimed that a distrusting attitude towards the 
representative institutions and the political process could be beneficial in some cases 
and a sign of a healthy democratic society (for a summary of the arguments concerning 
“the critical citizen”, see e.g. Marien & Hooghe 2010; Geissel 2008). A less “gullible” 
citizenry that is discontent with how democracy works is argued to be better equipped 
to critically examine government policies and governance, thereby putting pressure on 
officials and holding them accountable on a constant basis. Benjamin Barber, for 
instance, has maintained that “a certain amount of rational distrust is necessary for 
political accountability in a participatory democracy” (Barber 1983, in Aitalieva 2017, 
5). Some scholars have even suggested a public choice view of government as a 
Leviathan that deserves to be mistrusted by citizens as a kind of self-preservation 
mechanism against the predatory behavior of the state (Aitalieva 2017, 5). 
Fourth and finally, social surveys and empirical studies confirm that people in 
general tend to be less trusting of representative institutions and elected officials 
(politicians), in comparison to the public administration and nonelected officials 
(Grönlund & Setälä 2012; Houston & Harding 2013). This observation seems to confirm 
the notion that a certain level of distrust is perfectly normal in representative 
democracies and that the normative expectations toward the representative 
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institutions are more ambiguous and “political”. Additionally, Grönlund and Setälä 
(2012, 17) conclude “that the expectation of incorruptibility of officials is held (almost) 
universally […; r]egardless the level of corruption in their country, people value the 
honesty and impartiality of public officials”. 
The main reason for choosing to focus on the implementing institutions is simply an 
attempt to distill “unhealthy” distrust in the government institutions as a whole from 
a more “healthy” distrust and skepticism that may have its roots in democratic 
discontent, partisanship or personal feelings toward individual politicians or parties. 
Based on the previously discussed (theoretical) necessity to disentangle the “twin 
concepts” of political trust and bureaucratic trust from each other, the following 
definition of “bureaucratic distrust”, the key individual-level independent variable of 
this study, is hereby adopted: 
Bureaucratic distrust refers to a general expectation that the public administration will not 
perform its duties in an impartial and/or efficient manner.                
 
2.2.3 Institutional trust and corruption 
Corruption research has identified institutional distrust as both a cause and a 
consequence of various kinds of corrupt behavior. One often cited study that provides 
empirical evidence of the latter causal relationship was carried out by Christopher 
Anderson and Yulya Tverdova (2003). Their analysis of surveys conducted in sixteen 
mature and newly established democracies around the globe shows that citizens in 
countries perceived to have higher levels of public corruption also display more critical 
evaluations of the performance of the political system and a greater distrust of civil 
servants. These results are supported by Grönlund and Setälä (2012, 18), among others, 
who demonstrate that “people’s perception of the honesty of officials is positively 
associated with both trust in parliament and trust in the legal system”. 
Many of the cross-country studies that have found a relationship between 
corruption and institutional trust have not measured the level of corruption per se, but 
rather perceptions of corruption. This, however, can be highly problematic due to 
similarities in operationalization between these two concepts. Political or institutional 
trust is often measured using questions such as “How often can you trust the 
government to do what is right?” or “Is Government run by a few people looking out 
for their own interests or run for the benefit of all?” (Morris & Klesner 2010, 1265). These 
questions could almost directly be substituted with the question “Do you think the 
government is corrupt?” i.e. “do you perceive that public officials abuse their power 
for private gain?”. It is therefore important to take into consideration if these questions 
de facto measure at least in part the same underlying phenomenon: the level of distrust 
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toward public officials and institutions. This could mean that a low institutional trust 
also implies perceptions of widespread corruption, which in turn, in the words of 
Stephen Morris and Joseph Klesner (2010, 1266), could “create the expectation of 
corruption and inductively feed corrupt behavior, whereas corruption itself 
deductively confirms and reinforces people’s expectations of others”.  
Other studies confirm the existence of a discrepancy between actual corruption and 
perceived corruption. Morris (2008), for instance, claims that they are mildly related and 
have different causes and consequences, while Mitchell Seligson (2002) notes that 
perceptions are considerably more pronounced and widespread than the actual 
victimization of corruption. The corruption literature is quite clear on the point that 
perceptions of corruption are something “more than” corruption itself. The question 
thus remains how institutional trust or distrust is linked to actual corrupt behavior, 
intent or even attitudes. 
 
2.2.4 Institutional trust, social capital, and uncivic behavior 
While quite a large body of empirical studies has examined the determinants of 
institutional trust, relatively fewer have taken a closer look at the potential consequences 
of varying levels of confidence or trust in public authorities. 
Rothstein and Stolle’s (2002) analysis of survey data from Sweden and the World 
Value Study found that generalized interpersonal trust, which they consider to be the 
most important part of Putnam’s (1993) concept of social capital, could be explained by 
an individual’s institutional trust (particularly trust in the order or implementing 
institutions) and their perceptions of fairness and impartiality. Christian Bjørnskov 
(2004) in turn demonstrates in a survey-based study of 29 European countries a strong 
negative correlation between generalized trust and corruption. Social capital is argued 
to be vital in overcoming so-called social dilemmas56 or collective action problems such 
as endemic corruption, where cooperation would benefit all but is only possible if 
agents trust that (almost all) other agents will cooperate, i.e. it is conditional on the 
expected behavior of others (Rothstein & Eek 2009; Ostrom 1998). For instance, it would 
not make sense to be the only parent or one of few parents who abstain from paying a 
bribe to a teacher in order for one’s child to pass an exam or get a certain grade. 
Cooperation tends to be costly in both time and money and therefore requires strong 
incentives that can be viewed as a kind of “cooperation insurance”.  
Trusting “most people” blindly without this insurance of cooperation would be pure 
and dangerous gullibility in societies that do not consist purely of saints. People do not 
believe that “people in general” will refrain from behaving opportunistically or 
                                                 
56 Also known as social traps (Rothstein 2003). 
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illegally because they have some kind of intimate knowledge concerning their morality 
or behavioral history, but because they have confidence in that the same rules apply to 
them all and that the game is not rigged. However, it is not enough that the rules 
formally apply to all: they must also be convincingly enforced by well-resourced and 
able institutions. If these two conditions are perceived to be met, people are more likely 
to make the inference that it is safe to trust others and play by the rules, while the 
opposite may be true otherwise (Rothstein & Eek 2009, 89). In other words, citizens 
may be more averse to taking the risk of trusting strangers who might cheat them in 
societies where these conditions are not perceived to be (fully) met (Bigoni et al 2015, 
1339). It can therefore be argued that strong formal institutions can play this same role 
in regard to substituting or combatting both corruption, which can be seen as a sort of 
informal institution, and corruption tolerance, a sort of “anti-social” capital.  
The causation argued by Rothstein and Stolle (2002) receives support in an 
experiment-based study involving two student groups in Sweden, a high trust/low 
corruption country, and Romania, a low trust/high corruption country (Rothstein & 
Eek 2009). The authors of this study find “that corrupt behavior by public authorities 
clearly influences people’s trust in them, in both the Romanian and Swedish samples” 
and that people lose their trust in the general population if they encounter deceitful 
behavior by public authorities (Rothstein & Eek 2009, 106-107). The conclusion that the 
causal pathway mainly goes from institutional trust to social trust is further 
substantiated by recent empirical evidence from, among others, Kim Sønderskov and 
Peter Dinesen (2016) and Ran Tao, Dali Yang, Ming Li and Xi Lu (2013). The former, 
who utilize a cross-lagged panel model, find that institutional trust is the most 
important predictor of generalized trust, even if the authors cannot rule out a (limited) 
feedback effect from the latter type of trust (Sønderskov & Dinesen 2016, 20). 
However, while several empirical studies present evidence of that a lack of 
confidence in the fairness, impartiality and competence of public bureaucrats erodes 
social trust, it is at the same time argued to increase the expected utility of a third type 
of trust, namely interpersonal or particularized trust (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016, 250-
252). The basis of this trust is not self-interest and commonly agreed upon rules of 
conduct, but family, clan, love or friendship, i.e. close personal relationships containing 
strong mutual obligations to other members of the same in-group. In societies where 
citizens generally do not expect to receive impartial treatment by government 
representatives, and where generalized trust is consequentially quite low, people are 
more likely to believe that they require personal ties either to the public officials 
themselves or to powerful private patrons with the kind of connections that can help 
to facilitate the matter in question. In other words, when formal institutions are 
perceived as ineffective, people instead turn to personal connections and informal 
institutions such as nepotism and other forms of corruption.        
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Several studies have examined the relationship between institutional trust and the 
propensity to behave in an ethical way. One such study by Sofie Marien and Marc 
Hooghe (2011) finds that lower levels of political trust57 is related to a more condoning 
attitude toward illegal behavior58 in 33 European countries. Their assumption was that 
a low trust in public authorities causes a more widespread questioning of the 
legitimacy of these institutions and a lesser willingness to comply with their decisions, 
i.e. the laws and regulations of society which are considered to be mere recommendations 
rather than obligations (Marien & Hooghe 2011, 282). This in turn may result in a higher 
frequency of law-breaking behavior among the populous where vice may almost 
become a virtue and the dishonest, who are able to “cheat the system” by quicker and 
cheaper means, are seen as cunning and resourceful (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016, 
259-260). Other studies have come to similar conclusions when it comes to other kinds 
of illegal or risk-taking behaviors. Martin Lindström (2008a; 2008b), for instance, finds 
low levels of political trust (in the Swedish national parliament) to be associated with 
the illegal use of drugs and the purchase of illegal liquor in Sweden. Consequently, one 
could also infer that some individuals would be more willing to try to influence the 
implementation of policies and decisions that they find illegitimate using corrupt 
exchanges. 
One of the relatively few empirical micro-level studies to have systematically 
examined if distrust in political institutions produces actual corrupt behavior among 
ordinary citizens and vice versa focused on 17 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cho & 
Kirwin 2007). The findings in this paper indicate a circular relationship between 
corruption and distrust, where citizens’ experience with corruption leads to distrust, 
which in turn tends to increase experiences of corruption. Both distrust in institutions 
generally and dissatisfaction with government services (health care and education) 
specifically are found to be both a cause and a consequence of direct encounters with 
corruption. This leads the authors to conclude that “the experience of corruption 
decreases popular satisfaction with government service delivery in basic health care 
and education sectors and perceptions of an unjust government service delivered by 
corrupt public officials motivates citizens to pay a bribe or give a gift to obtain public 
services” (Cho & Kirwin 2007, 16).    
Another study by Mari-Liis Sööt and Kadri Rootalu (2012) analyzed data from an 
original survey conducted among Estonian public-sector employees and found that 
trust in institutions59, age and nationality are the most influential factors when it comes 
                                                 
57 “Political trust” is in this case measured using an index constructed out of four items from the European Values 
Survey (EVS): trust in parliament, the justice system, the armed forces and the police (Marien & Hooghe 2011, 275). 
58 “Legal permissiveness” is assessed using three questions from the EVS regarding the justifiability of a certain 
action: Cheating on taxes if you have a chance, claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled, and 
paying cash in order to avoid paying sales tax (Marien & Hooghe 2011, 274). 
59 Sööt and Rootalu’s (2012, 87) trust index contained questions regarding three political institutions: The judiciary, 
the police, and politicians. 
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to the opinions of public officials regarding corrupt and unethical behavior. 
Respondents that had a higher level of trust tended to have both a higher awareness of 
corruption60 and a lower tolerance of it. Charles H. Blake (2009) comes to similar 
conclusions with regard to ordinary citizens in his analysis of data from the fourth 
wave of the World Values Survey (1999 – 2004). The results of his logistic regression of 
64 countries61 reveal that those who expressed confidence in the police were 16 percent 
less likely to express acceptance of corruption. However, the statistical significance of 
this relationship disappeared when he restricted his analysis to include only the Latin 
American countries62, a geographical region singled out by scholars as especially 
tolerant of corrupt behavior (Blake 2009, 102-104; Lavena 2013; Moreno 2002). Blake’s 
latter findings are contradicted in another similar study, which includes six Latin 
American countries63 in OLS multiple regression models that contain data from WVS 
2005 – 2007 (Lavena 2013). Individuals with a high confidence in public institutions64 
tended to be less permissive of corruption.65 
One empirical survey-based study that challenges the commonly held assumption 
of a negative relationship between trust and corruption focuses separately on both 
public official and citizen attitudes in Estonia, a young post-communist democracy 
(Tavits 2010). This study finds no evidence in either case that supports the theory that 
generalized trust or institutional trust66 significantly affects a person’s “corruptibility”, 
i.e. willingness to engage in corruption. However, it must be noted that in the case of 
the citizens, Margit Tavits’ (2010, 1262-1263) “corruptibility” measure relies on a direct 
question regarding their involvement in corruption (“Have you ever paid a bribe or 
offered a gift to a public official in order to influence the provision of a public 
service?”). The officials are meanwhile confronted with hypothetical scenarios where 
they have to choose between participating in the corrupt exchange or not. These 
measurements are therefore distinctly different from the “bribe justification” 
measurements of other studies, which could explain the insignificance of the trust 
variables. 
                                                 
60 Sööt and Rootalu’s (2012, 88) corruption awareness index contained four questions regarding hypothetical 
situations involving different forms of corruption. Higher values reflected that the respondent held a narrow 
definition of corruption. 
61 Blake (2009, 102) excludes five countries classified as not free by Freedom House due to concerns about the 
reliability of survey responses: Belarus, China, Egypt, Iran, and Vietnam. 
62 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
63 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and Guatemala. 
64 Government, civil service, police, and political parties. 
65 Measured using Moreno’s (2002) index of corruption permissiveness. 
66 Tavits’ (2010) trust in government variable was measured taking an average of the responses to questions 
concerning the courts, the police, and the politicians. 
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Interestingly, Tavits’ (2010, 1263) study also included an independent variable 
labeled as “Perceived acceptability of corruption”67, intended to increase reliability by 
measuring the concept of “definitions”, as part of the “social learning” effects (see 
discussion on social learning theory [SLT] in section 2.3.3 of this chapter). 
Consequently, the results for both public officials and private citizens show a 
significant and strong impact on the likelihood of engaging in corruption even when 
controlling for wages (public officials) or extortion68 (general public), which was 
unsurprisingly observed as being the by far strongest predictor of bribe paying. Tavits 
(2010, 1275) therefore concludes “that willingness to engage in corrupt behavior is 
more likely when one does not define corruption as morally or situationally wrong”. 
While those who are less confident in public authorities are generally expected to be 
more tolerant of corruption, those who are more confident are meanwhile expected to 
be significantly less tolerant due to the following reasons. People with a high 
confidence in the implementing institutions are expected to be more sensitive or 
“allergic” to those occurrences that can defile or stain the image of the public 
institutions and go against their normative values, thereby resulting in a loss of 
confidence. Additionally, they are argued to be more likely to believe that the chances 
of escaping justice are slim, and that all members of society have the same chances and 
opportunities (Pop 2012, 30). Earlier studies have also empirically demonstrated that 
trusting citizens have a higher willingness to support policy goals and allocate 
resources to them, in addition to being significantly more willing to both accept and 
follow the decisions of authorities they consider trustworthy and legitimate (Chanley 
et al. 2000; Tyler 2006; Tyler & Huo 2002; Levi & Stoker 2000; Grimes 2008). 
The theoretical arguments and empirical evidence discussed above give quite a clear 
indication of how the relationship between confidence and corruption tolerance would 
generally tend to look like. Hence, the first hypothesis in this study is formulated as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who are more distrusting of the implementing institutions 
(the police, the courts, and the civil service) tend to be more tolerant of corrupt 
behavior. 
In addition to examining the link between bureaucratic distrust and corruption 
tolerance, this study also intends to take a closer look at another key factor on the 
individual level, namely self-reported levels of perceived public corruption. The aim is to 
examine both the direct effects of self-reported levels of perceived corruption, as well 
as its interaction with bureaucratic distrust, on corruption tolerance. Here, the study 
                                                 
67 This variable included four questions concerning hypothetical third person scenarios involving different types of 
corrupt exchanges. The respondent was supposed to answer on a 4-point scale how strongly they agree that it is 
corruption (Tavits 2010, 1263).     
68 I.e. if they were asked to pay a bribe.  
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begins by presenting the hypothesis of the direct effect of perceived corruption and 
later on it will discuss potential indirect or moderating (interaction) effects of perceived 
corruption. Unfortunately, the extent of public corruption-question was only included in 
the third wave of the World Values Survey (1995 – 1999), which consequently limits 
those analyses that include this variable to this specific time period and the 56 countries 
included in this wave. The following hypothesis is formed based on the previously 
discussed arguments:  
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who perceive a greater extent of public corruption tend to 
have a higher corruption tolerance. 
 
2.3 Dysfunctional societies and corruption tolerance 
This theoretical section discusses the potential effects of different macro indicators of 
societal “dysfunctionality” on attitudes towards corrupt and uncivic behavior. Are 
citizen attitudes and values influenced or shaped by the structures of the surrounding 
societies and the quality of the public institutions, or are they simply peculiar 
characteristics of certain cultural heritages transferred from parents to children 
through processes of socialization? In other words, do dysfunctional and weak states 
produce dysfunctional citizens?  
The umbrella term “dysfunctionality”, as we saw in Chapter 1, section 1.4, refers in 
this case to the extent of poverty and economic inequality in a country, and to the 
quality of the public institutions, factors that are widely considered to have an 
impairing effect on the cohesiveness of societies and social wellbeing (e.g. Kotzian 
2014). This section begins by discussing the potential effects of the level of socio-
economic development and poverty on corruption and attitudes toward corrupt 
behavior, after which it will continue on to addressing the potential effects of economic 
inequality. Lastly, this section will conclude with a discussion concerning how 
different aspects of institutional quality may influence people’s perceptions of corrupt 
and uncivic behavior.      
 
2.3.1 Socio-economic development and corruption tolerance 
In the literature on corruption, one factor constantly resurfaces as one of the, if not the, 
strongest predictors of the extent of corruption: a countries level of socio-economic 
development, often operationalized as GDP per capita or with the Human 
Development Index (see e.g. Treisman 2000; Lambsdorff 2006). A great number of 
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empirical studies have demonstrated that public corruption tends to be perceived as 
more widespread in socio-economically less developed countries and that corrupt and 
criminal practices tend to prosper in contexts of extensive and deep poverty. However, 
do these observations also indicate that the populations of these countries possess 
values and attitudes that are more conducive to corrupt and uncivic practices?  
While it is difficult to separate the socio-economic causes from the consequences (see 
e.g. Mauro 1998), most scholars would still agree that a low level of development and 
deep-seated poverty create a fertile soil for both low- and high-level corruption. The 
issue of socio-economic development and corruption has received a lot of attention 
during the last few decades, partly due to a change in attitudes toward public 
corruption, which used to be seen mainly as a domestic problem, among development 
aid donor organizations such as the World Bank or the IMF.69 
Several attempts to explain the relationship between socio-economic development 
and corruption have been made, including various ways that it can increase public 
accountability by, for instance, giving rise to a well-educated middle class with higher 
demands on public goods and services, better paid civil servants who are less willing 
to risk their stable livelihoods for illegal gains, or more resources in general to invest 
in anti-corruption initiatives such as e-government or ethics training (e.g. Rose-
Ackerman & Palifka 2016). However, the focus of this section is not directly on elites 
or government structures, but on the grass roots, i.e. the attitudes and values of 
ordinary citizens. Does the level of development also translate into more or less tolerant 
attitudes regarding corrupt and uncivic behavior? 
As we will see, there are somewhat conflicting theoretical expectations regarding 
the exact relationship between socio-economic development and general attitudes 
toward corrupt and uncivic practices. On one hand, socio-economic development is 
argued to generate postmaterial or emancipative values, which are in turn argued to 
be conducive to liberal democracy and pro-democratic attitudes. However, on the 
other hand, emancipative values are furthermore argued to include norm and 
authority challenging attitudes and values that revolve around the needs of the 
individual rather than those of the collective. This latter dimension of value change 
may generate conditions suitable to choices where the individual prioritizes his or her 
own self-interest before the public good, while the former should strengthen attitudes 
that are hostile towards such non-democratic and uncivic practices (Welzel 2010; 
Welzel & Inglehart 2008; Kravtsova et al. 2017). 
                                                 
69 Former World Bank President, James D. Wolfensohn, “made a groundbreaking speech on the "cancer of 
corruption" to all the Bank's shareholders at the 1996 Annual Meetings, placing the issue squarely on the 
development agenda for the first time for a multilateral institution. "Let's not mince words - we need to deal with 
the cancer of corruption…," Wolfensohn said. "Let me emphasize that the Bank Group will not tolerate corruption 
in the programs that we support, and we are taking steps to ensure that our own activities continue to meet the 
highest standards of probity."” (The World Bank [1]) 
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Modernization theorists all the way from Karl Marx and Max Weber to Samuel 
Huntington and Ronald Inglehart, just to name a few, have long argued that socio-
economic development brings with it profound value change, although there has been 
a lot of disagreement and debate regarding exactly what kind of value change and if the 
direction of the value change is dependent on prevailing societal traditions. Next, this 
section will therefore examine the arguments for why a low level of socio-economic 
development could be related to a higher level of corruption tolerance in a society. 
Does poverty breed corruption tolerance? 
Some scholars argue that the extensive corruption in developing countries may be a 
syndrome of unfinished processes of modernization or a residual of traditional 
societies living on in the collective memory of citizens. Johann Graf Lambsdorff (2010, 
1), among others, has noted that “[t]here is widespread belief that “western societies” 
apply a more vigorous definition of bribery […,] and are thus superior in their moral 
standards”. Many western business companies have for instance excused their bribing 
of foreign officials in non-western countries by referring to “local customs and 
traditions” or business necessity70, which has accordingly made companies from so-
called relatively “corruption-free” wealthy countries an important source of public 
corruption, a fact often ignored by most corruption indices71 and the governments in 
these countries.  
Several renowned scholars have claimed that the “moral superiority” of western 
nations is a result of the high levels of prosperity and modernization that these 
countries have attained in comparison to the so-called developing world. According to 
Huntington (1968, 378), modernization entails a gradual change in the basic values of 
a society towards universalistic- and merit-based norms, loyalty to and identification 
with the nation-state (“the public interest”), and ideals of equal rights and obligations 
in relation to the state. Corruption is therefore argued to be a natural consequence of 
the modernization process where traditional values and norms collide with modern 
ones, resulting in “opportunities for individuals to act in ways justified by neither” 
(Huntington 1968, 378). Customs that previously were sanctioned or even advocated, 
such as using your official position to aid your kin or seeking out political patrons for 
assistance in strictly private matters, could suddenly become illegal and officially 
unacceptable.  
                                                 
70 Lambsdorff (2010, 3) provides an example of this with observations from panel discussions where such a position 
was stated by representatives from the Federation of German Industry, and a citation from Lord Young, former 
head of Cable and Wireless and Secretary of State for Trade and Industry for the United Kingdom, who said in a 
BBC interview that “Now  when  you’re  talking  about  kickbacks, you’re  talking  about something that’s illegal in 
this country, and that of course you wouldn’t dream of doing ... but there are parts of the world I’ve been to where 
we all know it happens, and if you want to be in business, you have to do.”   
71 Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index (BPI) is an exception that ranks countries based on perceptions 
regarding the supply side of corruption (Bribe Payers Index 2017).  
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Traditional societies are claimed to lack a clear-cut distinction between the private 
and the public spheres, and between traditional “tribute giving” and outright bribery 
on one hand, and the “special obligations” linked to any favor on all societal levels on 
the other hand (Myrdal 1968, 413-414; see also Treisman 2000, 404). This blurriness of 
the boundaries between public and private roles is thereby argued to lower the social 
stigma of both the exploitation of public positions for private gain and the giving of 
“gifts” in return for specific favors. 
There are some well-founded reasons to believe that widespread poverty may be 
related to attitudes that are more accepting of corrupt practices. Abraham Maslow’s 
(1970) renowned motivational theory, the hierarchy of needs, argues that basic 
physiological and psychological needs have to be fulfilled prior to being motivated by 
higher needs related to esteem and self-actualization. According to Maslow, the lower 
levels of this hierarchy include needs related to survival, such as food, water, rest, 
security, safety, belongingness, and love, while the higher levels contain such needs as 
the need for independence, status, prestige, personal growth, and, most pertinently, 
the need for moral standards and ethics. For instance, if people are hungry and lack the 
resources needed to buy food for their family, they are consequently more likely to 
steal some bread, even though theft is both morally and legally condemned and 
sanctioned by society and religion. 
 Similarly, a person who lives in great insecurity and the threat of violence is more 
likely to resort to bribe giving, clientelism72, or other illicit practices in order to fulfill the 
need for personal security. Scholars largely agree that the phenomenon of clientelism, 
which is closely related to corruption, thrives in poor democracies with weak 
institutions unable or unwilling to deliver programmatic public goods that target 
broader layers of the population, including even those who have not sworn their vote 
or loyalty to a specific politician or party beforehand (Manzetti & Wilson 2009, 81-83). 
Poverty is said to make citizens more willing to support corrupt politicians73 and 
governments, or at least turn a blind eye to high-level corruption, in return for club 
goods or “bribes” such as jobs, contracts, permits or more basic goods (e.g. a Christmas 
turkey, a toaster or a pair of shoes), and is thereby argued to loosen the mores of social 
morality. A tolerance of high-level corruption could in turn translate into a tolerance 
of low-level corruption following that the patron is likely to function as a role model to 
the client due to his higher socio-economic status and perceived success in life. 
                                                 
72 There is no universally accepted definition of clientelism, but James C. Scott (1972, 92) for instance defines it as a 
relationship “in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources 
to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (the client) who, for his part, reciprocates by 
offering generous support and assistance, including personal service, to the patron”. 
73 One often cited case comes from Brazil, where the supporters of Adhemar de Barros, one of the most prominent 
Brazilian politicians from the 1930s to the 1960s, liked to exclaim “Rouba, mas faz!” (“He steals, but delivers!”) 
(Manzetti & Wilson 2009, 84).  
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Another argument as to why corruption tolerance may be negatively related to 
socio-economic development is that developed countries tend to have more highly 
educated citizenry that may be better equipped to understand the negative 
consequences of different forms of corrupt practices and act on the information, in 
addition to being more likely to identify themselves with the country as a whole rather 
than with specific in-groups (Uslaner 2002; Uslaner & Rothstein 2016). The citizens in 
these countries also tend to possess the skills needed to find gainful employment and 
live under more secure conditions, where they may feel that clientelistic networks or 
bribe-paying are unnecessary for achieving sufficient and stable living conditions for 
themselves and for their families (Uslaner & Rothstein 2016, 229). 
As was already touched upon in an earlier section of this dissertation, some scholars 
contribute the observed lack of cooperation and public-spiritedness in extremely poor 
and “backward” societies to a special kind of ethos called “amoral familism” (Banfield 
1958). The previously described existential pressures generated by unfulfilled basic 
needs feed this kind of ethos where the needs and interests of the immediate family 
come first and civic morality or the common good comes second or third.  
However, there are also some reasons to believe that the general attitudes and values 
in less developed countries might not actually differ from those in developed countries, 
and that they may even be less tolerant of corrupt practices. Next, this study will 
examine the arguments that suggest that a higher level of socio-economic development 
could engender a higher tolerance of corrupt and uncivic behavior. 
Do forces of modernization engender a greater tolerance of corrupt practices? 
The existential pressures produced by unfulfilled basic needs are argued to increase 
the utility of so called “collectivistic” or “survival” values and conformity to group 
norms, which in turn increases the demand for authoritarian institutions to enforce 
them (Welzel 2014). The pioneer of cross-cultural psychology, Harry C. Triandis (1995 
in Welzel 2014, 33), argues that “collectivism is the psychological response to existential 
hardship because hardship makes people dependent on kinship solidarity”. This 
dependency on solidarity could consequently make people less tolerant of 
disobedience and free riding behavior in general if it has the potential to hurt the 
collective in any way. Strict social norms may therefore be valued more highly in less 
developed societies due to their greater utility and potential lack of (effective) 
alternative enforcement methods (see Kotzian 2014 and section 2.3.3 in this chapter).  
Socio-economic development and processes of modernization are in turn argued to 
result in that a growing number of citizens no longer value strict obedience to 
authorities and norms of civic virtue to as high a degree as in less developed, more 
traditional societies (Zmerli 2010, 671; Kravtsova et al. 2017). The utility of survival 
values such as norm conformity decline as people possess more action resources (e.g. 
higher wages and levels of education, more spare time and better health) to spend on 
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realizing their potential, which in turn gradually increases the utility (and demand) of 
freedom to do just that. A growing share of people adopt what Christian Welzel (2014) 
calls “emancipative values”, which refers to the human development towards 
empowerment and emancipation from domination by various kinds of authority (e.g. 
religious, political, etc.). However, there is also a chance, at least in the short run, that 
social norms may become almost completely eroded as a consequence of 
modernization forces such as urbanization. Urbanization may lead to what Émile 
Durkheim (2013) calls “anomie”, i.e. feelings of norm- or rootlessness, when large 
urban centers, where people do not even know their next-door neighbors, replace tight 
rural communities, where “everybody knows everybody” and community norms are 
familiar to most if not all villagers. 
Moreover, scholars such as John Clammer (2012; see also Hao & Johnston 2007) 
claim that forces of globalization and processes of neo-liberal market-driven 
development, which have been heavily promoted by global financial institutions like 
the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank, have engendered so-called “market-cultures” 
that have fundamentally reframed various aspects of morality. It is argued that 
“capitalism transforms social relations, brings into existence new social strata, 
monetises what were formerly gift or cooperative rather than commoditised 
relationships, […and] introduces new values (including the alien idea that time is 
money)” (Clammer 2012, 121).  
Self-interest or greed becomes viewed as something resembling “good” and people 
are encouraged to get rich, which stands in stark contrast to more traditional values 
often rooted in religion espousing a rich spiritual life and altruism, rather than 
materialism and self-interest. Social solidarity thereby stands at risk of being eroded 
(or not to form at all) as all attention is turned towards individual rather than collective 
interests and gains. Furthermore, the negative moral consequences of this “reframing 
of morality” are argued to be felt the strongest in transition economies where the 
capitalist economy is still a relatively fresh experience (Clammer 2012, 128). Market-
driven driven development and globalization is further argued to intensify both 
international and domestic inequalities, which, as we will see in the next section, can 
potentially have devastating consequences for civic morality and social order in a 
society.      
Empirical research has supported the claim that individuals in more developed 
societies have a higher likelihood of placing greater emphasis on the previously 
described postmaterialist or emancipative values and/or being surrounded by people 
who express these kinds of values (Inglehart 1971; Welzel 2010). Postmaterialists are 
described as people who “do not take for granted the norms prescribed by external 
sources of authority, including the family, religion, or the state […] and decide for 
themselves which social rules and norms to follow” (Kravtsova et al. 2017, 4). Empirical 
studies have also demonstrated the existence of a link between postmaterialism and 
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individualism/autonomy, which suggests inherent distrusting and elite challenging 
views towards authorities (Welzel 2010, 2013; Dobewall & Strack 2014; Catterberg & 
Moreno 2006). Based on these observations one could expect postmaterialists to be 
more tolerant of corruption and free riding behavior, but studies have also associated 
postmaterialism with support for democracy and transparency, civic activism, 
generalized trust, and impartiality (Welzel 2010; Welzel & Inglehart 2008).  
These last observations suggest that the impact of socio-economic development is 
more complex than one might expect at first glance and that there are conflicting 
expectations regarding the diffusion of so-called postmaterialist values. Kravtsova et 
al.’s (2017) multilevel study of the link between postmaterialist values and the approval 
of bribery suggests that the individual level link is dependent on the contextual share 
of the surrounding postmaterialists. Individuals who put a greater emphasis on 
postmaterial values generally tend to be more tolerant of corruption, while the so-
called ecological effect operates in the other direction. Highly affluent countries 
possessing a larger share of postmaterialists demonstrate a significantly higher overall 
disapproval of corruption among their populations, and a negative individual-level 
relationship between postmaterial values and the acceptance of bribe taking. Kravtsova 
et al. (2017, 229) argue that the reason why the social effects of postmaterialism lead to 
a greater disapproval of corruption, instead of a greater approval, can be explained with 
the help of the evolutionary theory of morality (ETM, see Krebs 2008). In short, this theory 
argues that humans have a natural tendency to think and behave prosocially following 
an evolutionary process that has resulted in that prosocial attributes are more likely to 
spread74 and gain support in a population. 
Empirical evidence of this phenomenon is provided by Jong-Sung You and Sanjeev 
Khagram (2005), who note that individuals in high-income countries perceive less 
corruption but are more likely to justify bribe taking and cheating on taxes. Kravtsova 
et al. (2017) on the other hand found no evidence of a greater tendency to condemn 
bribery in more developed countries or any significant relationship at all with 
economic development. 
As we have seen, there are highly conflicting expectations regarding the potential 
effects of socio-economic development and forces of modernization on levels of 
corruption tolerance in various societies, and it is not entirely clear which of these 
effects dominate, if any. However, based on the earlier discussed concept of “amoral 
familism”, which is said to thrive in extremely poor, “backward” societies (Banfield 
1958), and the arguments that predict the diffusion of so-called “democratic values”, 
such as equality, through more equal and universal opportunities of acquiring 
educational services, the following hypothesis regarding the direct effect of socio-
economic development on attitudes toward corruption is formed: 
                                                 
74 For more on how the ecological effects are argued to work, see Kravtsova et al. (2017, 227-229). 
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Hypothesis 3: Corruption tolerance tends to be higher in socio-economically less 
developed societies. 
 
2.3.2 Economic inequality and corruption tolerance 
Besides the level of socio-economic development of a country, another related factor 
has also received extensive attention among scholars when it comes to explaining why 
some societies are perceived to be more corrupt, less trusting, and less public-spirited 
than other societies, namely the level of economic inequality, i.e. the distribution of 
wealth in a society. These studies have looked at the consequences of how equally 
resources are distributed within a society when it comes to both social capital and 
corruption (e.g. Dobel 1978; Uslaner 2008). This section begins by discussing the impact 
of economic inequality on corruption, where social capital (usually proxied by 
generalized trust) is argued to be an important intermediate variable, before moving 
on to a discussion concerning the (claimed) more indirect influence of economic 
inequality and generalized trust, which are argued to have a more direct causal 
relationship. 
Does inequality breed cultures of corruption? 
 While empirical studies have indicated a strong causal impact of inequality 
(commonly measured using the Gini index) on generalized trust, they have in turn also 
demonstrated weak correlations between economic inequality and various indices of 
perceived corruption. However, several studies have linked high levels of economic 
inequality with widespread corruption (Dobel 1978; You & Khagram 2005; Gyimah-
Brempong & Munoz de Camacho 2006; Uslaner 2008). As discussed in the previous 
section, corruption favors those who can afford to pay sizeable bribes for substantial 
benefits, and disfavors those who are more dependent on formally free or subsidized 
government services and goods. Members of affluent and influential elites can use their 
deep pockets and valuable contacts to strive to preserve the status quo, i.e. hinder the 
redistribution of wealth, through high-level payoffs and patronage, thereby creating 
vicious circles of corruption and rising inequality (You & Khagram 2005).    
There is some empirical evidence that supports the theory that economic inequality 
makes people more likely to behave corruptly. The study by You and Khagram (2005), 
for instance, indicates that economic inequality may affect the morals of the people, 
rich and poor alike, and make them more accepting of corrupt practices through 
normative mechanisms. 
You and Khagram (2005, 138-139) provide several theoretical arguments as to why 
economic inequality could potentially contribute to increasing the corruption tolerance 
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of both rich and poor alike. Firstly, growing levels of inequality result in higher stakes 
for the rich who “have more to lose through fair political, administrative, and judicial 
processes”, which often imply high societal pressure for redistributive policies and 
higher levels of progressive taxation (You & Khagram 2005, 138). Corruption may in 
some scenarios be the most effective way for the affluent and privileged ones to avoid 
the kind of policies that aim to narrow the income gap between rich and poor. 
Secondly, it also grants them more resources to invest in both legal and illegal 
influence-buying, which can include such activities as political lobbying, election 
campaign contributions, general political contributions, and even bribery with an aim 
of influencing legislative processes (grand corruption) or the implementation of laws 
(petty corruption). Thirdly, the poor often lack the necessary resources needed to be 
able to monitor the rich and the powerful efficiently. This implies that in highly 
unequal societies, where the middle class is either miniscule or (almost) completely 
absent, the risk of getting caught when engaging in corruption and being punished is 
substantially smaller, and this in turn might signal that corrupt behavior is more 
acceptable (You & Khagram 2005, 138-139).  
Fourthly, the poor are often the main targets or engagers when it comes to petty 
corruption, and if a large share of a highly unequal society is engaged in petty 
corruption it eventually might become viewed as something “normal” or “everyday”.  
In other words, a great bulk of the people now sees the widespread petty corruption as 
appropriate behavior. This phenomenon has been noted by Uslaner (2008, 92), who, 
when analyzing corruption attitudes in transition countries, observes that “grand 
corruption makes people less trusting of others and more envious of those who have 
become wealthy by dishonest means, while petty corruption has little effect on people’s 
attitudes”. Ordinary people at the bottom of the income ladder excuse their own 
participation in corruption by rationalizing to themselves and others that they are the 
victims and that they have no choice but to pay the bribe so that they can secure a 
certain public service for their family, thereby deserving absolution. This self-
rationalization in turn becomes considerably easier if they can observe others like them, 
or “better” than them, behaving similarly and point out that they are far from the only 
ones acting in such a manner. 
A potential fifth reason as to why inequality might generate corruption tolerance is 
related to the theme of the next section, namely institutional quality and government 
performance. Economic inequality is claimed to be “an important indicator of 
government performance” and empirical studies point to a negative relationship 
between inequality and trust in government (Aitalieva 2017, 1). Perceptions of high 
inequality could be interpreted by citizens as a sign of that the government does not 
really care about the interests of ordinary citizens (Dobel 1978). Economic inequality, 
and in extension poverty, could therefore potentially be seen as an indicator of 
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government performance in relation to desirable (long-term) outcomes from public 
policy. As mentioned, this subject is expanded upon in the next section.    
Inequality is argued to erode social solidarity and give rise to strong tensions 
between those at the top and those who have less, resulting in “all for all” scenarios 
where different social groups harbor deep mistrust and enmity against one another 
(Rothstein & Uslaner 2005; Dobel 1978). Uslaner (2011) has developed a model that 
links inequality, corruption, and trust in government into something that he calls an 
“inequality trap”. He claims that the institutional accounts of the causes and 
consequences of corruption, which have been highly popular among academics, are in 
fact lacking, and in turn proposes a structural account of corruption that rests upon 
both inequality and generalized trust. While he admits that the earlier mentioned 
simple correlation between inequality and public corruption on a country level is 
“minuscule”, he still urges that “[i]nequality matters because people think it matters” 
(Uslaner 2008, 54). 
Uslaner (2011, 143; see also You & Khagram 2005; Dobel 1978) provides three key 
pathways ways by which inequality breeds corruption: 
1. [By] leading ordinary citizens to see the system as stacked against them […]; 
2. creating a sense of dependency of ordinary citizens and a sense of pessimism for the future, 
which in turn undermines the moral dictates of treating your neighbours honestly; and 
3. distorting the key institutions of fairness in society, the courts, which ordinary citizens see 
as their protectors against evil-doers, especially those with more influence than they have 
[…].  
He furthermore argues that “[o]rdinary citizens (far more than elites) believe that you 
cannot get rich without being corrupt and that corruption plays a large role in 
promoting more inequality” (Uslaner 2011, 147). The following cautioning by Alexis 
de Tocqueville from his classic book “Democracy in America” (1835) does a superb job 
of illustrating the previously discussed arguments regarding the corrupting influence 
of inequality and the line of reasoning involved in these causal processes: 
[W]hat is to be feared is not so much the immorality of the great as the fact that immorality 
may lead to greatness. In a democracy, private citizens see a man of their own rank in life who 
rises from that obscure position in a few years to riches and power; the spectacle excites their 
surprise and envy, and they are led to inquire how a person who was yesterday their equal 
today is their ruler. To attribute his rise to his talents or his virtues is unpleasant, for it is 
tacitly to acknowledge that they are themselves less virtuous or less talented than he was. They 
are therefore led, and often rightly, to impute his success mainly to some of his vices; and an 
odious connection is thus formed between the ideas of turpitude and power, unworthiness and 
success, utility and dishonor.    (Alexis de Tocqueville 2003 [1835], 203) 
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There is also some empirical evidence that supports the argument that inequality 
erodes social solidarity, defined as “the willingness to contribute to the welfare of other 
people” (Paskov & Dewilde 2012), resulting in the previously described “all for all” 
high-corruption equilibrium. 
Can rising inequality decrease corruption tolerance? 
Based on the previously discussed theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence it 
is reasonable to expect corruption tolerance to be higher in less egalitarian societies. 
However, recent micro-level empirical evidence provided by Ioana Pop (2012), whose 
study included 43 European countries, seemingly contradicts the theoretical 
expectation that inequality fosters corrupt behavior in ordinary citizens: Individuals in 
countries with a greater economic inequality (Gini) tended to show a lower acceptance 
of corrupt acts.75 This finding could according to the author be explained by the fact 
that corruption mainly benefits a small minority that can afford to buy unfair 
advantages over the poor grand majority. The highly visible inequality, injustice, and 
grand corruption in these societies is argued to make ordinary people more sensitive 
towards corruption, which they associate with the high inequality, and thereby less 
accepting of it and its effects (Pop 2012, 30-31).  
This is in fact also consistent with the observations of Uslaner (2008, 54), who argues 
that people blame growing inequality on the dishonesty of public officials and business 
leaders, and refers to anti-corruption riots in China where the peasants have protested 
against the corrupt behavior of the elites and their own poverty. The consequences of 
free riding behavior such as tax evasion and the usage of bribes become arguably 
clearer in more unequal societies or in societies that have experienced a sharp decline 
in equality, and this in turn may make the population more intolerant of that sort of 
behavior. 
Evidence could thereby point at a possible non-linear statistical relationship between 
economic inequality and corruption tolerance. Pop’s (2012) study included several 
transition countries with relatively low levels of economic inequality that resulted from 
their communist heritages and lack of free markets. Many observers have noted that 
post-communist countries tend to have widespread occurrences of corruption, which 
many scholars claim to be a result of their socialist heritages where circumventing the 
cumbersome and ineffective public bureaucracies became a way of survival in an 
environment with scarce resources, resulting in an incorporation of corruption 
tolerance into the very norms and values of these societies (Pop 2012, 30; Sandholtz & 
Taagepera 2005; Karklins 2005).  
                                                 
75 Acceptance of corruption is measured using a modified version of Moreno’s index, where the European Values 
Study (EVS) questions are first turned binary before they are computed into a summative scale of 0 to 4 (Pop 2012, 
31). 
55 
 
Wayne Sandholtz and Rein Taagepera (2005, 110) present findings that they claim, 
“suggest that corruption is not just the product of immediate material incentives, but 
is also powerfully influenced by cultural orientations that are acquired through 
socialization in a society’s historical heritage”.  Moreno (2002, 8) also notes in his study 
on corruption permissiveness that post-communist countries have the highest average 
level of tolerance among all the observed regions, which is why this study will control 
for these particular countries in its empirical analyses. 
However, because of its Eurocentric focus, Pop’s study excluded many extremely 
unequal societies, many of which can be found on the African continent and in Latin 
America.76 Public attitudes toward corruption could therefore be quite different in a 
high inequality setting, where citizens are likely to be accustomed to extremely high 
gaps in income and consumption, compared to countries with low- or medium-levels 
of economic inequality. These extremely unequal societies are arguably those where 
“cultures of corruption” are likely to be most vibrant: inequality breeds cynicism 
among ordinary people regarding the chances of attaining success in life without being 
ruthless and corrupt. This cynicism in turn may erode the public spiritedness of the 
ordinary citizens and make them less likely to strive for the common good and abstain 
from free riding behavior. 
The following hypothesis is hereby formulated: 
Hypothesis 4: Corruption tolerance tends to be lower in societies with intermediate 
levels of economic inequality, but significantly higher in extremely unequal societies. 
[non-linear relationship] 
  
                                                 
76 Chile, for instance, has a Gini coefficient of around 55 in 2000, while South Africa has 63 in 2013, on a scale from 
0 – 100 (The World Bank 2017). 
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2.3.3 Institutional quality, economic performance, and corruption 
tolerance 
The two previous sections discussed how the extent of poverty and the distribution of 
economic resources could potentially affect general attitudes toward behavior that 
undermines the common good. Now it is time to shift the focus back to the public 
institutions again and discuss the potential consequences for civic morality of living in 
societies with dysfunctional public institutions that produce unsatisfactory outcomes. 
The rotting fish argument: Does public corruption and inefficiency increase 
corruption tolerance? 
Former US president Jimmy Carter (1977 – 1981) expressed that “a country can expect 
a government as good as its people” (paraphrased in Rose & Mishler 2011, 118). 
However, the arguments presented in this study suggest that it is possible to reverse 
this statement to suggest “a country can expect a people as good as its government”, 
i.e. that elite misconduct and a general weakness of government generates citizen 
misconduct.  
The people that constitute the different branches of government can be said to 
provide important role models for ordinary citizens, and the behavior and performance 
of representatives from the former group may have a significant influence on the 
public-spiritedness of those from the latter. This is arguably the core of the rotting fish 
argument. Before discussing the potential relationship between institutional quality 
and corruption/corruption tolerance, however, this study first needs to elaborate on 
what “institutional quality” actually is and how it can be defined. Later on, the study 
will discuss how it is operationalized for its empirical part.  
Good governance, government performance, public sector performance, or 
institutional quality77, whichever term a person chooses to use, is a hotly debated 
subject among both academics and policymakers, but a wide consensus is still missing 
regarding what exactly it should entail, how it should be defined, and the most suitable 
way to measure it (Kaufmann et al. 2010; Van de Walle 2009). As with most, if not all, 
phenomena of interest to social science researchers, there are both wide and narrow 
definitions of institutional quality. However, instead of just summarizing these 
definitions, this section will start by examining the general characteristics of good and 
bad governance.  
Bribe paying could widely be viewed as justifiable or even a normal part of the 
administrative processes in countries with long delays in transactions, widespread 
corruption and onerous amounts of bureaucratic paperwork (Dong et al. 2012, 15). One 
                                                 
77 This study will mostly be using the term “institutional quality” due to the reason that it finds it clearer and more 
precise than the term “governance”. 
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scholar, Hernando De Soto (1989), and his research team experienced this first hand 
during an experiment while setting up a small garment factory in Lima, Peru. The 
intention of the research team was to follow bureaucratic regulations and procedures 
without having to resort to any bribe paying, but this simply became an impossible 
task. In the end, they are reported to have been asked for “speed money” ten times and 
twice it became necessary for further continuation of the experiment (De Soto 1989, in 
Torgler & Valev 2010, 557). The demand for additional payments may be so strong or 
the professional ethics may be so weak78 that the administrative machine cannot 
function properly without these informal remunerations. 
The perceived quality of public institutions may signal the chance of being detected 
and sanctioned when engaging in corrupt transactions or other illegal activities, and 
the widespread existence of opportunities that only open up through bribery. Low 
institutional quality may on one hand imply weak accountability and too much 
discretion for individual public officials, which according to principal-agent theory 
implies greater informational asymmetries between government agents and their 
supervising principals to whom they are duty bound.79 This lack of information 
regarding the daily activities of individual agents creates incentives for both bribe 
taking and bribe giving, if there exists a goal conflict between the principals, who are 
presumed to represent the public interest, and the agents, who are expected to behave 
corruptly if the benefits of such behavior outweigh the costs (Persson et al. 2013; 
Klitgaard 1991).  
However, poor institutional quality may on the other hand also imply excessive80 or 
inefficient monitoring of the everyday work of public officials, i.e. too little discretion 
or autonomy, which can have a negative impact on the length or frequency of 
bureaucratic transactions, or on the perceived competence of individual bureaucrats. 
Highly detailed and rigid regulations and standard operating procedures (SOPs) that 
prevent agents from, in the eyes of the citizens, “following common sense”, may send 
signals of incompetence, untrustworthiness, and unreliability on behalf of the agent(s). 
 Furthermore, as argued by Claus Offe (1999, 53), “[t]he absence of trust is rather 
likely to condition a type of behavior on the part of the non-trusted that is rigidly and 
ritualistically following orders and seeks to hide behind established rules and 
routines”. Moreover, if a public organization (the government) judges that it cannot 
afford to give its own officials at least some discretionary powers, out of fear that they 
will abuse them or neglect their duty, then how could ordinary citizens place their trust 
in them? A delicate balance is therefore clearly required between accountability and 
monitoring on one hand, and discretion and flexibility on the other, if the aim is to 
                                                 
78 For instance, due to low public wages.  
79 The principal can for instance be a senior/higher level official, a politician or an ordinary citizen. 
80 As argued by Fukuyama (2014, 546-547), red tape can be so complex that it actually makes it hard it for the 
principal to supervise if rules are being followed.  
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reach a high institutional quality and win the trust of the citizens (Fukuyama 2014). 
Here it is again important to remember that the public bureaucracy within a certain 
country is not a monolithic entity. Some specific organizations or institutions may thus 
require more discretion and autonomy to function more efficiently, while others 
should have less. 
Francis Fukuyama (2014) argues that the problem with inefficient bureaucracies in 
rich countries with a relatively high state capacity81, such as the United States, is not 
necessarily too much discretion, as it often is in poor countries such as Nigeria, but 
rather too little. Growing demands in advanced democracies for more democratic 
accountability in the form of formal procedures intended to increase the transparency 
and responsiveness of administrative agencies have often had the opposite effect. 
Transaction costs have increased while innovation and risk taking has decreased, 
which in turn has led to even greater demands for more accountability and, ultimately, 
distrust and perceptions of illegitimacy. The question then is which factors, more 
precisely, explain how people judge their government and its institutions? 
According to Rothstein and Stolle (2002), public institutions such as the legal system 
have two key aspects on which people judge them: fairness and efficiency. Uslaner (2011, 
144) claims that fairness is “the key to the connection between law and corruption” due 
to the reflection of the advantages of some individuals or groups that is inherent in it. 
If citizens perceive the police or the courts as unfair and partial, they are more likely to 
express a low confidence in them, and this may in turn lead people to believe that the 
only way to become successful is by taking part in corrupt exchanges. Grönlund and 
Setälä argue that “[c]orruption is likely to reduce trust in institutions, because it is 
contradictory to the idea of impartiality […; c]orrupt institutions and public institutions do 
not treat citizens impartially, they do it unequally on the basis of how able and how 
willing citizens are to perform personal reciprocal favors” (emphasis added, Grönlund 
& Setälä 2012, 5). Rasma Karklins (2005, 103) meanwhile argues that public corruption 
“undermines public spiritedness and commitment to serving the public good”.  
Corruption as a term refers in this institutional context to the earlier discussed 
contemporary narrow conceptualization of corruption that focuses on the public sector 
and the rules and demands of a public office (in other words, public corruption). It is 
therefore important to keep it theoretically separated from the broader 
conceptualization of “corruption” in corruption tolerance, which focuses on the 
general attitudes and values of ordinary citizens rather than on the (perceived) 
behavior of bureaucratic and political elites and office holders.  
Fairness, impartiality and efficiency are not expectations reserved solely for the legal 
system. They pertain to the entire implementing side of the political system, i.e. the 
                                                 
81 Fukuyama (2014, 541-543) argues that a high state capacity consists of three different parts: [1] technocratic 
competence or professionalism (education & experience), [2] cohesion based on shared norms or a strong esprit de 
corps, and [3] resources such as an adequate pay.  
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legal and administrative82 branches of government charged with the implementation 
of public policy (Rothstein & Stolle 2002). This is the main reason why this study 
focuses on the following two aspects of institutional quality, which are called procedural 
quality in order to separate them from the second dimension of institutional quality (see 
the next section): government efficiency and the extent of public sector corruption, i.e. abuse 
of public office for private gain. 
However, the commonly used aggregated measures of both government efficiency 
and corruption are often found to be so highly correlated that it may be impossible to 
include both at the same time in the same models due to the issue of collinearity. While 
some studies have argued that government intervention in the economy and excessive 
red tape generates corruption as a result of the consequent reduction in transparency 
and competition (Kaufman & Wei 1999; Goel & Nelson 2010), other studies have 
argued that corrupt actors often have incentives to create administrative barriers (or at 
least preserve them) and longer handling times in order to collect larger or a greater 
number of rents (Myrdal 1968). Consequently, because of this arguably very close 
reciprocal relationship between inefficiency and corruption, this study will mainly be 
using one single aggregated measure of procedural quality, namely an indicator of the 
ability of the state to control corruption, which can also be interpreted as the perceived 
extent of corruption in a society.  
This has also been the strategy of other related studies such as the one by Mattias 
Agerberg (2018, 1), who argues that corruption “is now understood […as] arguably the 
most blatant example of poor institutional quality”. High public sector inefficiency 
combined with low levels of corruption (especially petty), or high levels of corruption 
together with high efficiency, seems like a very improbable scenario. An indicator of 
the government’s ability to control corruption in an efficient manner is hence used in 
this study as a proxy for both dimensions of institutional quality. 
The decision to include a measure of corruption in this study is also motivated by 
social learning theory (SLT; Bandura 1971). This theory assumes that exposure to signals 
from the surrounding environment influences and shapes individual behavior by 
differentiating common, and therefore often formally and/or informally acceptable, 
behavior from socially deviant, often unacceptable or taboo, behavior (see also Akers 
1998). People perceive that their fellow citizens react in a certain way in relation to the 
dysfunctional environment and consequently the threshold and the shame of behaving 
similarly becomes significantly smaller. In other words, “if everybody’s doing it, it 
can’t be that bad”, becomes the way of reasoning among many when it comes to 
                                                 
82 However, as pointed out by Rothstein and Stolle (2002, 17), the high-level civil service may in fact be perceived as 
partisan and as an extension of the elected public officials in many countries. One example of such a country is the 
United States where high-level civil servants are indeed often politicized (Peters & Pierre 2004). Rothstein and 
Stolle’s (2002, 16) factor analysis of confidence in various “political” institutions suggests that confidence in the civil 
service falls under the same dimension as the institutions of the elected officials (the parliament, the government 
and the political parties). 
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corruption in countries where corruption is very common. Research by Inge 
Amundsen (1999, 5), among others, supports this theory and he argues that “as 
corruption spreads, the social acceptance of it may also increase […, w]hen it is 
generally understood that there is a climate of corruption, still more people will believe 
it is inevitable and expected”.  
The inability of the state to control the corrupt behavior of its administrators and 
politicians, thereby providing clean public services and political processes, could 
therefore increase the willingness to tolerate corruption through several different 
causal pathways. Firstly, it may spawn a sense of inevitability. People might feel that 
they have no choice but to accept corrupt and free riding behavior as a rational 
response to an inefficient and corrupt institutional environment where you may feel 
forced to pay a bribe to get anything done in a reasonable time. Secondly, people are 
more likely to perceive that others behave in similar ways when confronted with 
similar challenges in relation to the state, and this could further reinforce the feeling 
that what they are doing is inevitable or even acceptable and just. Thirdly, the 
government’s inability to keep corruption under check could further signal that high-
level politicians or even state institutions such as the courts are in the pockets of 
affluent elites, which further erodes the state’s legitimacy. High-level corruption 
involving large sums of money or other highly valuable resources might be compared 
to the significantly smaller sums often involved in low-level corruption, and this 
comparison could provide even deeper feelings of justification. 
Some empirical evidence in support of the “rotting fish” thesis is provided in a very 
recent study carried out by Nan Zhang (2017) on the determinants of accountability 
norms. This study performed a laboratory experiment in the form of a corruption game 
in order to elucidate if there are differences in the willingness to report bribery between 
students originating from the northern regions of Italy on one hand and the southern 
regions on the other (see section 2.1.4 in this chapter), and if these potential differences 
are dependent upon the quality of the enforcement institutions. Zhang (2017, 12) 
concludes based on the evidence from this experiment that there is very little to support 
the notion proposed by the earlier discussed “raccomandazione” thesis that corruption 
has a cultural base that promotes a tolerance of illicit behavior among Southerners in 
Italy. There was no significant difference in reporting rates across different subgroups, 
holding the institutional configuration constant (Zhang 2017, 11). However, there was 
a significant institutional effect indicating that participants were more willing to report 
bribery under strict enforcement, i.e. more efficient and credible enforcement 
authorities that show a high responsiveness to grassroots monitoring. 
 Prior empirical evidence in support of this theorized negative (positive) relationship 
between institutional quality and corruption tolerance (civic morality) is also provided 
by Letki (2006, 321), who concluded based on evidence from 38 countries that quality 
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of government83 “is an important factor increasing the citizen’s civic morality”. 
Meanwhile Pop (2012) found no significant relationship between the level of 
(perceived) corruption84 and the acceptance of corrupt acts in 43 European countries, 
and Kravtsova et al. (2016) came to a similar conclusion regarding control of corruption 
and the justification of bribery in 95 countries. 
Can high-quality institutions substitute anti-corruption norms? 
While many scholars have argued that weak and dysfunctional public institutions 
promote a tolerance of illicit behavior among ordinary citizens, some have also 
suggested the possibility that individuals in countries with uncontrolled and endemic 
corruption might be less tolerant of corrupt practices than their peers in countries with 
higher quality institutions. Pop (2012, 30), for instance, argues that individuals in more 
corrupt countries are more likely to perceive the unfair consequences of corrupt 
practices which bestow valuable advantages on those that can afford them while 
punishing those who cannot. Furthermore, they are also more likely to come in direct 
contact with this type of unfair competition that could further reinforce their negative 
feelings towards various forms of corruption.  
Endemic grand corruption, uncovered in high-profile corruption scandals, could 
result in a deep moral disgust towards such undemocratic and widely condemned 
immoral practices, possibly resulting in widespread protests and anti-corruption 
movements against corruption, as has been the case in many countries, with several 
recent examples from Russia  and Brazil. This point is also argued by Rasma Karklins 
(2005) and Bo Rothstein and Daniel Eek (2009, 106), who state that their data “seems to 
confirm the hypothesis that it is not the case that people who live in highly corrupt 
societies come to morally accept corrupt behavior by public officials”. These people 
could therefore have a higher tendency to officially condemn bribe taking, while still 
feeling forced by “the system” to take part in it in one way or another. 
Similarly, one might also imagine that citizens in “cleaner” countries where petty 
corruption is considerably rarer and where confidence in authorities is generally 
higher, might develop a more tolerant attitude toward such a “invisible” and rarely 
noted phenomenon as corruption. If corruption and the negative consequences of 
corruption remain hidden and out of sight from the ordinary citizen, it may instead 
generate feelings of ambivalence or apathy towards such behavior, rather than anger 
and antagonism.   Many a citizen in the relatively corruption-free developed West may 
not simply take these issues seriously due to the apparent lack of corruption in their 
own vicinity.  
                                                 
83 Letki (2006) operationalized quality of government using a composite index consisting of four dimensions from 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI): Government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control 
of corruption. 
84 Operationalized using the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 
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Empirical evidence that might support the argument that institutional quality could 
be positively related to corruption tolerance is provided by Ting Gong, Shiru Wang 
and Jianming Ren (2015), who based their analysis on an original survey conducted 
among university students in Hong Kong and Mainland China. Results from this 
survey, which compared perceptions of corruption, implied that “the Mainland 
[China] students who hold weak formal institutions responsible for pervasive 
corruption, instead of taking it as an excuse to forgive corrupt individuals, reckon on 
personal power to fight corruption and, thus, show statistically less tolerance for 
corruption in hypothetical scenarios” (Gong et al. 2015, 475). A lack of confidence in 
public organizations could lead to feelings of great frustration with their incompetence 
in keeping corruption levels down, and this might in turn result in feelings of a more 
personal responsibility in regards to staying clean from corrupt practices and putting 
pressure on others to stay clean. Meanwhile, students in Hong Kong, where the 
government has claimed considerable fame for its anti-corruption accomplishments, 
showed a tendency to push the responsibility of fighting corruption over to 
government agencies such as the Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC), resulting in displays of tolerance of individual corruption under certain 
specific circumstances (Gong et al. 2015, 475-476). 
The argument that corruption tolerance may be positively related to governmental 
quality is also consistent with the findings of Peter Kotzian (2014) regarding civic 
norms and law abidance. The study, which included 17 countries, found that “[h]igher 
welfare spending [and governmental quality] substantially decreases the importance 
assigned to abidance to laws” (Kotzian 2014, 72-73). One plausible explanation for this 
finding could according to the author be a substitution process whereby developed 
welfare states have effective institutions that substitute the civic norms needed for the 
citizens to exercise control over the political system.  Countries without an effective 
“third party” control system that guarantees social order have a significantly greater 
need for strong social norms (e.g. “thou shalt not steal”) that keep society from 
descending into chaos and a “all for all” situation (Kotzian 2014, 74; Rothstein & 
Uslaner 2005). Norms regarding law abidance and, presumably, that one should avoid 
free riding on the public good should hence become significantly weaker in societies 
where there are other alternative means of controlling citizen behavior and voluntary 
norm abidance is not necessary to as high a degree. 
However, this study finds the earlier discussed theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence concerning a potential negative relationship between institutional quality and 
corruption tolerance more compelling, which leads it to formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: Corruption tolerance tends to be higher in countries with a lower level 
of procedural quality.  
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Does economic performance influence corruption tolerance? 
As was discussed earlier, bureaucratic efficiency and the extent of public sector 
corruption is likely to be highly correlated. However, instead of using a separate 
aggregated measure for the government efficiency dimension, this study will utilize a 
different kind of proxy that is not as clearly related to governmental quality or 
performance as the previously discussed aggregate measures.  This indicator may or 
may not actually be a result of the efficiency or quality of the public sector, but more 
importantly, the citizens are likely to perceive it as a prominent indicator of government 
efficiency and legitimacy, namely a country’s economic performance (Newton 2006; 
Easton 1965).  
As argued by Letki (2006, 310), “[e]conomic growth is a basic criterion of a 
government’s efficacy, thus influencing government’s legitimacy”. A recent economic 
decline, not to mention an actual economic crisis, may have a negative impact on citizen 
confidence in the ability of the state to govern the economy and reduce poverty, which 
in turn may reduce the general willingness to abide by the law and stay clear from 
using bribes or other corrupt tactics. The inability of the state to uphold its end of the 
bargain in the “social contract” by providing economic opportunities to its citizens may 
in turn cause them to rebel against the social order upheld by the state, thus resulting 
in a higher frequency of free riding behavior. 
Some empirical evidence in support of this potential relationship between economic 
performance and civic norms is provided in both Kotzian (2014) and Letki (2006). While 
Kotzian finds that economic performance in the form of recent GDP growth has a 
positive effect on law abidance and civic engagement, Letki meanwhile finds that 
citizens living in low-unemployment countries have a significantly higher level of civic 
morality. 
Based on the previous discussion regarding the impact of economic performance on 
corruption tolerance the following hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 6: Corruption tolerance tends to be higher in countries with a poor 
economic performance. 
However, the study also expects procedural quality to have a greater likelihood of 
having an impact on corruption tolerance due to the more long-term or “sticky” effects 
of poor institutional quality, which tends to be more stable than economic performance. 
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2.4 The moderating effect of dysfunctional contexts 
Previous sections have mostly discussed potential direct effects of a. bureaucratic 
distrust and b. various indicators of state dysfunctionality. The aim of the present 
section is to discuss potential moderating effects of the previously presented indicators 
of dysfunctional societies on the earlier proposed association between bureaucratic 
distrust and corruption tolerance.  
Even though the potential direct effect of, for instance, socio-economic development 
or economic inequality on attitudes toward corruption is likely to be weak or non-
significant85, there may still be significant indirect effects through bureaucratic distrust, 
which was earlier argued to be a key predictor of socially deviant behavior. The key 
question of this section is therefore: Under what conditions is bureaucratic distrust 
more likely to be associated with corruption and free riding condoning attitudes? 
The following section will discuss the indirect effects in the same order as in the 
previous section concerning the direct effects, beginning with socio-economic 
development. Many of the arguments are closely related to the ones in the previous 
section, so this study will strive to keep them short to avoid repeating itself. First, 
however, the section starts by briefly elaborating on why this study has opted to 
include so-called cross-level interactions in its models. 
Why include cross-level interactions? 
Most studies have assumed that the impact of institutional trust is uniform across cases 
(e.g. Letki 2006; Pop 2012; Kotzian 2014). However, a few studies have noted that the 
correlation between institutional trust and corruption tolerance tends to be 
significantly weaker in some countries such as the ones in Latin America (Blake 2009; 
Andrews 2008). 
Studying corruption tolerance or civic morality is a very complicated task, especially 
if one also aims at explaining differences between different countries and/or periods. 
Very few respondents admit to finding for instance bribe taking acceptable, which 
means that the measure of corruption tolerance is highly skewed, and this fact pertains 
to most countries and time period from whence there is data available. Consequently, 
there is quite a limited variation in corruption tolerance between different countries, a 
factor that makes it difficult to explore the effects of various contextual factors that 
previous studies have linked with various kinds of corruption. The limited variation in 
the data combined with the limited number of higher-level cases available makes it 
simply very difficult to find significant differences. 
In order to deal with this complicating factor this study has decided to include cross-
level interactions in its models to see if the contextual factors have indirect effects 
                                                 
85 The effects are likely to be weak due to the limited variation in the dependent variable. 
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through its key individual level variable “Bureaucratic distrust”. As was mentioned 
earlier, this study does not consider institutional trust to be a cause of attitudes toward 
civic norms regarding free riding, but rather a correlate or a symptom due to their 
endogeneity. Both bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance are likely to be 
caused by other, and as this study would argue, similar exogenous forces or shocks. If 
the previously discussed contextual factors really are sources of uncivic attitudes and 
values, then it could be expected that the correlation between bureaucratic distrust and 
corruption tolerance is stronger in such contexts where the deep distrust of the state 
institutions actually stems from extensive poverty, inequality, and poor institutional 
quality and performance. For instance, in countries with extensive public sector 
corruption, i.e. low procedural quality, it could be expected that the relationship 
between bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance is significantly stronger than in 
countries with a high institutional quality such as the Scandinavian countries. 
However, based on the theoretical importance of prevailing citizen expectations 
highlighted in other studies (e.g. Ariely & Uslaner 2017), it could also be the case that 
the association is significantly weaker in the previously mentioned contexts. 
One important reason why it is worthwhile to include cross-level interactions is that 
it may illuminate under what conditions bureaucratic distrust is most strongly related 
to corruption tolerance. For instance, one could argue that in contexts where the 
association between bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance is very weak or 
even completely absent, traditional approaches to civil service reform and other efforts 
that aim to increase confidence in public institutions are more likely to fail in boosting 
civic morality. In such cases it may be more important to focus on other relevant factors, 
such as alleviating poverty or inequality.      
 
2.4.1 The moderating effect of socio-economic development 
Earlier it was hypothesized that corruption tolerance tends to be higher in less 
developed countries where people live in less secure environments where bribe giving 
and patronage may become a way of dealing with this insecurity. However, does this 
(also) reflect as a contextual effect on the trust-corruption tolerance relationship? Does 
the relationship between institutional trust and corruption tolerance differ depending 
on the level of socio-economic development in a country? 
One could expect the correlation between bureaucratic distrust and corruption 
tolerance to be stronger in socio-economically more developed countries, where 
citizens are more likely to lack personal experience of the negative consequences of 
corruption and free riding. A high confidence in authorities in highly corrupt countries 
could furthermore be a sign of support for the government in general and the 
widespread occurrence of clientelism or vote buying. Participation in clientelistic 
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networks could foster more condoning attitudes towards certain types of corrupt 
behavior such as bribe taking and nepotism, not least if it relates to the behavior of the 
patron himself or his associates. Studies have most commonly associated clientelism 
with developing country settings and poorer voters who are more susceptible to 
clientelist offers (Hicken 2011, 299). This could potentially indicate that highly trusting 
individuals tend to be more permissive of corrupt behavior in countries with low levels 
of economic development and widespread clientelistic networks. 
Distrusting citizens perceive more public corruption than their more trusting peers 
in both highly developed and less developed countries. However, their reactions to this 
perceived corruption are argued to differ in the different contexts: The distrusting ones 
in the less developed countries are argued to adapt a more tolerant attitude towards 
corruption than their brethren in the wealthy countries, who (at least partly) have 
adopted more postmaterial values that advocate equality and fairness.  
Hypothesis 7: The association between bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance 
is weaker in less developed societies. 
 
2.4.2 The moderating effect of economic inequality 
Earlier this study hypothesized about the potential direct effects of economic inequality 
on the general attitude towards corrupt and uncivic behavior. Highly unequal societies 
were assumed to be more tolerant of corrupt acts than societies that have a more equal 
division of resources and opportunities. However, what about possible indirect or 
moderating effects of economic inequality on the relationship between this study’s key 
individual-level variable, bureaucratic distrust, and corruption tolerance? Are citizens 
who are more distrusting of public institutions more or less likely to justify acts of 
corruption in societies with high levels of economic inequality? 
There are at least two hypothetical reasons why the relationship between 
bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance could vary across different contexts of 
(in)equality, the first having to do with the prevailing expectations of citizens and the 
second with the question “Who are the stakeholders in a corrupt system?”.  
Firstly, one could imagine that the association between bureaucratic distrust and 
corruption tolerance could be stronger in societies with a highly unequal distribution 
of resources and opportunities if citizens attribute this inequality to the unfairness and 
partiality of the public institutions and accordingly perceive them as illegitimate 
(Rothstein 2011; Tyler 2006; see earlier sections). However, in theory the association 
between these two micro-level factors could also be weaker in highly unequal societies 
due to differences in expectations regarding the behavior of public authorities such as 
the police or, more precisely, an adjustment to prevailing circumstances. Long historical 
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experiences of high levels of economic inequality and endemic corruption could 
potentially mean that the citizens of these kinds of societies have become socialized not 
to expect fair and evenhanded treatment from public authorities (Ariely & Uslaner 
2017; Uslaner 2008). They become demoralized and see corruption as something that is 
inevitable and beyond their control, albeit not necessarily acceptable. Their lack of 
expectations may instead suggest that the honesty and performance of public 
institutions such as the police, which they perceive to be in the pocket of a rich 
minority, does not have a significant impact on their own personal morality (Andrews 
2008, 178; see also next section). 
Meanwhile, citizens in societies with a relatively equal distribution of resources are 
claimed to hold greater expectations (and demands) regarding their public institutions 
and officials (Ariely & Uslaner 2017; Uslaner 2008). They see unfair treatment as, in the 
words of Gal Ariely and Eric Uslaner (2017, 350), “a violation of the integrity of the 
governmental system”. Societies with relatively low levels of inequality have a 
significantly greater growth potential for inequality that can be blamed on the 
hypothetical corrupt behavior of elites. A loss of confidence in the public institutions 
could therefore potentially have a significantly larger negative impact on the 
legitimacy of these institutions in the eyes of the citizens in more equal contexts than 
in the previously discussed highly unequal ones. This negative impact would in turn 
based on earlier arguments be related to a higher tendency to condone low-level 
corruption and free riding. 
The results of Ariely and Uslaner’s (2017) recent empirical study of 31 countries 
suggest that people who perceive unfair treatments are considerably more likely to 
perceive (grand) corruption and that these perceptions are higher in more unequal 
countries. However, the results also indicate that “[t]he impact of fair treatment on 
corruption perceptions is much greater in more equal countries, where people are far 
more likely to expect fair treatment” (Ariely & Uslaner 2017, 358). The authors therefore 
conclude that perceptions of fair treatment are less important in highly unequal 
societies. 
Secondly, in theory one could even expect the relationship between bureaucratic 
distrust and corruption tolerance to be the opposite of the earlier hypothesized one in 
highly unequal societies due to the following reason. 
Corruption can be perceived as an informal institution or rather a system of informal 
institutions. As argued by Fukuyama (2011, 526) “[a]ny institution or system of 
institutions benefits certain groups in a society, often at the expense of others, [… and 
t]hose elite groups [who] have a stake in existing institutional arrangements […] will 
defend the status quo as long as they continue to remain cohesive”. Groups that benefit 
from corrupt arrangements within public institutions, i.e. stakeholders, are arguably 
more likely to possess a greater confidence in these institutions than those who do not. 
Conversely, those who suffer the most from the consequences of corruption in highly 
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unequal societies, i.e. the poor majority that lacks the means to benefit from corruption, 
are likely to be relatively less tolerant and more welcoming of institutional change and 
tighter control. Consequently, there could exist a wealthy minority with a privileged 
access to power, a (relatively) high confidence in the corruptible authorities, and a 
higher than average tolerance of corrupt practices. However, this group could include 
some lower SES individuals too who benefit from clientelistic arrangements.      
Based on these arguments, one could therefore expect the effects of distrusting 
attitudes towards implementing institutions to vary across societies with differing 
degrees of economic equality. More specifically, this study expects the level of 
bureaucratic distrust to matter less in highly unequal societies where corruption 
tolerance is generally higher. The following hypothesis is hereby formulated: 
Hypothesis 8: The association between bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance 
is weaker in highly unequal societies. 
 
2.4.3 The moderating effect of institutional quality and economic 
performance 
In addition to exploring the direct effects of institutional quality on corruption 
tolerance, this study is also interested in possible interaction effects between 
institutional trust and institutional quality. Does the relationship between confidence 
in implementing institutions and corruption tolerance differ depending on the 
institutional quality? 
Theoretically, one could imagine that the relationship between bureaucratic distrust 
and corruption tolerance could be weaker, or even the opposite, in countries with a low 
institutional quality or performance due to similar reasons as discussed in the previous 
section, namely expectations among the public and the occurrence of significant 
stakeholder groups that benefit from a corrupt system either directly or indirectly.  
Christina Andrews (2008) notes in her bivariate analysis of the correlation between 
confidence in institutions and civic morality in 30 countries that the Latin American 
countries showed the weakest correlations. Moreover, she also notes that this group 
has the highest number of correlations in the opposite direction, i.e. that a higher 
confidence is related to a lower civic morality. The author speculates that “[o]ne 
explanation for these results is that in Latin America public institutions are still too frail 
to impact the civic morality of their citizens” (Andrews 2008, 178, emphasis added). 
Thus, she arrives to the conclusion that confidence in institutions and civic morality 
only seem to be related in Western democracies and in post-communist countries, 
while factors such as inequality or unemployment matter more in explaining civic 
morality in developing countries. People from countries with long histories of “frail” 
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institutions do not generally come to expect neither impartiality nor efficiency from the 
public institutions, and are therefore not as deeply affected, at least with regard to their 
own civic morality, when confronted by corruption and unprofessionalism among 
public administrators as those who expect more from their public institutions. 
This “adjustment-hypothesis”, which was also discussed in the previous section, is 
consistent with the empirical observations from a recent survey in the Western 
Balkans86 concerning citizens’ opinions of the police. The survey finds that “[t]he 
perception of high corruption of the police survives simultaneously with a relatively 
high level of trust, which may indicate reconciliation with the fact that corruption is 
omnipresent in the institutions, and that citizens have become accustomed to it as an 
inevitable segment of public administration” (Mandić 2017, 22). Furthermore, one 
could also theoretically argue that a low confidence in public institutions could 
correlate with less tolerant attitudes toward corrupt behavior and that this might 
especially be the case if a low confidence in government is a result of perceived 
corruption within the government or in society in general. Those unable to reap the 
rewards of a corrupt system, and who only suffer the costs, are arguably less likely to 
both trust the authorities and tolerate corrupt behavior.   
 Distrusting citizens in countries with high quality institutions, meanwhile, are 
considerably less likely to have any personal experience of (petty) corruption and a 
clear picture of its detrimental consequences. They are therefore less likely to hold as 
negative a view of this more “alien” phenomenon because, as was discussed earlier, 
efficient institutions may have substituted at least to some degree their anti-corruption 
norms (Kotzian 2014).  
Moreover, due to the more sophisticated and clandestine forms that corruption 
tends to take in advanced democracies with well-consolidated institutions such as the 
Nordic countries (Erlingsson et al. 2014; Andersson 2017), it does not automatically 
follow that the public sectors in these countries are perceived by their citizens as less 
corrupt and more trustworthy. Gissur Erlingsson, Jonas Linde and Richard Öhrvall 
(2014) demonstrate that there is quite a large distrust towards public officials in the 
aforementioned countries, and that relatively many citizens, especially in Sweden and 
Iceland, do not believe that public officials treat citizens fairly (see also section 2.1.2 of 
this chapter). Additionally, the scholars observe a link between perceptions of 
dishonest bureaucrats and dissatisfaction with the performance of the political system 
(Erlingsson et al. 2014, 114). This potent combination of high expectations and 
perceptions of unfair and partial treatment could together contribute in producing the 
kinds of attitudes that are of interest in this study.        
Based on these theoretical arguments and empirical observations, this study expects 
the positive effect of bureaucratic distrust on corruption tolerance to be weaker in 
                                                 
86 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia. 
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countries with a poor institutional quality, which encompasses on one hand procedural 
quality (extent of corruption and level of efficiency) and on the other hand economic 
performance. However, just as was noted earlier, the study also expects procedural 
quality to have a greater likelihood of having an impact due to the more long-term or 
“sticky” effects of poor institutional quality on public mentality. The following 
hypothesis is hereby formulated: 
Hypothesis 9a: The association between bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance 
is weaker in countries with a low procedural quality (high corruption and inefficiency) 
and poor economic performance. 
Furthermore, in addition to examining the cross-level interaction effect between the 
individual-level indicator of confidence in the bureaucratic institutions and a measure 
of country-level perceived corruption, this study will also investigate whether there is 
an interaction effect between the former variable and the micro-level measure of self-
perceived extent of corruption among public officials. 
This study expects there to be a similar interaction effect as with the macro-level 
corruption indicator. The level of confidence in public authorities should not matter to 
as high a degree when it comes to explaining the level of corruption tolerance of 
individuals who perceive that almost all public officials are engaged in corruption. 
Both those citizens who have a high confidence and those who have a low confidence 
have come to expect corruption and inefficiency as something almost approximating 
normality, at least to some degree. Citizens with a high confidence who perceive no or 
almost no corruption, on the other hand, are more likely to hold very high standards 
when it comes to corrupt or deviant behavior. They hold clear expectations of both 
impartiality and efficiency from their public institutions. The following final 
hypothesis is thusly formed: 
Hypothesis 9b: The association between bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance 
is weaker among individuals who perceive a greater extent of public corruption. 
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2.5 Summary of formal hypotheses 
The hypotheses derived from the previously discussed theoretical arguments and 
empirical findings are summarized below:  
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who are more distrusting of the implementing institutions 
(the police, the courts, and the civil service) tend to be more tolerant of corrupt 
behavior. 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who perceive a greater extent of public corruption tend to 
have a higher corruption tolerance. 
Hypothesis 3: Corruption tolerance tends to be higher in socio-economically less 
developed societies. 
Hypothesis 4: Corruption tolerance tends to be lower in societies with intermediate 
levels of economic inequality, but significantly higher in extremely unequal societies. 
[non-linear relationship] 
Hypothesis 5: Corruption tolerance tends to be higher in countries with a lower level 
of procedural quality.  
Hypothesis 6: Corruption tolerance tends to be higher in countries with a poor 
economic performance. 
Hypothesis 7: The association between bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance 
is weaker in less developed societies. 
Hypothesis 8: The association between bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance 
is weaker in highly unequal societies. 
Hypothesis 9a: The association between bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance 
is weaker in countries with a low procedural quality (high corruption and inefficiency) 
and poor economic performance. 
Hypothesis 9b: The association between bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance 
is weaker among individuals who perceive a greater extent of public corruption. 
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PART TWO 
Research design, results, and conclusions 
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3. Research design 
This chapter presents the research design used in this study, beginning with a 
discussion concerning the way the variables are operationalized. After this discussion 
follows an illustrated figure of this study’s research model and a detailed description 
of the method of analysis.  Lastly, the sources of data utilized in this study are 
presented. 
 
3.1 Operationalization of variables 
The chapter begins by discussing how the variables are operationalized, starting with 
the dependent variable, corruption tolerance, and then moving on to the micro- and 
macro-level predictors. The data for all macro-level predictors included in this study 
originate from at least one or a couple of years prior to the survey occasion when the 
phenomenon of interest, corruption tolerance, was measured. 
 
3.1.1 Dependent variable: Corruption tolerance 
One problem, which needs to be settled before an attempt is made to answer the earlier 
listed research questions, is how can the earlier conceptualized and defined 
phenomenon of interest in this thesis, low-level corruption tolerance (see Chapter 1, 
section 1.2), be operationalized?  
A review of previous studies related to this one reveals that two different strategies 
have mainly been utilized in the literature that has applied quantitative methods in an 
attempt to elucidate the determinants of corruption tolerance both within and across 
different societies. The first one has employed an index constructed by Alejandro 
Moreno (2002) while the second one has made use of a single survey item. Both 
strategies will now be briefly discussed, starting with the index-based 
operationalization strategy, and rounding off with a discussion regarding which one 
of these two strategies (in a modified form) is the main strategy utilized in this thesis.  
Moreno’s (2002) solution to the problem of how to measure corruption tolerance is 
the construction of an index, which he chooses to call an “index of corruption 
permissiveness”, based upon four different questions asked in the World Value Survey 
(WVS). In his article, Moreno (2002, 3) defines corruption permissiveness as “the extent 
to which individuals tend to justify certain practices that can be considered to be corrupt”. The 
questions from the WVS that form the backbone of the index are based on the extent 
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that individual respondents are prepared to justify the acts or behaviors included in 
the following four survey items:  
[1] “claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled”,  
[2] “avoiding a fare on public transport”,  
[3] “cheating on taxes if you have a chance” and  
[4] “accepting a bribe in the course of their duties”,  
on a scale from 1 to 10 were 1 indicates that the corrupt practice is “Never justifiable” 
and 10 indicates that it is “Always justifiable” (Moreno 2002, 4). 
Other researchers such as Roberta Gatti, Stefano Paternostro and James Rigolini 
(2003) have chosen a slightly different, more parsimonious, strategy for the 
operationalization of corruption tolerance. They decided to only utilize the question 
concerning whether they think that “someone accepting a bribe in the course of their 
duties” can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, as a proxy 
for the respondent’s attitude toward such rule-breaking and explicitly corrupt 
behavior. However, as argued by some scholars, there are at least three advantages to 
using a multi-item index of corruption tolerance instead of just a single-item one 
(Williams & Martinez 2014).  
Firstly, it may be difficult for a single-item question to adequately capture different 
inter-related aspects of the earlier defined concept of corruption tolerance and it may 
furthermore be negatively affected by random errors in measurement. Secondly, errors 
tend to be averaged out in a multi-item index, which indicates a greater reliability. 
Thirdly, a multi-item index pools together information that the different items have in 
common, and is therefore likely to produce superior score reliability (Williams & 
Martinez 2014). Moreover, as we saw in earlier discussions (Johnston 2005, 2014; 
Andersson 2017; see Chapter 2, section 2.1.2), some scholars have argued against a 
unidimensional measurement of corruption (and, indirectly, corruption tolerance) 
with a focus on bribery. Previous research has shown that corruption varies greatly in 
both form and scale, and some forms of corruption are more common in certain types 
of societies (or parts of societies, e.g. sectors or government levels) than in others 
(Johnston 2005, 2014). Bribery, for instance, is more common in economically less 
developed societies where civil servants are poorly remunerated, while it is relatively 
rare in advanced post-industrial societies, such as the Nordic countries, where “undue 
influence” or “conflict of interest” or other more “gray” forms of corruption are more 
frequent (Andersson 2017).  
Certain forms of corruption are furthermore more morally ambiguous than others 
and can arguably be placed on several different points on a lengthy “moral scale” that 
goes from one extreme to another. For instance, some would probably argue that 
bribery, or at least the high-level type involving larger sums, is more morally 
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repugnant than for instance nepotism, where a person in a position of power favors 
their kin. Similarly, in accordance with the broad definition of corruption adopted in 
this study, many would probably argue that the abuse of entrusted power is a 
considerably worse crime than a simple abuse of public resources perpetrated by 
ordinary citizens. Of course, the “level of immorality” of an act is arguably also highly 
dependent on many contextual factors, such as who are the potential victims and how 
many are there, the extent of the direct and indirect damage, and what was the purpose 
of the act (self-enrichment, support to a party or family member/friend, ideological, 
etc.) (Etzioni 2017).  
Exclusively focusing on the act of bribery, the most clear-cut form of corruption in 
the modern sense of the word, and tolerance thereof, would result in too narrow a view 
of the broader phenomenon of corruption. Hence, this would miss many important 
nuances of the more and less sophisticated forms of corruption, which can have very 
serious consequences, especially when aggregated (Dobel 1978; Andersson 2017).  
When constructing indices that aim to measure specific social or political 
phenomena it is inevitable that some measurement problems will arise. One such 
problem highlighted by Moreno (2002, 4) himself is that the answers to the previously 
mentioned survey questions might be contaminated with social desirability biases, 
which signifies that it may be difficult for respondents to answer truthfully to the 
questions due to a fear of being judged and frowned upon by their surrounding society 
and peers in particular. Despite this problem, Moreno still judges that the additive 
index allows for sufficient cross-country and cross-regional variation, thus allowing us 
to come to some conclusions. Other survey-based studies that have used similar 
questions regarding various hypothetical scenarios agree that these measures have face 
validity, and that they suffer less from social desirability bias than more direct 
questions regarding a person’s involvement in corruption and other forms of unethical 
behavior (Tavits 2010, 1262). 
In order to maximize the limited variance and deal with the skewness of the 
dependent variable, this study has decided to chiefly utilize a heavily modified version 
of Moreno’s index of corruption permissiveness, which is also utilized by Pop but with 
a different scale. Instead of aggregating all four items as they are and taking the average 
value, this study will follow the same path as Pop (2013, 31) and recode all four scales 
so that all respondents who answered that the four corrupt practices were justifiable to 
some degree receive a value of 1 while those who declared them “never justifiable” 
receive a value of 0.  
A reliability analysis reveals that the four items have a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.807 in 
the full sample, which indicates that respondents scoring high on one variable tend to 
score high on all four. The recoded items are then computed into a 5-pointed 
summative scale that measures the acceptance of corrupt practices and varies between 
the scores 0, 25, 50, 75 and 100, where a higher value indicates a greater tolerance (see 
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Chapter 4, Figure 4.1). However, the study will also strive to control the robustness of 
its results using various alternative measurement strategies, including Moreno’s 
original corruption permissiveness index. 
 The average score on the corruption tolerance index for the entire pooled sample is 
38.3 (SD = 38.3) but there is quite a large variation across different countries and 
country-waves, with the lowest country/country-wave average in Bangladesh 
(5.6)/Bangladesh (4th Wave, 3.5) and the highest in the Philippines (64.2)/ India (6th 
Wave, 78.6). 
  
3.1.2 Independent variables and control variables 
The aim of this section is to describe the operationalization of the independent 
variables and the control variables included in this study. The section begins by looking 
at how the individual- or micro-level variables are operationalized. 
 
3.1.2.1 Micro-level variables 
Bureaucratic distrust 
Bureaucratic distrust is operationalized using an aggregated measure of institutional 
trust. Earlier studies have demonstrated that all the different trust judgements 
concerning both political and implementing institutions generally can be added into 
one single scale that measures institutional trust (see e.g. Marien 2011).  
However, as was mentioned earlier in this study (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.2), there 
is evidence of covariance87 between the trust judgements regarding the implementing 
institutions, which compels this study to aggregate these into an index of bureaucratic 
distrust. A reliability analysis reveals that the Cronbach’s Alpha of a scale containing 
the three items (trust in the police, courts, and civil service) is 0.743, which indicates 
that respondents scoring high on one variable tend to score high on all three. The scale 
of this index run from zero to 10, where a higher value indicates a greater mistrust 
towards public officials or organizations.  
Unfortunately, the question that measures people’s confidence in the courts is 
missing in wave 4 (2000 – 2004) of the World Values Survey, resulting in a loss of both 
countries and country-waves. This study has therefore decided to only include the 
items regarding confidence in the police and the civil service in order to maximize the 
                                                 
87 Marien (2011, 18) notes some covariation between the police and the legal system “due to sources other than [a] 
general attitude of “trust in political institutions””. 
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number of higher-level units. This indicator is treated as a continuous variable with a 
scale that ranges from zero to one where one indicates a complete lack of confidence. 
However, this study will also perform its analyses using the three-item index and 
report if there are any substantial differences in the results. 
The average score on the bureaucratic distrust index for the entire pooled sample is 
0.5 (SD = 0.25), but there is quite a large variation across different countries and 
country-waves, with the lowest country/country-wave average in Uzbekistan 
(0.19)/Vietnam (5th Wave, 0.18) and the highest in the Dominican Republic 
(0.7)/Argentina (4th Wave, 0.75). 
Self-perceived extent of public corruption  
Perceived extent of public corruption is operationalized using the following question 
in wave 3 of the World Values Survey: “How widespread do you think bribe taking 
and corruption is in this country?” (1 = Almost no public officials engaged in it; 2 = A 
few are; 3 = Most are; 4 = Almost all public officials are engaged in it). This item will 
initially be treated as a dichotomous variable that varies between zero (almost none or 
a few are engaged) and one (most or almost all are engaged) in the micro-level analysis. 
Later on, it is treated as a continuous variable with a scale that ranges from zero to one 
where one indicates a high level of self-perceived corruption in the interaction analysis. 
The average score (in original metrics) on this micro-level corruption perception 
indicator is 2.9 (SD = 0.8).  
 
Micro-level controls 
Socio-economic status  
Six different standard questions in the WVS regarding socio-economic status (SES) are 
included in the analyses as individual-level controls: Age, gender, income, education, 
marital status, and employment status.  
Age is included because aging is often argued to be strongly related to people’s 
attitudes toward rule breaking or deviant behavior. A person’s age is argued to have 
an effect through either some type of socialization effect where people acquire greater 
social stakes as they grow older, thereby becoming more reluctant to risk losing hard-
earned resources (the desistance theory), or through some biological process where the 
aging of the organism affects individual behavior (the aging theory, Gottfredson & 
Hirschi 1990).  
Gender is likewise included due to the frequently observed greater aversion towards, 
and lesser involvement in, corruption, tax evasion, and other kinds of rule breaking 
behaviors observed among women. This in turn is claimed to be either due to 
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differences in nature between men and women, where men are more competitive and 
risk-taking than women, or due to differences in opportunity structure, where men are 
more often in direct contact with public authorities (Torgler & Valev 2010).  
Income is included due to the assigned importance of the amount of resources 
available to invest in corrupt activities or, alternatively, to cope with unsecure 
conditions. High-income individuals may on one hand have more opportunities to 
behave corruptly, but low-income individuals may on the other hand perceive 
corruption as a personal security mechanism (Jaime-Castillo & Martinez-Cousinou 
2012). More affluent individuals are furthermore argued to have a higher likelihood of 
cheating in order to attain private benefits and further increase their resources, due to 
a sense of greed where affluence begets a sense of self-entitlement and a feeling of being 
“above the law” in some cases (Grundmann & Lambsdorff 2017).  
Education is controlled for due to the simple reason that education is claimed to foster 
civic values and attitudes and increase understanding about the negative consequences 
of bribery and other similar behaviors (Uslaner & Rothstein 2016).  
Finally, Marital status and Employment status are included partly because of the same 
reasons as age, i.e. higher social stakes: Those who are married or/and are employed 
may risk their marriage, job and social status if they choose to behave in a corrupt and 
dishonest way (Kravtsova et al. 2017).    
Age and income are treated as continuous variables and grand mean centered in the 
analyses.  Some of the initially categorical variables are transformed into dummy 
variables in order to facilitate the estimations. Gender was recoded so that the 
respondent receives a one if the respondent is female and zero if the respondent is male. 
Education was transformed so that the respondent receives a one if he or she has a 
university degree and a zero for all other educational levels. Marital status was 
transformed so that the respondent receives a one if the respondent is married and zero 
otherwise. Employment status is transformed so that the respondent receives a one if the 
respondent is unemployed and zero if the respondent has another employment status. 
Religiosity  
In addition to the previously discussed standard controls for socio-economic 
characteristics, it was also judged necessary to include a simple measure of how 
religious a respondent perceives him or herself to be. Corruption tolerance and civic 
morality tends to be viewed as “a manifestation of individuals’ broader moral code” 
(Letki 2006, 315), and is thereby intimately linked with religion, which generally tends 
to condemn corrupt and socially deviant behavior (Beets 2007), and religious values 
that should be controlled for.  
The indicator of religiosity used in the current study is based on the WVS survey 
item asking “How important is God in your life?” on a scale of one (“Not at all 
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important”) to 10 (“Very important”), which is treated as continuous and recoded to 
range from zero to one. 
Generalized trust  
As a final micro-level control, this study will include the often-used proxy for social 
capital, i.e. the level of generalized trust. People with a high generalized trust are often 
argued to have a greater tendency to cooperate with other people outside their own in-
groups, and are thereby seen as less likely to free ride on the public good and turn to 
corrupt practices (Uslaner 2004).  
This variable is operationalized using the standard survey question used to measure 
social capital in the literature: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”, which is 
recoded to range between zero (“Most people can be trusted”) and one (“Need to be 
very careful”). 
 
3.1.2.2 Macro-level variables 
Socio-economic development 
The widely used term “development” (and “poverty” for that matter) is rather fuzzy 
and there is an extensive debate among scholars regarding the correct way of 
operationalizing this phenomenon (see e.g. Milenkovic et al. 2014).  
The commonly used gross domestic product (GDP) per capita measure has received 
a lot of criticism due to its alleged narrowness and inability to capture other important 
non-economic dimensions that are argued to be important determinants of the 
wellbeing of populations, such as happiness, life expectancy, access to education, 
internet connectedness or gender equality. Economic growth alone is widely argued to 
be insufficient as an indicator of how developed a certain society is or how capable its 
citizens are in comparison to other societies’, which is why this study has opted to use 
the term socio-economic development rather than mere economic development.    
However, despite the previously mentioned criticism directed towards this 
measure, this study has still decided due to reasons of data availability to mainly utilize 
GDP per capita, which is “the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value 
of the products” divided by midyear population (The World Bank [2]).  
The data for this variable are retrieved from a secondary source88, the V-Dem 
extended dataset (2018), and it has been transformed by taking the natural logarithm 
                                                 
88 The original source is the Maddison Project Database (2018). 
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(ln). An alternative, education-based development indicator will also be used to control 
the robustness of the findings. The Education index, which is an integral part of the 
widely used Human Development Index, is calculated using mean years of schooling 
and expected years of schooling (UNDP 2018).  
The data for this variable in turn originate from the United Nations Development 
Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Reports. The scale of both development 
indicators have been recoded to range from zero to one in order to facilitate 
interpretation. 
The average GDP per capita (in $) for the entire pooled sample is 8817.14 (SD = 
7669.20) but there is a very large variation across different countries, with the lowest 
country/country-wave average in Tanzania (4th Wave, 534.76) and the highest in the 
United States (5th Wave, 30199.81).  
Economic Inequality 
Economic inequality is operationalized in this study using the standard measure of 
inequality, the (income based) Gini index, which measures how unequal the 
distribution of income is as a Gini coefficient on a scale from zero to 100. The data for 
this variable originate in part from both the V-Dem extended dataset (2018) and the 
UNU-WIDER (2017) World Income Inequality Database (WIID). The scale of this 
variable has been recoded to range from zero to one in order to facilitate interpretation. 
The average original score on the income based Gini index for the entire pooled 
sample is 39.39 (SD = 9.86) but there is a relatively large variation across different 
countries, with the lowest country/country-wave average in Slovakia (19.45)/(4th Wave, 
534.76) and the highest in Zimbabwe (73.3) (5th Wave, 30199.81).  
Institutional quality and economic performance 
Procedural quality 
Procedural quality, i.e. the efficiency and “cleanliness” of government activities, is 
operationalized using different measures of efficiency and corruption, two of which 
are retrieved from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI; The World Bank [3]) 
project, a set of cross-country indicators of governance developed by Daniel 
Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010). The WGI measure governance 
in over 200 countries since 1996 and consist of six broad dimensions of governance: 
“Voice and Accountability”, “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism”, 
“Government Effectiveness”, “Regulatory Quality”, “Rule of Law” and “Control of 
Corruption”. 
This study has chosen to utilize two of the six governance indicators in its empirical 
analyses, namely Government Effectiveness (GE) and Control of Corruption (CC). 
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The former indicator captures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies”. The latter in turn captures “perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised  for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by  elites and private 
interests” (Kaufmann et al. 2010, 4). As can be inferred from the two previous 
quotations, the chosen indicators are based exclusively on subjective assessments of 
public sector efficiency and corruption, gathered from various household, firm and 
expert surveys.  
There are three reasons why Kaufmann et al. (2010, 17-18) decided to use perception-
based measurements of governance. The first reason is that the behavior of agents is 
influenced by how they perceive reality. The authors argue that “[i]f citizens believe 
that the courts are inefficient or the police are corrupt, they are unlikely to avail 
themselves of their services”89 (Kaufmann et al. 2010, 18). Investors are similarly more 
likely to base their investment decisions on expert evaluations and perceptions of 
reality rather than on actual cold hard facts. The conclusion is thusly that perceptions 
influence reality and therefore possess intrinsic value.  
The second reason is that there are very few real alternatives when assessing some 
important questions or phenomena related to governance. Corruption, for instance, is 
a very illusive phenomenon that does not leave a lot of concrete evidence due to its 
illegal nature. This makes it almost impossible to objectively measure some aspects of 
governance (Kaufmann et al. 2010, 18). The third and final reason mentioned by the 
authors is that available objective data tend to capture so-called “official” or de jure 
aspects of government praxis, which may differ from the actual or de facto reality that 
individual agents or citizens confront on a daily basis. Bribe taking may for instance 
formally be prohibited by law, but informally widely tolerated in some parts of the 
public sector. Official statistics regarding the quality of service delivery can be 
manipulated by those in power, and is therefore unreliable as an indicator of 
institutional quality. 
However, correlation analysis shows that these two measures have an extremely 
high correlation (Pearson’s r = .939), which raises the issue of multicollinearity and 
compels this study to analyze them in separate models to see which is the better 
predictor. This gives a good indication of how closely entangled inefficiency and 
corruption truly are, with inefficiency giving strong incentives for the use of bribes and 
with corrupt public officials colluding to engender ever more bureaucratic obstacles 
with the hope of extorting bribes, as argued by Myrdal (1968). 
                                                 
89 Or the citizens may instead turn to informal institutions such as corruption or organized crime, as this study has 
argued in earlier sections.  
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The scale of this variable has been recoded to range from zero to one. The average 
original score on the Control of Corruption index, which ranges between -2.5 (very 
corrupt) and 2.5 (very clean), for the entire pooled sample is .095 (SD = 1.06) but there 
is quite a large variation across different countries, with the lowest country/country-
wave score in Iraq (-1.39)/Georgia (3rd Wave, -1.39) and the highest in Finland (2.45).   
Economic performance 
This study’s second dimension of institutional performance is more interested in the 
potential outcome of government activities rather than in the activities themselves. Here 
this study has decided to focus on economic performance, operationalized using the 
cumulated90 rate of growth in GDP of the five previous years before the survey 
occasion. The data used for this variable originate from the WGI dataset (The World 
Bank [3]). However, alternative indicators of economic performance are also used (see 
Chapter 4, section 4.2.2.3). The scale of this variable has been recoded to range from 
zero to one. 
  
Macro-level controls 
Post-communist countries  
In addition to the previously discussed macro-level independent variables, this study 
will also include a couple of system-level controls, the first of which is a dummy for 
the former communist countries. The specific historical experiences of scarcity, 
inefficiency and corrupt public institutions is argued to have resulted in the diffusion 
of resilient norms that are conducive to corrupt behavior.  
Similarly, dummies for the Latin American or East Asian countries could also have 
been included in the analyses, due to the earlier mentioned high level of corruption 
tolerance observed in some of the countries in these regions. However, the study opted 
not to include them, due to there being no specific common historical experience or 
critical juncture in the recent history of these particular countries comparable to that of 
the post-communist countries and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rest of the 
socialist systems in Eastern Europe.  
Furthermore, adding dummies for these particular cases would not be that helpful 
in telling us what exactly is so special about these countries, other than their weak 
institutions, high levels of inequality or other potential explanatory factors that are 
                                                 
90 The average rate of growth and the rate of growth in the previous year are also tested. 
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controlled for elsewhere. The post-communist countries are arguably unique in this 
regard and therefore deserve a dummy variable. 
Duration of democracy  
The second macro-level control variable included in the analyses is an indicator of how 
long a country has been democratic since 1900 without any significant interruptions in 
the prevailing form of government. The data for this variable originate from the Boix-
Miller-Rosato (2014) dataset. 
Studies have demonstrated that long91, uninterrupted periods of democratic 
governance are required for countries to experience any significant reductions in 
perceived corruption (e.g. Treisman 2000). One reason for this is probably that it takes 
a long time for new fragile democratic institutions to consolidate so that they can 
become better at resisting corrupt abuses. Another reason could be that it takes time 
for democratic values and norms to take root in a society after it has made the transition 
from an autocratic system to a democratic one, as people slowly adjust to their newly 
won liberties and political rights. This adjustment is likely to be especially difficult for 
older generations who are more used to living under autocratic rule and have formed 
their basic values and norms under such circumstances (Inglehart 1971). 
Only the current democratic regime is taken into account and not brief democratic 
experiences in the beginning of the 20th century, as in the case of Estonia, which was 
categorized by the Polity Project as a democracy between the years 1919 and 1933 
before first suffering a democratic breakdown and then occupation by the Soviet Union 
and (briefly) Nazi Germany from 1940 onward until 1991 when the current democratic 
period began (Polity Project 2019; Encyclopedia Britannica 2019). This study finds it 
unlikely that such distant and short-lived experiences of democratic governance have 
left any strong and enduring impressions on the values of ordinary citizens and has 
therefore chosen to focus on the length of more recent experiences of democracy. In 
Estonia’s case, the relevant period is therefore from 1991 to the year of the survey in 
question.  
The year 1900 was chosen as a threshold year mainly because it represents, in the 
words of John Gerring, Philip Bond, William T. Barndt and Carola Moreno (2005, 341), 
“a period […] in which mass democracy becomes a world-historical phenomenon (no 
longer restricted to the US and a few European states)” and because of data availability. 
However, this study will also try using alternative indicators of democratization, such 
as a country’s degree of democratization (polity index, Polity Project 2019) and 
                                                 
91 Daniel Treisman (2000) found that at least 40 years of consecutive democracy was needed for even a small decrease 
in corruption level. 
84 
 
dummies for autocracies and/or anocracies. The scale of this variable has been recoded 
to range from zero to one. 
 
3.2 Research Model, Method of Analysis, and Data Sources 
This section will take a closer look at the research model, the method of analysis, and 
the data sources utilized in this study. After this methodological discussion, the study 
will move on to the empirical analyses themselves. We will begin by examining the 
research model. 
 
3.2.1 Research model 
The following figure (Figure 3.1) illustrates the research model used in this study: 
 
Figure 3.1 Research model 
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3.2.2 Method of analysis 
The main method of analysis utilized in this dissertation is three-level hierarchical 
multilevel modeling (see Figure 3.2) where the primary units of observation are 
individuals (the first level) nested within country-waves, (the second level) which in 
turn are nested within countries (the third level), and the outcome variable of interest, 
“Corruption tolerance”, is treated as a linear outcome. All continuous variables included 
in this study have been centered around their grand mean values in order to facilitate 
the interpretation of the intercept. 
There are several reasons why using multilevel analysis is recommended as an 
alternative to the more traditional single level methods in order to answer questions of 
interest to social scientists. Next, this section will briefly summarize some of the 
advantages of including more than one level in the analyses. 
One of the central assumptions of linear regression models is that the variance is 
homoscedastic, i.e. that the size of the error term, or residual92, is the same across the 
values of an independent variable. This means that there should be no patterns 
whatsoever among the residuals. However, this is often not the case in statistical 
analyses based on real world data: Individual cases are often grouped or clustered into 
subgroups where the patterns regarding the effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable can vary quite substantially between different clusters of cases. For 
instance, members of a given society often share certain social norms regarding, inter 
alia, ethics, trust and reciprocity, and also to a high degree answer under the same 
public and private institutions. This often also equates to that their attitudes toward 
different societal phenomena are likely to be correlated, corruption included. To ignore 
the realistic complexity intrinsic to naturally occurring dependencies and fit only 
single-level models could therefore result in inefficient standard errors and the loss of 
important information (Jones & Duncan 1998). 
 
                                                 
92 The differential between the predicted (modeled) value and the actual sample value.  
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Figure 3.2 Three-level structure 
Multilevel modeling relaxes the usually held assumptions of independence between 
the observations on varying data levels and should therefore be particularly suitable 
for studies involving hypotheses about the influence of group-specific contextual 
factors such as culture or institutional structures. One of the key advantages of 
multilevel techniques is thusly argued to be that they facilitate the exploration of such 
contextuality and complexity that would otherwise have remained quite inaccessible 
using standard procedures, paving the way for a much richer set of analyses. This 
“analytical enrichment”-effect could further be strengthened by the multilevel 
approach’s ability of modelling simultaneously at each level; enabling the separation 
of “compositional” effects from “contextual” effects (Jones & Duncan 1998, 23-26).  
If this study would instead choose to ignore the autocorrelation it could, in the 
words of Kelvyn Jones and Craig Duncan (1998, 22), “result in incorrect estimates of 
precision, giving incorrect confidence limits and tests”. Another technical advantage 
lies in the ability of multilevel models to “distinguish between […] two different levels 
of variation through the random parameters” (Jones & Duncan 1998, 22). This means 
that the explanatory powers of higher-level predictors are more likely to be correctly 
estimated when using multilevel techniques. 
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3.2.3 Data sources 
This study utilizes high quality data from the official WVS aggregate file, which pools 
together individual-level data from all six waves. The number of countries included in 
the World Values Survey was very limited in the first two survey waves covering the 
periods 1981 – 1984 and 1990 – 1994 (10 and 18 countries respectively).  
High coverage was attained only since the third wave (1995 – 1999; 57 countries) and 
this study has therefore chosen to include data exclusively from the four latest waves 
of the survey in its main analyses: 1995 – 1999 (Wave III), 2000 – 2004 (Wave IV), 2005 
– 2009 (Wave V), and 2010 – 2014 (Wave VI). This sample includes in total more than 
300 000 individuals from over 90 different countries representing all global regions of 
relevance. However, after the deletion of cases where there are data missing for key 
variables of interest, the final sample includes 84 countries, 170 country-waves, and 
around 230 000 individual respondents. 
Other data sources for the macro-level variables include the V-Dem extended 
dataset (2018), the Worldwide Governance indicators (The World Bank [3]), the UNDP 
(2018) Human Development database, the UNU-WIDER (2017) World Income 
Inequality Database (WIID), and the Boix-Miller-Rosato (2014) and Polity Project (2019) 
datasets. 
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 4. Empirical analyses 
This chapter presents the results and findings of the empirical analyses and compares 
them to the earlier discussed hypotheses and the findings in previous empirical 
studies. It starts by presenting a few descriptive statistics of the variables that also 
demonstrate the variation in corruption tolerance across all the countries and country-
waves included in the statistical analyses, before moving on to the main micro-, macro-
, and cross-level analyses. Lastly, it discusses the robustness of the findings. 
 
4.1 Descriptive analyses 
The chapter begins by first looking at some descriptive analyses of the data included 
in this study. As can be seen from Table 4.1, the average corruption tolerance in the 84 
countries and the 170 country-waves included in these analyses is relatively low (~ 38 
on a scale from 0 – 100). However, figures 4.3 and 4.4 indicate that there is quite a lot 
of variation in the average country- and country-wave-level corruption tolerance, 
ranging from as low as approximately 7.7 and 3.5 in Bangladesh (Waves 3 & 4; country 
average: 5.6) to as high as 64.2 (country average) in the Philippines and 77.3 in Thailand 
(wave 5). These findings indicate that the country context matters with regard to the 
variation in corruption tolerance, although, there seems to be a greater variation 
between different country-waves. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive information of main variables 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Corruption tolerance 230 143 0 100 38.29 38.32 
Bureaucratic distrust (police & civil 
service) 
224 221 0 1 .5041 .252 
Age 242 459 15 99 41.37 16.39 
Gender (female) 242 953 0 1 .52 .500 
Household income 223 900 1 10 4.67 2.32 
Education (university degree) 242 953 0 1 .15 .36 
Marital status (married) 242 953 0 1 .57 .495 
Employment status (unemployed)  242 953 0 1 .10 .296 
Religiosity 237 357 1 10 7.63 3.02 
Generalized trust (high) 242 953 0 1 .71 .455 
GDP per capita, logged 242 953 6.28 10.32 8.67 .964 
Income inequality, Gini 242 953 19.45 73.30 39.39 9.86 
Control of Corruption (WGI) 242 953 -1.39 2.53 .095 1.06 
Cumulative growth (annual %) of 
previous 5 years (WGI) 
242 953 -103.10 154.06 14.67 25.99 
Post-communist country 242 953 0 1 .26 .437 
Duration of current democratic 
regime (since 1900) 
242 953 0 111 24.57 33.99 
Valid N (listwise) 198 063 
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Figure 4.1 Dependent variable 
 
Figure 4.2 Tolerance of bribe taking 
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Figure 4.3 Average corruption tolerance in 84 countries (WVS Wave 3-6) 
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Figure 4.4 Average corruption tolerance in 170 country-waves (WVS Wave 3-6)  
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4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
This section continues on to the multivariate analysis of the previously described data, 
starting with the micro effects before moving on to the macro (contextual) effects and 
finishing with the interaction effects. As a start, the section begins by analyzing the 
impact of individual characteristics and values. 
 
4.2.1 Micro-level effects 
As we saw from the figures in the previous section, there is a relatively large variation 
in the data between both countries and different country-waves. However, in order to 
estimate just how much of the variation is situated on the higher levels and how much 
is due to compositional (individual) characteristics, and which particular factors 
explain this variation, a number of multilevel models need to be estimated. The 
modeling strategy utilized here, which is divided into six different stages, is as follows:  
In the first stage, a null model is estimated so that the estimated variance 
components in this model can be used to calculate the intra-cluster correlations (ICC), 
which indicate how much of the variance in corruption tolerance is explained at the 
country- and the country-wave-levels respectively (Hox et al. 2017). The ICCs in the 
null or empty model (Model 0) in Table 4.2 are approximately 6.3 % at the country-
level (level 3) and 7.5 % at the country-wave-level (level 2), which indicates that the 
remaining 92.5 % of the variation is explained by individual-level factors. All three 
variance components are highly significant (p<0.01), which means that corruption 
tolerance not only varies significantly among individual, but also across country-waves 
and countries. The estimation that only 7.5 % from the variance is due to contextual 
factors indicates that the differences between individuals weigh more than the 
differences between countries or country-waves.  
In the second stage, the study proceeds to estimating a model (Model 1a) that 
contains all individual-level predictors, except for the self-perceived corruption 
dummy variable, in order to ensure that the country-level variation is not solely a result 
of differences in population composition. Following this, in the third stage, it estimates 
a model (Model 1b) containing the second key micro-level variable of interest in this 
study, the indicator of the self-perceived extent of corruption, which limits the data to 
wave 3 of the WVS.  
After having analyzed the micro-level effects, the study proceeds to the fourth stage, 
where it analyzes the effects of the macro-level variables of interest (Model 2 and 3). 
Having done this, it turns its attention in the fifth stage to the cross-level interactions 
between bureaucratic distrust and the key macro-level variables of interest and 
includes interaction terms in the next set of models (Model 4 and 5). Finally, in the sixth 
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stage of this empirical analysis, the study estimates a model of the interaction effect 
between bureaucratic distrust and the self-perceived extent of corruption on the 
probability of accepting or tolerating bribe taking (Model 6).  
All continuous predictors have been grand mean centered and recoded to range 
between zero (the lowest value) and one (the highest value) in order to facilitate 
interpretation of the intercept. 
Table 4.2 Relationship between bureaucratic distrust, self-perceived corruption, and corruption tolerance 
Variables Model 0 S.E. Model 1a S.E. Model 1b S.E. 
Bureaucratic distrust   3.4*** 1.3 6.0** 2.3 
High self-perceived corruption (ref. low)   1.1** 0.5 
Age   -23.8*** 1.9 -33.2*** 2.5 
Female   -1.6*** 0.3 -2.2*** 0.5 
Level of income   3.5*** 1.2 0.5 1.7 
University education (ref. other)  -2.1*** 0.6 -2.2* 1.3 
Married (ref. other status)   -2.6*** 0.3 -4.0*** 0.5 
Unemployed (ref. other status)  0.9** 0.4 1.0 0.9 
Religiosity   -11.1*** 1.8 -10.9*** 2.6 
Low generalized trust (ref. high)  -1.7*** 0.5 -3.2*** 1.0 
Intercept 38.7 1.4*** 42.4*** 1.4 44.0*** 2.3 
Variance components:       
Level 3, intercept 92.7 24.9 87.9 23.6 157.5 35.4 
Level 2, intercept 109.8 16.7 103.2 15.7   
Level 1, intercept 1262.4 3.7 1225.6 3.9 1171.8 8.1 
N of countries (level 3) 84  84  40  
N of country-waves (level 
2) 170  170  -  
N of individuals (level 1) 230143  198063  42175  
Estimation:  IGLS  IGLS  IGLS  
-2*loglikelihood:  2297390.7 1971389.3 417903.4  
Note. Robust standard errors, ***p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 (2-tailed tests). All continuous 
variables have been grand mean centered. 
4.2.1.1 Bureaucratic distrust, perceived corruption, and corruption tolerance 
Turning to the first key individual-level variable of interest, “Bureaucratic distrust”, 
the results show that, as expected, its coefficient is positive and highly significant in 
Model 1a (p<0.01), which indicates that the less confidence or more distrust individuals 
have in the administrative institutions, the more tolerant they are of corrupt practices, 
a finding that supports hypothesis 1.  
Low confidence in the public authorities charged with the implementation of public 
policy and the preservation of public order is related to a more authority challenging 
attitude towards the legitimacy of these normatively impartial institutions and a lesser 
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willingness to comply with social norms or show solidarity with the rest of society and 
the public good (Tyler 2002; Marien & Hooghe 2011). Figure 4.5 illustrates this positive 
relationship. 
  
Figure 4.5 Bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance 
Individuals who demonstrate a very low confidence or a high distrust in public 
authorities are more likely to be less optimistic and to draw the conclusion that hard 
work (and honesty) do not generally bring success93, and that free riding on the public 
good is the preferred (and widely chosen) mode of behavior, especially if it confers 
benefits to that person’s “tribe” or in-group (e.g. family or clique). However, as was 
stated earlier, both institutional trust and corruption tolerance are likely to be 
endogenous and caused by other exogenous factors such as the quality of public 
services. Macro-level predictors are therefore introduced in the following models in 
order to check if commonly argued causes of institutional trust/distrust explain the 
higher-level variation in corruption tolerance. Before turning to the macro effects, 
however, the results for the second key micro-level variable, “Self-perceived 
corruption”, and the micro-level controls are inspected. 
The other key individual-level variable, which indicates the respondent’s perception 
of how widespread corruption is among public officials, shows a significant estimated 
coefficient and a positive sign, thereby supporting hypothesis 2. Respondents who 
perceive that most or almost all public officials are engaged in corruption tend to be 
                                                 
93 A WVS item indicating the respondent’s view on the relationship between hard work and success is positively 
and highly significantly (p<0.01) related to acceptance of bribe taking (results not shown but available upon request), 
suggesting that those who perceive that “[h]ard work doesn´t generally bring success - it´s more a matter of luck 
and connections” (WVS 2018) are more tolerant of corruption. 
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significantly more accepting of corrupt behavior in comparison to those who perceive 
that only very few or almost no one is engaged in such activities. However, the size of 
the coefficient is quite small relative to the other significant coefficients: The difference 
between the respondents who perceive only a little or no corruption and those who 
perceive a lot is approximately only a single percent. 
 
4.2.1.2 Micro-level controls 
The correlations between corruption tolerance and the other individual-level controls 
in Model 1a are generally in agreement with the expectations and results of previous 
studies.  
First, as previous studies have also demonstrated, age is found to be quite a strong 
predictor of corruption tolerance. As the individual grows older, he or she tends to 
become less tolerant of deviant behavior due to various socialization effects related to 
aging such as the rising stakes or costs of participating in corrupt exchanges or 
behaving in a socially deviant manner (Torgler & Valev 2010).  
Second, women have a tendency to be less tolerant of corruption compared to men, 
which potentially could be related to differences in the competitive natures of men and 
women (Lee & Guven 2013). Empirical evidence from the economics literature has 
demonstrated that men tend to be more competitive and consequently more likely to 
resort to foul play and cheating in order to get ahead of the competition.  
Third, those with a higher income tend to show a greater tolerance of corruption 
(and, as recent experiments have demonstrated, a lower tax morale), proposedly due 
to what is described as a “psychological force” that makes affluent people more likely 
to cheat in these kinds of scenarios, i.e. a sense of greed (Grundmann & Lambsdorff 
2017). However, the income variable is non-significant in Model 1b, which 
consequently challenges this finding. 
Fourth, those with a higher education are more likely to condemn corruption, 
arguably as a result of the civic knowledge, skills and values that are conveyed via the 
education system to the more highly educated who are thereby in a better position to 
understand the consequences of corrupt and uncivic behavior (Uslaner & Rothstein 
2016).  
Fifth, religiosity is found to be negatively linked with corruption tolerance. 
Respondents who consider God to be more important in their lives tend to be less 
tolerant of corruption, presumably due to the ethical and moral guidance derived from 
the various religious frameworks that tend to condemn lies, dishonesty, greed, and 
deception, i.e. modes of behavior closely related to various forms of corruption (Beets 
2007).  
97 
 
Sixth, married people have a lesser tendency to justify corruption, possibly due to 
similar reasons as with aging, i.e. a greater risk aversion due to larger stakes (Kravtsova 
et al. 2017). Seventh, the study finds a positive effect of unemployment. However, the 
effect is miniscule and does not turn up significant in Model 1b nor when Moreno’s 
original additive corruption permissiveness index is used.  
In addition to the standard socio-economic status (SES) control variables (plus a 
measure of religiosity) usually included in these types of analyses, a commonly used 
proxy for social capital, namely generalized or interpersonal trust, was also included 
in the analyses. People with a higher confidence in public authorities are more likely 
to possess higher levels of generalized trust and social capital (Rothstein & Stolle 2002), 
which could potentially indicate that at least a part of the impact of bureaucratic 
distrust is indirect, via generalized trust. According to the results, the effect of a low 
generalized trust (“you cannot be too careful” vs. “most people can be trusted”) is 
significant (p<0.05), but negative, i.e. a low generalized trust is related to a lower 
corruption tolerance.  
However, this finding is in fact in line with previous findings regarding the link 
between interpersonal trust and the importance that citizens attach to civic norms 
regarding law abidance.94 According to Kotzian (2014, 66), “[i]f persons believe people 
to be basically bad, unhelpful, and not to be trusted, they are likely to perceive it as 
necessary to have them constrained by laws and norms”. Distrusting persons who fear 
their fellow men are therefore (somewhat) more likely to emphasize that uncivic 
behavior cannot be tolerated at any cost and that the Machiavellian “wicked man” 
must be restrained by force and strong social norms. It must though be underscored 
that generalized trust matters only to a negligible degree and that the coefficient turns 
non-significant in some of the models, especially those that utilize Moreno’s original 
index. 
Now, having covered the predictors on the individual level, the analysis will switch 
level and turn its focus from the individual- or micro-level variables to the country- or 
macro-level variables instead in the next section. 
  
                                                 
94 Operationalized with the European Social Survey question, “[i]n order to be a good citizen, how important is it 
[…] to always obey to laws/regulations?” (Kotzian 2014, 81). 
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4.2.2 Macro-level effects 
The present section changes focus from the micro-level characteristics to the macro-
level contextual factors in order to investigate if the level of socio-economic 
development (natural log of GDP per capita), income inequality (Gini), institutional 
quality (Control of Corruption), and/or economic performance (Economic growth) can 
contribute to explaining the observed macro-level differences in corruption tolerance 
across countries and/or country-waves.   
Model 2 in Table 4.3 shows the estimated effects of the key system-level variables, 
together with the previously discussed individual-level ones but without any country-
level controls. Model 3 meanwhile introduces in addition to the previously mentioned 
variables two macro-level controls plus a country dummy for an observed outlier case, 
Zimbabwe. 
The introduction of the macro-level predictors in the analysis has quite a powerful 
impact on the dependent variable. However, much of this explanatory power seems to 
originate from just three explanatory variables: “GINI”, “Post-Communist Country” 
and the outlier dummy. Once these three variables are added to Model 1, the country-
level variance component shrinks from around 88 in Model 1 to 60, i.e. by almost a 
third, while the country-wave component remains virtually unchanged.95 
 
  
                                                 
95 The country-level variables in Model 2 and Model 3 do not significantly improve the model’s fit to the data (due 
to the relatively large number of new parameters). However, the -2*log-likelihood or deviance decreased from 
1971389.286 (Model 1) to 1971377.361 in a model with only the three previously mentioned variables (model not 
shown), a difference of 11.925. This difference can be seen as a ꭓ² value with 3 degrees of freedom (three new 
parameters), which indicates a high statistical significance (p<0.01). 
99 
 
Table 4.3 Micro- and macro-level effects 
Variables Model 2 S.E. Model 3 S.E. 
Micro-Level 
Characteristics     
Bureaucratic distrust 3.4*** 1.3 3.4*** 1.3 
Age -23.8*** 1.9 -23.8*** 1.9 
Female (dum.) -1.6*** 0.3 -1.6*** 0.3 
Level of income 3.5*** 1.2 3.5*** 1.2 
University education 
(dum.) -2.1*** 0.6 -2.1*** 0.6 
Married (dum.) -2.6*** 0.3 -2.6*** 0.3 
Unemployed (dum.) 0.9** 0.4 0.9** 0.4 
Religiosity -11.2*** 1.8 -11.1*** 1.8 
Low generalized trust 
(dum.) -1.8*** 0.5 -1.8*** 0.5 
Macro-Level 
Characteristics     
GDP per Capita (ln) 12.2 9.8 8.3 9.5 
GINI^1 19.1** 9.5 17.0** 8.5 
GINI^2 75.6** 31.4   
GINI^3 -194.1*** 61.1   
Control of Corruption -16.2** -6.6 -5.8 7.7 
Economic growth -5.9 -0.6 -1.1 14.9 
Post-Communist Country   9.1** 3.6 
Democracy duration   -0.1 4.9 
Intercept 40.7*** 1.7 40.2*** 1.7 
Variance components:     
Level 3, intercept 62.3 19.9 63.2 19.9 
Level 2, intercept 106.3 16.1 105.0 15.9 
Level 1, intercept 1225.6 3.9 1225.6 3.9 
N of countries (level 3) 84  84  
N of country-waves (level 
2) 170  170  
N of individuals (level 1) 198063  198063  
Estimation:  IGLS  IGLS  
-2*loglikelihood:  1971378.0  1971376.0  
Note. Robust standard errors, ***p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 (2-tailed tests). All predictors have 
been grand mean centered. 
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4.2.2.1 Socio-economic development and corruption tolerance 
This section begins the review of potential macro-level explanations by focusing on the 
first dimension of interest, socio-economic development, operationalized in the presented 
models using the natural log of a country’s GDP per capita. Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that the level of socio-economic development and corruption tend to be 
highly correlated96 and that more developed countries tend to be perceived as 
significantly less corrupt. However, is there also a relationship between development 
level and public attitudes towards corrupt and uncivic behavior? In other words, have 
the populations of poor countries a tendency to be more tolerant of corruption when 
compared to the populations of more affluent countries? 
As we saw earlier in the theory section, there are somewhat conflicting expectations 
regarding the relationship between socio-economic development and corruption 
tolerance. However, based on the previously mentioned observations regarding the 
link between development and corruption, and the arguments that widespread 
poverty contributes to generating “cultures of corruption”, social deviancy, and moral 
flexibility among citizens, it was hypothesized that socio-economically less developed 
societies tend to be significantly more tolerant of corrupt practices.  
An inspection of the coefficients of GDP per capita (ln) reveals that it is non-
significant in both models in Table 4.3. Moreover, the coefficient shows a positive sign 
when institutional (procedural) quality is taken into account97, which contradicts 
hypothesis 3, according to which countries with a higher level of socio-economic 
development should be less tolerant of corruption, not more. This finding mirrors the 
findings of Kravtsova et al. (2017) and Dülmer (2014), who report that the attitude 
regarding the acceptance of bribes is not related to a country’s level of development, 
measured using the Human Development Index (HDI). However, this study also tried 
using an alternative indicator of development, the Education index98, which is a 
component of the HDI and calculated using mean years of schooling and expected 
years of schooling (UNDP 2018). The coefficient for this variable is in turn highly 
significant (p<0.01) and positive (24.6) as long as the corruption indicator is also 
included in the model. Once “Control of Corruption” is removed, it turns non-
significant. 
Based on these results it can be concluded that there is no significant relationship 
between a country’s level of development and corruption tolerance: poor countries do not 
                                                 
96 The correlation between GDP per capita and Control of Corruption is .729. This study ran tests for collinearity, 
but it does not seem to be a problem based on the resulting VIF-value of 2.152. The correlation with its alternative 
development indicator, the Education index, is smaller (.613, VIF=1.631), but the results were similar. This leads this 
study to conclude that the observed reaction is not due to collinearity. 
97 The coefficient does show an expected negative sign when this study includes it as the sole macro-level predictor, 
but its size is miniscule (-0.704) and non-significant, and it turns positive when it introduces its corruption indicator. 
98 Results not shown but available upon request. 
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have a significantly higher acceptance or tolerance of corrupt practices and free riding 
when compared to rich countries. On the contrary, there seems to be some indications 
of the opposite when one also considers institutional quality, although this might still 
be due to collinearity and should therefore be interpreted with caution. Now, this 
chapter will shift its attention to another related variable that concerns economic 
resources, or rather the distribution of them, namely economic inequality. 
 
4.2.2.2 Economic inequality and corruption tolerance 
This section turns its attention to the relationship between corruption tolerance and 
this study’s second “dimension of dysfunctionality”, economic inequality, 
operationalized using the income-based Gini index99 where higher values indicate a 
higher level of income inequality. 
Earlier in the theoretical discussion, it was hypothesized that there may be a non-
linear statistical relationship between inequality and corruption tolerance based on a 
previous empirical finding that suggested a negative correlation between inequality and 
corruption tolerance (Pop 2012). A finding that contradicts many of the earlier 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence regarding the impact of inequality on 
public attitudes regarding corruption and civic morality or social solidarity (Dobel 
1978; You & Khagram 2005; Uslaner 2008; Kotzian 2014; Rothstein & Uslaner 2005; 
Paskov & Dewilde 2012). Pop’s study, however, only included European countries, 
thereby excluding many of the extremely unequal societies often found in Latin 
America or on the African continent. Consequently, it was hypothesized that the 
relationship between inequality and corruption tolerance could potentially be non-
linear, a hypothesis which this study’s initial analysis (shown in Model 2 in Table 4.3) 
seemed to support as the results showed a highly significant (p<0.01) cubic, tilted S-
shaped relationship. 
However, a closer look at the data reveals that this initially observed non-linear 
relationship is largely due to a couple of influential outliers (Slovakia and Zimbabwe) 
and once dummy variables for Zimbabwe (included but not shown) and for the post-
communist countries in general are included (see Model 3 and the discussion regarding 
control variables), the non-linear relationship turns non-significant. A significant 
(p<0.05) and strongly positive linear relationship between income inequality and 
corruption tolerance can now be discerned. This finding indicates that highly unequal 
societies tend to be significantly more tolerant of corrupt practices than their more 
equal counterparts, if one also takes into account the post-communist countries where 
                                                 
99 Alternative versions of the Gini index base their estimates on wealth instead of income, but because it is more 
difficult to measure wealth than income, most Gini coefficients usually refer to income (Investopedia [2]). 
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economic resources historically tend to be relatively equally distributed as a 
consequence of their socialist heritages of previous lack of free markets and limited 
property rights (Karklins 2005). Figure 4.6 illustrates this relationship. 
 
Figure 4.6 Income inequality and corruption tolerance 
The evidence presented in the table and illustrated in the figure above suggest that the 
estimated average corruption tolerance is approximately 31 on a scale from 0 to 100 in 
the most equal societies (controlling for the post-communist countries) and 52 in the 
most unequal societies, ceteris paribus. 
Based on this evidence, it may be concluded that hypothesis 4 is only partly 
confirmed: Corruption tolerance indeed tends to be significantly higher in countries with 
a high level of inequality, but there is no evidence of a non-linear relationship after having 
controlled for post-communist countries and outliers. However, it must also be noted 
that these results are relatively unstable and sensitive to changes in the model 
configuration, such as, for instance, the exclusion of certain influential cases (e.g. the 
Philippines, South Africa or some Latin American countries), and should therefore be 
treated with caution. More data on a more extensive number of country-level cases 
(especially extremely unequal societies) are needed before any firm conclusions can be 
drawn regarding the relationship between economic inequality and corruption 
tolerance. 
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4.2.2.3 Institutional quality, economic performance, and corruption tolerance 
This section turns the spotlight to the results regarding the two outlined dimensions of 
institutional quality or performance: procedural quality, operationalized with the WGI’s 
Control of Corruption indicator, and economic performance, operationalized with the 
cumulated growth in GDP of the five previous years before the survey occasion.100 The 
section begins by turning its attention to what this study chose to call the “procedural” 
dimension of institutional quality. 
Procedural quality and corruption tolerance 
Earlier it was hypothesized that corruption tolerance should be higher in countries 
with a high level of public sector corruption and low efficiency, i.e. that corruption of 
the “head” (the state) or elite misconduct causes decay of the body politic or societal 
corruption. This hypothesis was based on the argument that if citizens believe that 
public institutions and office holders are corrupt, i.e. partial to those that can afford to 
buy unfair advantages, and inefficient, and if they perceive corruption as “the only 
game in town” and required to “get things done”, they become more likely to view the 
formal institutions as illegitimate and instead turn to informal institutions such as 
clientelism. This could in turn increase their expressed tolerance concerning instances 
of bribery, cheating with taxes, and other related forms of uncivic behavior. 
The first indicator of institutional quality, Control of Corruption, is significant 
(p<0.05) in Model 2 and the sign of the coefficient is negative, which would seem to 
support hypothesis 4 that corruption tolerance tends be higher in countries with higher 
levels of perceived corruption, i.e. lower institutional quality. However, the observed 
effect seems to be dependent on the inclusion of the socio-economic development level 
indicator. Once the non-significant “GDP per capita (ln)” variable is removed from the 
model, the Control of Corruption coefficient drops from around -16 to -8 but remains 
significant. Furthermore, this effect turns non-significant once the control for the post-
communist countries is added to the model (see Model 3). 
This finding is in line with the earlier mentioned non-significant results in Pop (2012) 
and Kravtsova et al. (2017) regarding the effect of institutional quality on bribe 
acceptance and does not support the conclusions of Moreno (2002) and Letki (2006) 
regarding its impact on “civic morality”, a concept closely related to the phenomenon 
of interest in this study (see discussion in Chapter 1, section 1.2).  
However, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions regarding the link 
between procedural quality and corruption tolerance due to the fact that it is difficult 
to tell if the above average corruption tolerance in post-communist countries is a direct 
                                                 
100 This study also tried using the average growth during the same period and it produced similar results, but the 
effects were somewhat stronger for the other measures of growth.  
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consequence of the unique experiences during communist times or if it is a result of the 
high extent of corruption in these countries, or a combination of both factors. Either 
way one could still interpret these results as being consistent with the basic 
interpretation of the rotting fish thesis in the light that the well documented (see e.g. 
Karklins 2005) dysfunctionality of the Soviet and other socialist state institutions have 
often tended to produce a greater proportion of “dysfunctional” citizens with a higher 
tolerance of rule breaking behavior. 
Hypothesis 5, i.e. that there is a negative association between procedural quality and 
corruption tolerance, however cannot be confirmed based on these results and their 
inconsistency.  
Economic performance and corruption tolerance 
Next, the study turns its attention to its second dimension of institutional quality, 
economic performance, which focuses more on the potential outcomes of government 
choices and institutional performance.  
The coefficient for this variable demonstrates the expected negative sign in Model 2 
but fails to reach statistical significance in the present models. Furthermore, it switches 
signs from negative to positive (but remains non-significant) when the dummy for the 
post-communist countries is introduced in Model 3 (see discussion regarding the 
controls in Chapter 3, section 3.1.2). After taking into account the cases that experienced 
deep economic contraction during or after the fall of the communist regimes and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (Investopedia [1]), there is no evidence that recent 
economic performance is in any way related to prevailing attitudes towards corrupt 
practices.  
An alternative indicator of economic performance, the natural log of the average 
inflation of the previous five years, behaves in a similar way as the growth variable, 
albeit turns up highly significant and positive (19.4) in the first model.101 However, 
when controlling for the former communist states, the previously highly significant 
positive effect of the inflation level becomes non-significant.  
A third alternative indicator of economic performance, the level of unemployment, 
in turn fails to reach any conventional level of significance, and even turns up negative, 
thereby supporting the conclusion that there is no significant impact of recent economic 
performance, except for, perhaps, in the unique cases of the former Soviet republics in 
the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is therefore possible that 
only a veritable economic catastrophe, such as the one that occurred in the former 
Soviet states (Investopedia [1]) or the Great Depression during the 1930s (and, more 
recently, the Great Recession [2007 – 2009]; Investopedia [3]-[4]), can have a significant 
impact on expressed public attitudes towards corruption and free riding, at least 
                                                 
101 Results not shown but available upon request. 
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temporarily as a civic protest to recent developments (see the next section). Ordinary 
economic fluctuations seem considerably less likely to have any meaningful impact on 
prevailing attitudes, at least in the short run.102  
These results seem contrary to those of Kotzian (2014) who found that economic 
performance has a positive impact on the acceptance of civic norms (especially law 
abidance and civic engagement), and partly similar103 to the results of Letki (2006) who 
found no significant effect of GDP growth (of the previous year) on civic morality. 
 However, based on the inconsistency of these results it cannot be confirmed that 
economic performance has a significant impact on corruption tolerance (Hypothesis 6). 
 
4.2.2.4 Macro-level controls 
In addition to the previously discussed contextual variables, this study also included 
two macro-level controls in Model 3: A dummy for the post-communist states and an 
indicator of how long a country continuously has been designated a democracy since 
the year 1900, which is when the age of global mass democracy is perceived to have 
begun in earnest (Gerring et al. 2005). 
Only one of these two control variables turns up significant (p <0.01), namely the 
dummy for post-communist countries. Furthermore, the coefficient for this dummy 
variable shows a positive sign, which indicates that corruption tolerance is higher in 
these particular countries. A separate hypothesis for this variable was not formed, but 
this result was to be expected based on the arguments forwarded in Karklins (2004) 
and Sandholtz and Taagepera (2005), among others, who argue that “old habits die 
hard” and that a “culture of impunity”, especially among elite groups, has lived on in 
some of these states. While corruption tolerance is on average somewhat higher in this 
group of countries, there is quite a large variation within this group and between 
different country-waves, ranging from as low as 15.6 in Azerbaijan (Wave 6) and 22.4 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina to 68 in Moldova (Wave 4) and 63.8 in Slovakia. Figure 4.7 
illustrates these differences across different country-waves. 
                                                 
102 However, one could imagine that it may have strong long-term effects, for instance, on child development (see 
Kalil 2013). Young people, especially those from low SES backgrounds who have experienced a strong economic 
downturn during their childhood, may become more pessimistic and cynical as young adults. 
103 However, Letki (2006) finds that citizens living in countries with low unemployment are significantly more 
disapproving of dishonest behaviour, but this study in turn found no significant effect of the level of unemployment. 
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Figure 4.7 Average corruption tolerance in the post-communist countries 
 
A certain pattern can be discerned from the above figure. Four out of the five104 post-
communist country-waves with the highest average corruption tolerance belong to the 
third wave (1995 – 1998), i.e. the wave closest to the years that marked the collapse of 
the communist systems (1989 – 1991), while relatively few105 of the country-waves from 
the third wave belong to the least tolerant ones.  
Moreover, four out of the five106 post-communist countries with the lowest 
corruption tolerance belong to the most recent wave of the WVS (Wave 6). Albania, for 
instance, which has the second highest corruption tolerance in wave 3, has dropped to 
an average level by wave 4. All of this taken together is hardly a coincidence, but more 
likely due to gradual processes of value change driven by either long-term 
                                                 
104 Five (Albania, Slovakia, Croatia, Latvia, the Czech Republic) out of the top ten post-communist country-waves 
with the highest corruption tolerance originate from Wave 3. 
105 Only Bulgaria (10th) and Romania (11th) are among the top 11 least tolerant country-waves. 
106 Four (Azerbaijan, Romania, Armenia, Georgia) out of the top ten post-communist country-waves with the 
lowest corruption tolerance originate from Wave 6. 
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developments (the accumulated experience from the communist era) or short-term 
events (the collapse of the communist systems) or a combination of both.  
Inglehart (1971) has argued that value change principally happens through a process 
called intergenerational population replacement, where younger birth cohorts replace 
older ones in the population. Those generations whose basic values were shaped by 
the deeply dysfunctional and/or autocratic institutions during their formative107 pre-
adult years are gradually replaced by younger generations who grow up with 
relatively less dysfunctional and, at least in some cases, more democratic institutions. 
Moreover, those belonging to the former group become more conservative and less 
likely to take risks as they grow older (see the previous discussion on age and 
corruption tolerance), which would also point to a life-cycle effect when it comes to 
attitudes toward deviant behavior. This somewhat slow process could potentially 
explain some of the change that we can observe in the previous figure.  
 
4.2.3 Interaction effects 
This section explores potential interaction effects between the two key micro-level 
variables “Bureaucratic distrust” and “Self-perceived corruption” on one hand, and 
“Bureaucratic distrust” and the four key macro-level variables of interest, “GDP per 
capita (ln)”, “Economic inequality”, “Control of Corruption”, and “Economic Growth” 
on the other. The aim here is to explore if and how the relationship between confidence 
in the bureaucratic institutions and corruption tolerance varies within different 
contexts and/or across varying perceptions of the extent of public corruption.   
First, the section looks at Model 4 in Table 4.4 where Model 3 from the previous table 
is re-estimated while this time allowing the relationship between “Bureaucratic 
distrust” and “Corruption tolerance” to vary across countries and country-waves. The 
results show that the coefficient of “Bureaucratic distrust” has significant random 
components (Bureaucratic distrust/Bureaucratic distrust) that differ across countries 
and country-waves, which in other words indicates that the relationship between these 
two variables does vary across different contexts.108 
Next, cross-level interaction terms are introduced to the model to see if they can 
contribute to explaining any of the observed variance in effect. Looking at Model 5, the 
study finds two significant cross-level interaction effects concerning the key micro- and 
macro-level variables: “Bureaucratic distrustxGINI” and “Bureaucratic 
                                                 
107 Inglehart (1971) assumes in the socialization hypothesis that people form their basic values in their pre-adult 
years and that they change very little after this period. 
108 Deviance decreased from 1971376.023 (Model 3) to 1970657.163 (Model 4), a difference of 718.86. This difference 
can be seen as a ꭓ² value with 4 degrees of freedom (four new parameters), which indicates a very high statistical 
significance (p<0.01) and that the more complex model is needed. 
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distrustxCorruption”.109 None of the two alternative indicators of socio-economic 
development shows any significant interaction effect at all, which indicates that there 
are no significant differences concerning the effect of bureaucratic distrust in different 
contexts of socio-economic development.  The study thereby finds no support for 
hypothesis 7 that bureaucratic distrust is more strongly associated with corruption 
tolerance in more developed countries. 
The following sections take a closer look at the significant interaction effects that the 
study does find and compare the results to the remaining hypotheses. Finally, the study 
will test hypothesis 9b, i.e. if there is a significant interaction effect in the expected 
direction between the two key variables on the individual-level. 
 
  
                                                 
109 Deviance decreased from 1970657.163 (Model 4) to 1970631.633 (Model 5), a difference of 25.530. This difference 
can be seen as a ꭓ² value with 4 degrees of freedom (four new parameters), which indicates a high statistical 
significance (p<0.01). 
109 
 
Table 4.4 Cross-level interactions 
Variables Model 4 S.E. Model 5 S.E. 
Micro-Level Characteristic     
Bureaucratic distrust 5.3*** 1.2 5.1*** 1.0 
Macro-Level Characteristics     
GDP per Capita (ln) 7.8 9.6 8.5 9.6 
Income inequality 15.3* 8.4 17.4** 8.5 
Control of Corruption -4.9 7.6 -5.9 7.6 
Economic growth -0.3 14.9 0.4 15.3 
Post-Communist Country 8.5** 3.5 8.5** 3.6 
Democracy duration -0.6 4.9 -0.5 4.8 
Interaction effects     
Bureaucratic distrustxGDP   -10.4* 6.0 
Bureaucratic distrustxGINI   -24.1*** 5.5 
Bureaucratic distrustxCorruption   11.0** 4.3 
Bureaucratic distrustxEconomic growth  -17.9* 9.8 
Intercept                                                                  
40.7*** 1.7 40.8*** 1.7  
Variance components:     
Level 3, intercept 62.1 20.0 61.6 19.9 
Bureaucratic distrust/intercept -8.5 13.5 -2.8 12.1 
Bureaucratic distrust/Bureaucratic 
distrust 65.0 18.3 46.5 14.7 
Level 2, intercept 106.6 16.1 106.9 16.2 
Bureaucratic distrust/intercept -3.0 10.1 -6.6 9.7 
Bureaucratic distrust/Bureaucratic 
distrust 61.6 12.6 55.1 11.6 
Level 1, intercept 1219.3 3.9 1219.3 3.9 
N of countries (level 3) 84  84  
N of country-waves (level 2) 170  170  
N of individuals (level 1) 198063  198063  
Estimation:  IGLS  IGLS  
-2*loglikelihood:  1970657.2 1970631.6   
Note. Robust standard errors, ***p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 (2-tailed test). All models include 
the individual-level controls and all variables have been grand mean centered.       
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4.2.3.1 Interaction effect of bureaucratic distrust and economic inequality 
Initially this section turns its attention to the cross-level interaction between 
bureaucratic distrust and a country’s level of income inequality. Here the study finds 
that the coefficient for this interaction effect is highly significant (p<0.01) and shows a 
negative sign, a finding that supports hypothesis 8 according to which the positive effect 
of bureaucratic distrust on corruption tolerance should be weaker in highly unequal 
societies where citizens are less likely to expect fair and evenhanded treatment from 
public officials. This would seem to suggest that the association between institutional 
trust and tolerance of corrupt practices truly is dependent to some degree on the 
context, in this case the level of income inequality. Figure 4.8 illustrates this interaction 
effect.      
 
Figure 4.8 Interaction effect of bureaucratic distrust and income inequality 
The mostly non-overlapping confidence intervals in the figure above support the 
previously established significant and statistically positive relationship between 
income inequality and corruption tolerance: People in highly unequal societies 
generally tend to have a higher corruption tolerance.  
Additionally, we can discern from the figure that the estimated effect of bureaucratic 
distrust is strongly positive in a low inequality context but negative in a high inequality 
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
C
o
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
 t
o
le
ra
n
ce
Bureaucratic distrust
Low inequality High inequality
111 
 
context.110 As inequality rises, the effect of bureaucratic distrust weakens, until it may 
even turn negative, which indicates that those with a high confidence in the public 
institutions tend to be somewhat more tolerant of corrupt behavior than those with a 
low confidence. A highly distrusting individual is estimated to have approximately the 
same level of corruption tolerance, around 44 on a scale ranging between 0 and 100, 
ceteris paribus, in both a high and a low inequality context, and the largest difference in 
corruption tolerance is between the most trusting individuals. An individual with a 
high confidence in the public institutions is estimated to have corruption tolerance 
score of around 50 in a highly unequal context, while his or her counterpart in an equal 
context is estimated to have a corruption tolerance score of around 27.  
A potential contributing factor that may help to explain this finding is related to the 
earlier discussed general expectations held by the citizens in these societies. A recent 
empirical study by Ariely and Uslaner (2016) indicates that ordinary citizens in 
unequal countries tend not to expect fair treatment by government officials. Partiality 
in favor of elites instead of impartiality is the prevailing norm, while ordinary people 
have to pay bribes for basic services and goods that they are righteously entitled to. If 
those in highly unequal societies are not as accustomed to expect public officials to be 
impartial, it is also likely that the correlation between a high distrust in public 
authorities and high corruption tolerance will tend to be significantly weaker.  
Distrust may still matter to some degree, but clearly not nearly as much as in more 
equal societies where citizens have internalized stronger expectations of impartiality 
and fairness on behalf of state actors. Ariely and Uslaner (2016, 360) argue that citizens 
“are more likely to associate unfairness with corruption in the countries with more 
egalitarian income distributions […and that] these greater expectations for honesty 
among public officials lead people to perceive unfair treatment as evidence of 
corruption”. If citizens perceive that the government treats them unfairly, they become 
more likely to perceive the regime as corrupt, even though this might not actually be 
the case, and the extent of corruption in the country is in fact very limited.111 
Another potential contributing explanation to this finding is that those who have a 
high confidence in the public authorities in these highly unequal (and highly corrupt) 
dysfunctional societies are those with personal stakes in the status quo, i.e. the 
prevailing institutions, that benefits them in certain ways (Fukuyama 2011, 526). They 
have a high confidence in a corrupt civil service, police force and/or judiciary because 
                                                 
110 For instance, in highly unequal Mexico (Gini ~55) the bivariate correlation between bureaucratic distrust and 
corruption tolerance is either negative (wave 3) or non-significant in all the included waves, while it is strongly 
positive and significant in Finland (wave 3 & 5), which is one of the most equal countries in the world according to 
the Gini index (~22). 
111 As Ariely and Uslaner (2016, 352) point out, unfairness and corruption is not the same thing. Many things in life 
(and in politics especially) are unfair, but that does not mean that it is corrupt. Politics is about winning and losing, 
and those who lose are more likely to perceive “foul play”, even though no actual corruption, i.e. abuse of public 
power for private gain, was involved. 
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they know that it is corruptible and favors them if given the right incentives. These 
stakeholders in the current highly unequal system, who could potentially belong to 
wealthy elite groups112 or groups that benefit from clientelistic and patrimonial 
systems, are those able to use their resources (both real and social capital) to manipulate 
the political and bureaucratic systems in their advantage and to evade capture and 
prosecution by corrupt means. Those with a low confidence in the state are meanwhile 
the ones who have the most to lose from the prevailing unfair system, those at the 
bottom of society who are forced to pay onerous bribes in order to get access to public 
services and goods.   
 
4.2.3.2 Interaction effect of bureaucratic distrust and procedural quality 
Next, the study turns its attention to the other interaction term that showed any signs 
of significance, “Bureaucratic distrustxCorruption”. Does the effect of bureaucratic 
distrust also vary across different contexts of procedural quality? The fact that the 
coefficient of this interaction term is significant (p<0.05) suggests that this indeed seems 
to be the case. 
Furthermore, the coefficients of this interaction variable show a positive sign, which 
indicates that the effect of bureaucratic distrust is stronger in countries that are deemed 
to have a higher procedural quality, i.e. a lower level of corruption. This supports 
hypothesis 9a that the positive association between bureaucratic distrust and corruption 
tolerance is weaker in countries with low procedural quality (high levels of corruption 
and inefficiency) where public institutions are perceived to be “too frail” to have a 
significant impact on civic morality (Andrews 2008). 
Figure 4.9 illustrates the estimated difference in effect between two different 
categories of countries, countries with the lowest score on the Control of Corruption 
index and countries with the highest score. 
                                                 
112 As we saw earlier, there are some indications that those with a higher income are more tolerant of corruption, 
which could be due to the fact that corruption mainly benefits the wealthy and punishes the poor. 
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Figure 4.9 Interaction effect of bureaucratic distrust and control of corruption 
As we can see from the overlapping confidence intervals in the figure above, there is 
no significant difference in overall corruption tolerance between a high corruption and 
a low corruption setting, which was already established in the previous section. 
However, there is a significant difference in the effect of bureaucratic distrust across 
these different contexts of institutional quality. The estimated difference between those 
with the lowest score on the bureaucratic distrust index and those with the highest is 
approximately 11 points on the corruption tolerance index in a low corruption context, 
ceteris paribus, while bureaucratic distrust has practically no relation at all with 
corruption tolerance in a high corruption context (the slope is almost completely flat). 
The estimated corruption tolerance of a person with the highest level of distrust is 
practically the same in both a low and a high corruption context, around 41, while the 
difference is much larger for the most trusting individuals, 29.5 and 41 respectively. 
 From this, it can be concluded that the attitude towards the implementing 
institutions seems to matter very little, if at all, in countries with governments of a poor 
institutional quality and endemic corruption. Meanwhile, in countries where the 
government and the civil society are quite successful in controlling corruption the 
impact of bureaucratic distrust is considerably larger. Here those who possess a very 
distrusting attitude tend to have a corruption tolerance that is very close in magnitude 
to the average tolerance in highly corrupt societies, while those who trust the 
authorities tend to have a very low tolerance of corrupt practices. 
The explanation for this finding is likely to be similar to the explanation for the 
previous finding regarding inequality. Citizens do not generally expect fair and 
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efficient public services in societies with weak institutions and are hence not morally 
affected by their level of confidence in the public authorities. However, the differences 
between slopes seem smaller when compared to the previous interaction with income 
inequality and there is furthermore no sign of any negative association between 
bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance this time.  
One could speculate that one reason for this could be that in relatively equal but 
highly corrupt societies there could be relatively fewer stakeholder groups who benefit 
from corruptible public institutions. As we saw in earlier discussions, corruption is 
argued to benefit the wealthy and the influential, at least in the short run, if the rest of 
society is weak, fractured, and unable to hold government accountable in an efficient 
manner by collective action (You & Khagram 2005). This condition is most likely to 
apply in highly unequal societies, where there are at least some “winners” in a high 
corruption equilibrium.   
However, can this previously observed cross-level interaction effect of perceived 
corruption also be found on the individual level using a more subjective indicator? This 
question is explored in the next section. 
   
4.2.3.3 Interaction effect of bureaucratic distrust and self-perceived corruption 
Lastly, in the sixth and final model this study estimates a logistic model of the log odds 
of tolerating bribe taking containing an interaction between the two key individual-
level variables, “Bureaucratic distrust” and “Self-perceived corruption” and data from 
the third wave of the WVS. The results of this model, together with the calculated 
probabilities, are shown in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5 Interaction effect of self-perceived corruption and bureaucratic distrust on tolerance of bribe taking 
Variables Model 6 S.E. Probability 
Micro-Level Characteristic    
Bureaucratic distrust 0.3*** 0.1 0.57 
Self-perceived corruption 0.1 0.1 0.51 
Age -1.4*** 0.1 0.2 
Female -0.1*** 0.03 0.46 
Level of income 0.01 0.1 0.50 
University education (ref. other) -0.2** 0.1 0.46 
Married (ref. other status) -0.2*** 0.03 0.45 
Unemployed (ref. other status) 0.04 0.05 0.51 
Religiosity -0.5*** 0.1 0.37 
Low generalized trust (ref. high) -0.1 0.1 0.47 
Macro-Level Characteristic    
Control of Corruption -0.8*** 0.3 0.31 
Interaction effect    
Bureaucratic distrustxPerceived 
corruption -1.0*** 0.2 
0.28 
Intercept -0.8*** 0.1 0.31 
Variance components:    
Level 2, intercept 0.3 0.1  
Bureaucratic distrust/intercept 0.01 0.1  
Bureaucratic distrust/Bureaucratic 
distrust 0.4 0.1 
 
N of countries (level 2) 40   
N of individuals (level 1) 43691   
Estimation:  IGLS (MQL1)  
Note. Robust standard errors, ***p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1 (2-tailed test). All variables have 
been grand mean centered.       
It was hypothesized earlier that self-perceived corruption, i.e. the extent of public 
corruption perceived by the respondent him/herself, has a moderating effect on the 
impact of bureaucratic distrust on corruption tolerance, similarly as with the 
previously demonstrated contextual cross-level impact of corruption. More 
specifically, it was expected that the positive effect of bureaucratic distrust on 
corruption tolerance is weaker among individuals who perceive a greater extent of 
public corruption. The highly significant (p<0.01), negative, coefficient for the 
interaction term in Model 6 reveals that this indeed seems to be the case: Perceptions 
of public corruption diminish the effect of a low confidence in public authorities on the 
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probability of justifying bribe taking. Figure 4.10 illustrates this interaction effect, 
which closely resembles the previously observed interactions. 
 
Figure 4.10 Interaction effect of self-perceived extent of corruption and bureaucratic distrust on probability of 
tolerating bribe taking 
As noted, the pattern in the figure above on the micro-level closely mirrors the pattern 
that we saw previously on the macro-level regarding the interaction with the control 
of corruption indicator. Here we can see that those who perceive the least public 
corruption and who have the highest level of confidence in public authorities have the 
estimated very low probability of tolerating bribe taking of around 0.19, ceteris paribus. 
Meanwhile, the probability of tolerating bribe taking is almost twice as large, 
approximately 0.37, for those who perceive very little public sector corruption but still 
have a very low confidence in the implementing institutions.  
However, for those who perceive a lot of public corruption, irrespective of their level 
of confidence in the authorities, their estimated probability of tolerating bribe taking 
remains approximately 0.28, ceteris paribus. This finding seems to support the earlier 
conclusion that the individual level of bureaucratic distrust does not seem to matter in 
a high corruption environment when it comes to predicting attitudes toward corrupt 
behavior. 
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4.3 Robustness checks 
This final section of the empirical analysis chapter discusses the strategies used to check 
the robustness of the findings in this study. Firstly, as was already discussed in the 
previous result section and in the section on operationalization of the variables, 
multiple alternative indicators for the independent variables are utilized in order to 
check the consistency of the results. For instance, two different indicators of socio-
economic development (logged GDP per capita and the Education index) are used to 
examine the impact of two distinct but closely related dimensions of the same 
phenomenon. All results from using the alternative predictor variables were reported, 
although not shown, in the previous section. 
Secondly, and related to the first point, a few alternative versions of this study’s 
dependent variable and a secondary method of analysis, logistic regression in a 
multilevel framework, are tested. The main alternative version of its dependent 
variable is a binary transformation of the bribe item used in its index of corruption 
tolerance, where respondents received a 0 if they answered that “accepting a bribe in 
the course of their duties” is never acceptable, and 1 if they considered it acceptable to 
some degree. However, this study also tried using similar binary transformations of 
the three other items included in the index, which are not considered to be acts of 
corruption in the strict modern sense of the word, but still are arguably important 
indicators of civic morality in general and attitudes towards what could be considered 
“moral” or “societal” corruption (cheating with taxes, etc.) (Dobel 1978, 960). 
The two figures (Figure 4.11 and 4.12) below demonstrate results for two of these 
four items concerning the only independent macro variable found to be significantly 
related to corruption tolerance in the previous section, income inequality (GINI). First, 
in Figure 4.11 we have the predicted probability of finding the main item of interest, 
bribe taking, acceptable, which is arguably perceived as the most serious ethical 
violation113 from a corruption standpoint and lies closest to the contemporary 
understanding of corruption, i.e. abuse of entrusted power for private gain.  
                                                 
113 About 73 percent of the respondents answered that bribe taking is never acceptable. 
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Figure 4.11 Interaction effect of bureaucratic distrust and income inequality on probability of tolerating bribe 
taking 
As we can see from the highly overlapping confidence intervals in Figure 4.11, there is 
no significant difference in the predicted probability of finding bribe taking acceptable 
between the most equal and the least equal societies included in the data.114 The sole 
significant difference that can be found is between the citizens with the highest level of 
confidence in public authorities, where those with a high confidence within the least 
equal societies are most likely to find bribe taking acceptable, while the opposite is true 
in the most equal societies. 
The second figure (Figure 4.12) illustrates the results for what is most likely to be 
perceived as the least serious ethical violation115 of these four particular acts, namely 
the predicted probability of finding the avoidance of paying fares on public transports 
(free riding) acceptable. 
                                                 
114 None of the other macro-level variables were significant on a conventional level (p<0.05). 
115 About 55 percent of the respondents answered that avoiding paying fares is never acceptable. The corresponding 
percentages for “claiming government benefits” and “cheating on taxes” lie around 57 and 62 respectively. 
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Figure 4.12 Interaction effect of bureaucratic distrust and income inequality on probability of finding avoiding 
paying fares on public transports (free riding) acceptable 
In Figure 4.12, we see a similar pattern as in the previous one, but there is considerably 
less overlap in the confidence intervals due to the considerably larger variation in 
stances on acceptability. Here we can see that citizens have a significantly higher 
overall probability of finding avoiding paying fares on public transports, i.e. free 
riding, acceptable in highly unequal societies. The only groups that show no significant 
difference in both types of societies are those who show the highest distrust towards 
the implementing institutions. 
In sum, it can be concluded from this robustness test that there is no evidence of a 
significant relationship between any of the macro factors of interest in this study, 
including income inequality, which was still found to be the strongest predictor, and 
the probability of finding bribe taking acceptable. This particular item can be 
considered a “hard case” due to the strong social stigma and illegality associated with 
bribe taking and bribe giving, which is likely to produce a significant social desirability 
effect. However, the study does find evidence of a significant association between 
income inequality and the probability of finding fare avoidance on public transports 
acceptable, which can be considered an “easier case” and a rather milder form of citizen 
malfeasance compared to the other three survey items of interest.  
This latter act of free riding on public transports is admittedly not corrupt behavior 
if one adopts a narrow definition of corruption (see Chapter 1, section 1.2). However, 
it can be perceived as a petty form of corruption if one instead chooses to adopt a 
broader definition of corruption as “decay of the body politic” or behavior related to 
free riding on a public good (public transports, in this case). The relative pettiness of 
this latter “corrupt” offence should also indicate that social desirability bias should be 
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considerably less of a problem than in the case of the other more serious items that tend 
to carry significantly larger penalties and social stigmas (Welsh et al. 2015).  
Previous studies have highlighted correlations between country levels of corruption 
and other types of unethical behavior similar to the act of free riding on public 
transports, such as parking ticket violations among United Nations diplomats living in 
New York City (Fisman & Miguel 2007).116 These findings could therefore indicate that 
these types of behavior are intimately linked with corruption and could thereby 
function as “cultural” proxies for social norms that may generate more traditional 
forms of corrupt behavior. Of course, in this case it is not a question of public officials 
abusing their office but of ordinary citizens who justify free riding on a public good, 
which still fits the broader conceptualization of societal corruption that takes into 
account the abuse of public resources. Even minor abuses can have harsh societal 
consequences when they are aggregated over time.  
Moreover, it is important to study attitudes towards minor infractions such as free 
riding on public transports or parking violations because research has pointed to the 
existence of a “slippery-slope” effect where the mechanism of moral disengagement117 
allows individuals who have committed minor infractions in the past to gradually 
become more prone to justify more serious ethical violations in the future (Welsh et al. 
2015).  
As a third and final robustness check, this study controls for the potential 
confounding influence of certain cultural dimensions often claimed to be associated 
with the prevalence of corruption and corrupt behavior (Husted 1999; McLaughlin 
2013). More specifically, it used the six measures of national culture118 developed by 
social psychologist Geert Hofstede. Are the previously presented findings only 
manifestations of some latent differences in cultural programming119, as argued by the 
earlier discussed cultural approaches (see Chapter 2, section 2.1.4) to cross-country 
differences in political behavior and attitudes? 
Including these cultural variables in the main model (Model 3) does not 
substantially affect the earlier results concerning the main contextual effects, if 
anything, the GINI (and the GDP) coefficient increases in size and displays a higher 
level of significance (p<0.01) than before. The only two cultural dimensions to display 
                                                 
116 Fisman and Miguel (2007, 1021) themselves argue that “[t]he act of parking illegally fits well with a standard 
definition of corruption, i.e., “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain,” suggesting that the comparison of 
parking violations by diplomats from different societies serves as a plausible measure of the extent of corruption 
social norms or a corruption “culture””. 
117 Welsh et al. (2015, 116) describe moral disengagement as “a form of moral self-deception that allows individuals 
to justify unethical behavior and avoid self-censure”. 
118 Power Distance, Individualism, Masculinity, Uncertainty Avoidance, Long Term Orientation, and Indulgence 
(Hofstede Insights [1]). Results not shown due to missing data for many of the country cases (data was only available 
for 55 of 84 cases), but available upon request.  
119 Hofstede has defined “culture” as “[t]he collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of 
one group or category of people from others” (Hofstede Insights [2]). 
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any signs of significance (p<0.05) are Power Distance (PD) and Uncertainty Avoidance 
(UA). Moreover, the PD coefficient displays the expected positive sign while the UA 
coefficient in turn displays a negative sign. 
These results are at least partially120 in line with previous research concerning the 
association between corruption and cultural values (e.g. Husted 1999; McLaughlin 
2013). Hofstede (in Husted 1999, 343) describes Power Distance as “the extent to which 
the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect 
and accept that power is distributed unequally”. High levels of PD are argued to be 
reflecting paternalistic modes of power, where the less powerful members of 
institutions are expected to show loyalty to their superiors in return for particularistic 
favors rather than due to more general legitimacy-related reasons (McLaughlin 2013, 
86). Furthermore, an expert panel from a previous study mentioned in Husted (1999, 
344) judged that people from a high PD culture should be more likely to perceive 
“questionable business practice as ethical”.  
Taken together, this evidence would hence seem to suggest that not only is a 
relatively high corruption tolerance associated with the unequal distribution of material 
wealth (operationalized with the Gini index), it is also associated with high expectations 
and tolerance of an unequal distribution of power. While one could expect these two 
variables to correlate very strongly with each other, as money is often equaled with 
power, this does not in fact seem to be the case according to correlation analysis. The 
two variables are according to this analysis positively correlated with each other, 
however, the correlation is relatively moderate (Pearson’s r =.225). 
With regard to Uncertainty Avoidance, the picture becomes somewhat less clear. 
Hofstede (in Husted 1999, 345) defines UA as “the extent to which members of a culture 
feel threatened by uncertainty or unknown situations”. Husted argues that because 
corruption can be viewed as an uncertainty-reducing mechanism, it should therefore 
be more prevalent in high UA cultures. However, based on the previously described 
results there seems to be a negative relationship between UA and corruption tolerance, 
which would seem to conflict with this expectation. 
  
                                                 
120 “Masculine” cultures are also sometimes argued to be associated with cultures of corruption due to their tendency 
to give high priority to values related with achievement and success (McLaughlin 2013, 86), however, this study 
found no significant effect of Masculinity.  
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
The overarching goal of this multilevel study with a global focus has been to explore if 
tolerance of low-level corruption, conceptualized in a broad, classic Machiavellian 
sense as “decay of the body politic”, varies across contexts and if so-called 
dysfunctional social contexts (societal structures, such as the distribution of resources, 
and public institutions) engender morally dysfunctional or “uncivic” citizens with a 
greater tolerance of rule breaking behavior.  
Additionally, it has also paid close attention to the association between varying 
levels of institutional trust, or more precisely, confidence in the normatively impartial 
public institutions, and corruption tolerance, and whether this association varies across 
contexts and in what ways. 
A number of important implications and conclusions can be drawn based on the 
findings in both this study and in earlier related studies regarding what some scholars 
call low-level corruption tolerance (Pozsgai Alvarez 2015; Uslaner 2008). However, 
there are also a few weaknesses and limitations to this study and the conclusions that 
can be drawn from it, which must be brought to light so that the research community 
may find better ways of dealing with them in future studies and produce more nuanced 
analyses, not least regarding strategies of operationalizing corruption tolerance. 
Finally, this chapter provides some concluding remarks and tentative suggestions for 
future studies into this highly important topic.  
 
5.1 Findings and implications 
Several important findings and implications can be noted on the basis of the empirical 
results presented in the previous chapter. This section begins the review of the findings 
by focusing on the observed micro-level associations. 
First, the individual-level evidence presented in this study indicate that citizens who 
harbor a deep distrust towards public authorities, such as the police or the judiciary, 
and perceive corruption as widespread among public officials tend on average to be 
significantly more tolerant when it comes to low-level corruption and rule breaking 
behavior. These two interrelated findings support earlier assertions concerning 
institutional trust as a subjective indicator of the perceived legitimacy of the state, 
which influences the willingness of citizens to obey formal institutions (laws, 
regulations, etc.) and public authorities, and abstain from free riding or rule breaking 
behavior that is otherwise viewed as completely unacceptable (e.g. Tyler 2006). 
Perceived corruption and incompetence contribute to the delegitimization of formal 
institutions and the legitimization of informal practices such as bribery or tax 
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avoidance. If individuals perceive injustice and partiality as the dominant behavioral 
strategy among public officials, who are normatively expected to behave in an 
impartial and evenhanded manner, they become less likely to behave in the way a 
“good citizen” is expected to behave and contribute to the public good.  
Second, while there are some differences in the perceived justifiability of certain 
unethical behaviors across various societies and cultures, people do not generally come 
to tolerate bribe taking, cheating with taxes, and other forms of free riding, even though 
they in some cases may feel “compelled” to participate in it due to so-called descriptive 
norms, i.e. the perceived frequency of certain types of behavior (Köbis et al. 2015). 
 Corruption may become a sort of Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) in certain 
societies where people continue to take part in corrupt transactions and pay grease 
money or kickbacks, even though they strongly oppose and even resent it due to its 
intrinsic unfairness, because they believe that other people do likewise and that 
refusing to do so would be either foolish, useless or both (Köbis et al. 2015). This is 
argued to be the number one reason why many citizens in endemically corrupt 
societies may officially promote a highly critical view of corrupt practices such as 
paying bribes to the traffic police, while unofficially continuing to contribute to its 
reproduction.  
People generally recognize that it is both legally and morally wrong (and socially 
condemned) and that there are severe negative externalities for society as a whole 
associated with this kind of behavior. This is evident from the empirical observations 
presented in this study and from the evidence discussed in earlier studies (e.g. 
Rothstein & Varraich 2017), which show relatively little variation across different 
societies and time periods. The considerably greater variation in perceived and 
experienced corruption across different societies demonstrates exactly why the 
“corruption trap” of a high corruption equilibrium is so devious and hard to break out 
from once a society is caught in it. 
Here we can draw some parallels to recent research suggesting that this same 
phenomenon also applies to tolerance of or support for corrupt politicians (high-level 
corruption tolerance) in contemporary democracies (Agerberg, Forthcoming). When 
forced to choose, people generally prefer uncorrupt and honest, but less efficient, 
politicians to efficient and corrupt politicians (Allen et al. 2016).  
However, in contexts of widespread political corruption citizens may have severe 
difficulties in telling honest politicians apart from dishonest ones (“all politicians are 
corrupt”), especially if suspicions of corruption and allegations of dishonesty are 
commonly used as political weapons to target political opponents. In these particular 
contexts, where there is often a lack of reliable and credible sources of information on 
the honesty of candidates, it can be more rational for an ordinary citizen to vote for the 
candidate who is positioned closest to his or her own political preferences and “gets 
things done” (rouba mas faz) or provides concrete clientelistic goods in return for the 
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vote, even though that candidate has a high likelihood of being corrupt. Better to vote 
for the devil that you know than for the devil you do not, or, alternatively, abstain from 
voting altogether. This might also explain why election turnouts tend to be significantly 
lower in more corrupt democracies (Stockemer et al. 2013). 
Third, so-called dysfunctional contexts with deep-seated poverty, corrupt and 
incompetent public administrations and/or weak economic performance do not 
generally tend to produce or consist of dysfunctional citizens unable to distinguish 
between civic and uncivic behavior. At least not to any statistically significant degree 
when one also includes acts of a more unethical nature than mere free riding on public 
transports.  
There is no evidence that a country’s level of socio-economic development is directly 
related to its average level of corruption tolerance or that citizens in poor developing 
countries are generally more uncivic or less virtuous than citizens in more affluent 
countries. A lower level of development does not equal inferiority with regard to civic 
morality in general.  
On the contrary, there is much evidence to suggest that increased material wellbeing 
and security make citizens more likely to question and challenge the legitimacy of 
different kinds of authorities and social norms. This could in turn in some cases, at least 
in the short-run, result in a growing prevalence of what can be considered “uncivic” 
norms and behaviors that may include various forms of corruption (Kravtsova et al. 
2017). Moreover, there is also the earlier discussed risk that modernization of 
traditional societies and the espousal of neo-liberal policies and principles will lead to 
an extensive monetization of various aspects of social life (e.g. time, gifts, favors etc.), 
which can be conducive to corrupt behavior, especially in transitional societies 
(Clammer 2012; Hao & Johnston 2007). The risk is even greater if ordinary citizens 
perceive these processes of modernization to be associated with growing inequalities, 
as will shortly be discussed. 
In sum, societies that are more affluent are not ipso facto more civic and honest or 
less corrupt than their poorer cousins. A rapidly increasing level of socio-economic 
development or modernization can instead potentially lead to what Huntington (1965) 
has called “political decay” and a breakdown of social order, unless governmental 
institutions and political development are able to keep up with the intensive economic 
growth and the consequential social changes (e.g. growing inequalities) and increasing 
demands in modernizing societies. 
Likewise, there is no evidence of a significant direct association between 
institutional quality, economic performance, and corruption tolerance, after having 
controlled for the post-communist transition countries. Countries, which due to their 
unique historical experiences with extremely dysfunctional, although relatively strong, 
governmental institutions combined with a lack of impersonal free markets have to be 
treated as extreme cases of institutional failure (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016, 258-
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259). The low variance of the dependent variable and the high influence of the post-
communist countries makes it impossible to ascertain for sure if there is an 
independent effect of institutional quality. Additional survey data, especially 
longitudinal, from a much wider spectrum of contexts are needed in order to be able 
to determine with greater certainty if and how institutional quality is related to uncivic, 
free riding-condoning attitudes.  
Moreover, as we saw in Chapter 2, section 2.1.2, several scholars have criticized the 
unidimensional single-score corruption indices for failing to register those forms of 
corruption that are more common in mature democracies. These forms take place on 
specific levels (e.g. local) or sectors of government and include conflict of interest and 
favoritism, which clearly violate the principle of impartiality, and other less clear-cut 
forms of corruption that are harder to detect (Andersson 2017; Johnston 2005; Linde & 
Erlingsson 2013). The studies by Andersson (2017) and Linde and Erlingsson (2013), 
for instance, find that Swedish citizens perceive public sector corruption as a significant 
(growing) problem although they very rarely pay bribes for public services. This 
finding may at least partially contribute to explaining why there is such a weak link 
between country-level measurements of corruption and this study’s measure of 
corruption tolerance. Future studies should hence aim at finding multidimensional 
approaches to measuring corruption of various types, not just bribery. 
Fourth, the sole contextual variable found to be significant in (almost) all models 
estimated in this study is economic inequality, operationalized using the income-based 
Gini-index. This finding is very much consistent with many of the previous arguments 
and observations regarding the destabilizing and adverse effects of high inequality on 
societal corruption, social trust, the rule of law and political stability (Dobel 1978; 
Rothstein & Uslaner 2005; Uslaner 2008; Paskov & Dewilde 2012).  
Highly skewed distributions of economic resources not only have an adverse effect 
on social trust and, indirectly, on the extent of corruption in societies, as argued by 
Uslaner (2008) in his “inequality trap” thesis. They also seem to be associated with 
lower levels of civic morality, another important, but often forgotten or ignored aspect 
of the highly debated concept that is often denominated “social capital” and is argued 
to be vital for vibrant democratic societies (Letki 2006). Inequality of both wealth and 
opportunities is often suggested to have deep and profound effects on the coherence 
and solidarity in contemporary societies (e.g. Paskov & Dewilde 2012; Rothstein & 
Uslaner 2005).  
Ordinary citizens do not consider themselves masters of their own fate in highly 
skewed societies and a sense of normlessness is likely to be more prevalent in these 
sorts of settings. The poor majority perceives corruption and other forms of 
malfeasance as both morally and legally wrong, but many still feel starkly compelled 
to take part in it in their own way, using whatever means they have at their disposal, 
even though they themselves usually are the principal victims in corrupt and unstable 
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political systems. The illegality or unethicalness of their own behavior seems minor 
and insignificant in comparison to the corrupt behavior of powerful elites, so 
consequently some may come to view it as justifiable in highly unequal and corrupt 
societies where success is often associated with patronage, nepotism and other forms 
of elite corruption. Hard labor and honest efforts in turn seem like dead ends in these 
contexts, if one hopes to climb the social ranks and reach elite or even middle class 
status. People distrust others and expect them to attempt to attain success and 
prosperity by means of cheating, and consequently they themselves become more 
likely to cheat, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophesy (Uslaner 2004; 2008; 2011). 
However, eventually there may come a point when ordinary citizens have had 
enough with all the corruption and immorality in their surroundings, which may stoke 
an anger and resentment against all forms of corruption, both petty and grand, which 
they blame for the dysfunctionalities of their societies. People may lose faith in the 
democratic process and institutions, and some may turn to populist and anti-
democratic leaders who promise easy and quick remedies that will rein in the 
corruption of the elites, or to left-wing parties who propose radical redistributions of 
wealth that result in yet further political turbulence, distrust and violence. This path of 
development is unfortunately familiar from many highly polarized countries in the 
Latin American context (see e.g. Fukuyama 2014).   
As we saw earlier in the theoretical discussion, high levels of inequality and 
corruption tend to go hand in hand: high inequality tends to engender environments 
that are favorable to various forms of corruption, while corruption in turn tends to have 
an inequality increasing effect due to its elite-favoring nature (Uslaner 2008). It 
therefore seems probable that it is this vicious cycle of both extreme inequality and 
endemic corruption that has the greatest likelihood of generating higher than average 
levels of corruption tolerance (both low- and high-level) among citizens. This in turn 
further exacerbates the problem of creating and maintaining strong, autonomous and 
merit based institutions able to withstand the pressure of influential elites who distort 
public policies in their own favor. Autonomous and well-functioning public 
institutions demand a sufficient amount of public resources121, resources that are lost 
when the willingness to pay taxes becomes weaker, or the willingness to claim 
illegitimate social benefits122 grows stronger, not to mention the vast amounts of public 
resources that are both directly and indirectly lost due to corruption and outright 
waste. 
The most obvious policy implication of this particular finding is of course a 
recommendation to strive to reduce inequality, especially in the most extreme cases in 
Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia. However, to do this in practice can 
be quite difficult due to the “stickiness” of inequality, and it is likely to take quite some 
                                                 
121 For instance, to pay competitively high wages to public officials. 
122 For instance, pensions for already deceased persons.  
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time to achieve even with the right policies in place (Jackman & Miller 2005; Uslaner 
2008, see also next section). Another complementary pathway would be to try to erode 
the perceived connection between success and corruption by signaling to ordinary 
citizens that it is possible to achieve success in life without having to resort to unethical 
approaches.  
Potential means of achieving this could be reforms that increase transparency in 
various fields of public administration such as taxation and public finances in general. 
Greater tax transparency regarding how much individuals and businesses have paid 
and how the money is used would increase incentives to improve service delivery, 
discourage tax evasion and the giving of unjustified tax exemptions to special interests, 
and, consequently, increase trust in the impartialness of government (Kornhauser 
2005). These kinds of reforms, which are greatly facilitated by the growing 
digitalization of contemporary societies, could potentially send powerful signals 
through the media that the majority of wealthy individuals and businesses obediently 
pay their taxes, as good citizens ought to.  
Other alternative methods of “virtue signaling” could include various types of 
information campaigns somewhat similar to the “I paid a bribe” initiative in India (I 
Paid a Bribe 2019), such as “I pay my taxes”- or “I never free ride”-campaigns on social 
media. Extensive information campaigns or just small reminders or prompts of 
statistical facts could provide the “nudge” needed to alter descriptive norms, especially 
in the relatively “cleaner” regions where the actual frequency of malfeasance is 
relatively small and for those persons who lack first-hand experience of real corruption 
(Köbis et al. 2015).  
This could potentially trigger a virtuous cycle in these regions, however, it is 
important to keep in mind that there is always the chance that these transparency- or 
knowledge-increasing measures will backfire and instead feed the perceptions of that 
“everybody is corrupt”, especially in the relatively “dirtier” regions. Nevertheless, this 
could provide the opportunity for more targeted anti-corruption efforts where 
resources could be more efficiently concentrated to these more salient problem cases. 
Additional research into the effects of “sunshine” reforms and various kinds of 
information campaigns (especially on the internet and social media) on corruption 
norms and corrupt behavior is clearly needed.    
Fifth, the significant random slope coefficients show that the association between 
bureaucratic distrust and corruption tolerance is not uniform and indeed tends to vary 
to some degree across different contexts. This observation is important because 
previous studies have generally assumed that the relationship is always uniform across 
different country contexts (e.g. Letki 2006; Pop 2012). Most studies have completely 
ignored the possibility that this particular association might vary across contexts (see 
Andrews 2008 for an exception). 
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While there is on average a positive relationship between a low confidence in public 
authorities and corruption tolerance, as was expected based on earlier results, there are 
also cases where this relationship is non-significant or possibly even negative, i.e. that 
those who demonstrate a high trust in the bureaucratic institutions tend to be more 
tolerant of corrupt and unethical practices than those who show a high distrust. This 
latter finding is consistent with the observations of Huntington (1968, 64), who notes 
that “both corruption and violence are illegitimate means of making demands upon 
the system, but corruption is also an illegitimate mean of satisfying those demands…he 
who corrupts a system’s police officers is more likely to identify with the system than he 
who storms the system’s police stations” (emphasis added). Those who identify with a 
corrupt system and prefer the status quo that serves their interests (i.e. the 
stakeholders) are hence arguably more likely to be more trusting of the corrupt system 
and to demonstrate a higher tolerance of corrupt and uncivic practices. 
Sixth, of the four main contextual variables examined in this study, it seems like 
bureaucratic distrust interacts the strongest with income inequality (Gini) while the 
second strongest interaction is with corruption control. According to the previously 
demonstrated results, a high bureaucratic distrust is most likely to be related to a high 
corruption tolerance in the economically least skewed and least corrupt societies, while 
the relationship is non-existing or sometimes even negative in the most unequal and 
corrupt societies. This last observation implies that a high confidence in public 
authorities could in some cases be associated with a high corruption tolerance in 
extremely unequal and corrupt societies where corruption tolerance, as we saw, is on 
average significantly higher than in more equal societies with a relatively high state 
capacity. 
The earlier discussed arguments derived partly from Ariely and Uslaner’s (2016) 
and Andrews’ (2008) recent studies could potentially assist in interpreting some of the 
results from where we looked at the relationship between the level of economic 
inequality and corruption tolerance. Perceptions of unfair treatment and that “the 
game is rigged” by shadowy elites, i.e. perceptions of grand corruption, is more likely 
to result in both distrust of the state and more favorable attitudes towards malfeasance 
and uncivic behavior in relatively more equal societies where the principles of fair and 
impartial treatment are held in very high regard and often taken for granted. More 
poetically speaking, one could say that the fires of revolution burn the brightest where 
the ideals are the loftiest. Expectations among citizens thusly play a key role also in this 
line of argument.  
Ordinary citizens pay taxes and expect high quality and impartial service delivery 
in return for their well-earned money. If they for some reason perceive that these 
expectations have not been met adequately, they may lose faith in the system and 
become less willing to pay taxes and more likely to express more positive sentiments 
towards uncivic behavior such as bribery. In highly unequal societies, on the other 
129 
 
hand, ordinary people are less likely to perceive impartiality and fairness on behalf of 
public officials as the norm. They more or less willingly pay their taxes (or not) but they 
do not hold as high expectations of receiving fair and impartial treatment from the 
state, which they perceive to be in the pocket of the wealthy few. Consequently, when 
they encounter something that they perceive as unfair or partial treatment on behalf of 
the state, such as bureaucratic corruption, it does not influence their faith in the system 
or their willingness to obey the law as severely as in societies with a more equal 
distribution of resources. The public institutions are, in the words of Andrews (2008, 
178), “too frail” to have any real direct impact on civic morality. 
Another potential reason why fair and impartial treatment is likely to be valued 
somewhat higher in more equal societies could also be related to the earlier discussed 
prevalence of postmaterial values in society. In extremely unequal societies, where the 
proportion of citizens who live below the poverty line tends to be substantial, the 
emphasis on material values is likely to be strong. This in turn implies that as long as 
the government manages to fulfill at least some of their basic material needs they 
would still continue to perceive the government as legitimate, even if it is widely 
perceived as corrupt (see the discussion below on the case of Bangladesh). They would 
hence base their trust in government more on policy performance, such as the 
government’s progress in alleviating poverty or providing affordable living and decent 
health care, rather than on procedural quality. 
In sum, as we move from a relatively equal society towards a greater degree of 
inequality and poverty, the expectation of fairness and impartiality loses its strength 
and its association with perceptions of grand corruption becomes weaker. This in turn 
results in a relatively lower corruption tolerance for the most distrusting citizens, as 
people no longer equal unfairness with grand corruption as strongly as in previous 
contexts.  
However, as inequality grows, corruption also becomes more widespread, as it 
tends to do in highly unequal societies where it is considerably easier for affluent elites 
to practice state capture. People blame grand corruption123 and the unethical behavior 
of the rich for the economic and social injustices in society, and they come to expect 
partiality, rather than impartiality, and unfairness, rather than fairness, which results 
in higher levels of corruption tolerance across the whole spectrum of institutional trust. 
Thus, it could therefore be argued that it is not the lack of trust in public authority that 
is the more likely cause of citizen misbehavior in extremely unequal and corrupt 
societies, but rather the perceived link or “odious connection”, in the words of 
Tocqueville, between malfeasance and success. 
                                                 
123 As argued by Uslaner (2008), people associate grand corruption with inequality, not petty corruption, due to the 
smallness of the sums involved in bureaucratic corruption, which can involve for instance the giving of a small sum 
to a doctor or a traffic police. 
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The policy implications of these findings concerning the complex relationship 
between institutional trust and corruption tolerance is that traditional reforms aimed 
at increasing trust in public administrations, such as codes of conduct, increased 
administrative surveillance, professional training, more resources and greater 
transparency and bureaucratic competition, are likely to be relatively ineffective in 
reducing corruption tolerance in highly unequal and corrupt social contexts (Andrews 
2008). The ethical behavior or perceived fairness of street-level public officials does not 
matter that much as long as the citizens perceive that the state institutions themselves 
are held captive by affluent elites through grand corruption, and are thus judged 
illegitimate (Uslaner 2008).  
Ambitious reformers should therefore start from the top, i.e. from the head of the 
fish, and deal with the main problems of elite corruption on one hand and economic 
and social injustice on the other. Reducing societal corruption in general without 
tackling these larger issues of inequality and discrimination of non-elites hence seems 
like a fool’s errand. As was already discussed, these are no easy matters to deal with, 
and the situation is further complicated by Ariely and Uslaner’s (2017, 360) claim that 
citizens will show no support for the type of policies that will result in greater equality 
and less corruption due to their lack of faith in the government’s ability to deliver 
public services. 
In more equal and relatively cleaner societies, at least when bribery is concerned, on 
the other hand, the question of perceived fair treatment by government officials 
becomes more salient. In these contexts, “people see unfair treatment […] as reflecting 
a corrupt regime” (Ariely & Uslaner 2017, 360). Reforms in these contexts should 
therefore focus more on strengthening and sustaining perceptions of fair treatment by 
both individual government officials and institutions. Here, one should also put more 
focus on combating the more common and ambiguous forms of public corruption, such 
as conflict of interest or favoritism (Andersson 2017).  
Any indications of discrimination or maltreatment by even a single individual 
official or institution could potentially shake the confidence in the entire system and 
result in a greater tolerance of corruption and malfeasance. The more traditional 
approaches to evoking high ethical standards and integrity among public officials are 
arguably of a considerably greater utility in these kinds of social settings.  
However, there are some good reasons to believe that these more traditional 
approaches are ultimately insufficient for the task at hand of reducing perceptions of 
unfair treatment. Many welfare programs are means tested, which implies that the 
government selectively singles out those social groups who are eligible to take part in 
programs that provide specific public goods or services (Rothstein 2003, 191). Means 
testing often tends to be a very complicated and difficult process largely due to many 
gray zones in the legal framework that should be applied to individual citizens. This 
procedure often raises suspicions of prejudices, stereotyping, or ignorance on behalf of 
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the means-testing bureaucrat, which of course in turn suggests partial and unfair 
treatment of certain individuals or groups. Rothstein and Uslaner (2005, 42) therefore 
advocate the establishment of universal social programs, i.e. programs “that are 
intended to create equal conditions for citizens regardless of their income, 
ethnic/religious background, sex, and race”.124 Such programs are argued to “enhance 
social solidarity and the perception of a shared fate among citizens” (Rothstein & 
Uslaner 2005, 43), and should therefore arguably lead to a lower corruption tolerance.  
Nevertheless, as was already mentioned in a previous paragraph, reforms such as 
universalistic welfare programs are difficult to implement in highly unequal settings 
due to the endemic lack of trust and sense of “shared fate” in these societies. Moreover, 
Rothstein and Uslaner (2005, 53) argue that universalistic welfare policies are hard to 
enact without an honest (and effective) government. This argument suggests that even 
though this study did not find a significant association between institutional quality 
and corruption tolerance, there is still the possibility of at least an indirect tie between 
these two variables, through inequality.  
Societies with a low state capacity, on one hand, are unable to enact reforms that 
reduce economic and social injustice or prevent inequality from spiraling out of hand 
due to both resistance from powerful stakeholders and a lack of political support from 
ordinary citizens with low social and institutional trust. In countries with less 
inequality and higher state capacity, on the other hand, these kinds of reforms should 
be easier to enact, and should therefore be a high priority for policy makers who want 
to prevent vicious cycles and spur virtuous cycles of civic morality and good 
governance. The best advice for policy makers in countries caught in inequality or 
social traps (Uslaner 2008; Rothstein 2003), and for the supporting international 
community, is hence to concentrate efforts primarily on building a sufficient state 
capacity before moving on to other problems (see e.g. Fukuyama 2011; 2014).      
 At the same time, it is also of great importance to keep citizens educated of what 
they reasonably can and should expect in their dealings with the state and its 
representatives, and inform them of the criteria used in decision-making. This way we 
can try to avoid unrealistic expectations that may needlessly shatter trust in the state. 
What is often viewed as unfair treatment on behalf of the state and the legal system is 
not necessarily a sign of grand corruption, even though they are strongly connected 
(Uslaner 2008, 7). Often it is a result of a political conflict where the citizens who 
perceive unfair treatment are on the losing side. Other times, it may be a sign of lack of 
                                                 
124 Universalistic social welfare programs do not of course mean that everybody always gets to take part in the 
program and receive, for instance, an equally sized benefit or grant (Rothstein 2003). It only implies that everybody 
has an equal opportunity of participating in the program and getting something, irrespective of income, race, gender, 
or other social group. 
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integrity among public officials, not public corruption (see Heywood 2018).125 Politics 
and public administration needs to become clearer and more transparent for ordinary 
citizens so that they can, instead of rebelling against the state, become encouraged to 
take part in it more actively through different formal channels of political participation 
(Dobel 1978, 972). This way they can strive to change those policies that they perceive 
as unfair.  
Lastly, one contributing factor to the initially observed higher than average 
corruption tolerance in the countries with the most equal income distributions is likely 
to be the communist heritage that several of them have, and the turbulent transitions 
from command to free market economies on one hand and from autocracy to 
democracy on the other. Such transitions may produce a “moral vacuum” and a sense 
of normlessness where the previous moral system has been violently torn down and a 
new one has not yet fully emerged to replace the old one.  
Yufan Hao and Michael Johnston (2007) provide an example of this type of “crisis of 
values” with Post-Mao China, which launched market-oriented reforms in 1978. While 
the old Maoist view emphasized the socialist values of equality and solidarity before 
short-term economic development, new reform-minded leaders such as Deng Xiaoping 
instead encouraged people “to get rich and to get rich fast” (Hao & Johnston 2007, 589). 
This development together with the rapid economic growth that China experienced is 
argued to have generated a strong thirst for money and a kind of materialism where 
everything has a price126, which in turn encouraged bribery, embezzlement, swindling, 
tax evasion, extortion, smuggling, speculation, and a long list of other unethical and 
often illegal practices (Hao & Johnston 2007).  
However, because the transition was only partial in nature in China, and moreover 
state-controlled, it is highly likely that the consequences for civic morality in general 
were considerably less severe than in the countries that experienced a wholesale and 
very turbulent transition period. Furthermore, citizens in former communist countries 
are also, as we have seen, argued to be more likely to perceive higher levels of grand 
corruption and unfairness (Karklins 2005; Uslaner 2008). Consequently, they are 
arguably more likely to demonstrate higher levels of corruption tolerance as a result of 
perceptions of rapidly rising levels of inequality that erode or prevent social trust from 
developing. Policymakers in transition countries should therefore strive to prevent 
inequality from further increasing and implement the previously discussed reforms 
that may help to build social solidarity and decrease corruption tolerance. 
  
                                                 
125 As argued by Heywood (2018, 4) “it is quite possible to act noncorruptly but also without integrity; for 
instance, by performing a task with little effort, habitually turning up late to work, or refusing to cover for 
colleagues”. 
126 Hao and Johnston (2007, 590) mention the story of a visitor who asked for directions in Canton and was told, 
“Sure I’ll tell you – if you pay me”.    
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5.2 Limitations and suggestions for future studies 
All studies have their own strengths and limitations and this one is no exception in this 
regard. This section discusses the potential limitations of this study and some of the 
steps that have been taken in an attempt to minimize their confounding or distorting 
effects, in order to raise awareness of them so that scholars may hopefully find some 
more efficient ways of dealing with them in future studies. Furthermore, a few 
suggestions are provided for these follow-up studies.   
A first obvious limitation concerns the important question of causal direction. It 
cannot be proven here without a doubt that negative perceptions of government 
institutions or high levels of inequality lead to higher corruption tolerance, rather than 
the other way around, i.e. that high levels of corruption tolerance lead to higher levels 
of inequality or poorly performing institutions. Put differently, it is rather impossible 
to conclude if the fish rots from the head down or from the body up based on the very 
broad empirical evidence presented in this study. Moreover, it is also very likely that 
the causal direction goes both ways if uncivic attitudes actually lead to a higher 
frequency of tax evasion, benefit frauds or even bribery and other unsavory practices. 
Practices that result in significant losses of valuable public resources, which in turn 
affects the public sector’s ability to provide quality services and build up a sufficient 
resistance against attempts of covert influence. In other words, there is a high 
probability of “feedback mechanisms” between these variables. 
However, the fact that institutional arrangements and incentive structures, such as 
the distribution of wealth, tend to be relatively sticky and durable (Jackman & Miller 
2005; Uslaner 2008) and unlikely to experience significant short-run changes without 
extensive reforms or strong exogenous shocks such as wars or revolutions, suggests 
that it is rather unlikely that current popular opinions or values can have any 
significant short-term effects on such conditions. At least as long as they do not lead to 
the aforementioned wars and revolutions that in turn lead to radical redistributions. 
Robert Jackman and Ross Miller’s (2005) extensive examination of the matter instead 
points to the conclusion that values and norms are more likely to be endogenous and 
influenced by these previously mentioned incentive structure. 
Furthermore, as economies grow and diversify, and citizens attain higher levels of 
education and adopt values of a more postmaterialistic kind, they are also likely to 
become more critical of the inequalities in their surrounding societies (e.g. Welzel & 
Inglehart 2008). This would further suggest that the causal pathway is more likely to 
go from structural inequality or institutional performance to public attitudes. People 
become more aware of their broader social, political and economic conditions, which 
in turn increases the likelihood that they will react in a certain way to said conditions. 
Another example of this structural rigidity is when formal democratic institutions are 
unable to accommodate the increasing number of critical citizens who feel a greater 
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need to participate politically in a more direct way than is currently possible with the 
representative institutions based on parties and elections (Dalton 2009).  
Moreover, as emphasized by Jackman and Miller (2005, 196), the cultural 
explanations proclaim the durability of values, which implies very limited changes in 
values and behavior, while the institutional perspective points to changes in behavior 
as a result of changes in rules and incentives. The case with the post-communist 
countries in turn suggests that it was the very specific and much analyzed institutional 
failures of the socialist systems that contributed to shaping public opinions and norms 
in the societies in question, not some cultural or civic “backwardness” that can be 
traced far back in history. Hence, it is much more likely that perceptions of inequality 
or dysfunctional institutions have a considerably greater impact on general attitudes 
rather than the other way around. Values and norms may change quite rapidly while 
social structures and institutions tend to be more conservative, which can in turn have 
deleterious consequences for political order and democratic processes. 
Nevertheless, additional research is needed in order to be able to determine with a 
greater confidence what the causal pathway actually looks like. Studies based on panel 
data and various laboratory and survey experiments are promising avenues in this 
regard. In any sense, as was mentioned earlier, this study has also taken some measures 
in order to try to deal with this causality problem. One important step is that all the 
data for the predictor variables originate from at least one or a couple of years before 
the measurement occasion for the dependent variable. 
A second limitation concerns social desirability bias (SDB), which could potentially 
vary in strength or prevalence across different societies due to various cultural factors. 
It is easy to imagine that in some countries, cultures, or religions, it could be perceived 
as more taboo to admit to anybody else, and especially to an outsider, that for instance 
bribery or cheating with taxes or benefits is ever justifiable, even if that person is 
completely anonymous. Take for instance a country like Japan, which has one of the 
lowest levels of corruption tolerance according to the index used in this study127, but is 
only in 20th place in the CPI 2017 with a score of 73. In more collectivist societies such 
as Japan, South Korea or China where conformity to social norms is highly celebrated, 
“losing one’s face” by confessing tolerance of deviant behavior may be perceived as 
considerably less acceptable than in more individualistic societies (Kim & Markus 1999; 
Oh 2013). This may in turn imply that the respondents in these kinds of societies with 
certain cultural predispositions are more reluctant to express their actual feelings and 
views regarding such matters.  
However, this does not necessarily imply that collectivists are more likely to follow 
social norms. The study by Se Hyung Oh (2013), for instance, indicates that collectivists 
may signal or present a higher level of conformity, but their true or internalized level of 
                                                 
127 Japan’s average score on the corruption tolerance index is 22.6 compared to the total average of 38.3. 
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conformity may not actually differ from that of individualists. Future studies should 
hence strive at finding and adopting more appropriate strategies to deal with the 
problem of SDB, which may confound the results of cross-cultural studies such as this 
one that deal with taboo subjects. Various kinds of survey techniques aiming at 
minimizing SDB would be useful in dealing with this problem in future cross-cultural 
studies that explore similar questions. 
A third potential limitation or problem with this study concerns the 
operationalization of its dependent variable, corruption tolerance. Some critics are 
likely to argue that the index designed to measure this phenomenon is too broad and 
that ultimately, only one of the four items (tolerance of bribery) used to construct this 
index can really be defined as corruption in the contemporary sense of the word. 
However, this study would argue that this is not necessarily a problem, or at least not 
an insurmountable one, for a couple of reasons. 
Limiting this study solely to attitudes regarding public corruption, i.e. corruption 
involving public officials, would result in too narrow a perspective for the purposes of 
this study. While the act of bribe taking or giving is often considered synonymous with 
corruption, many forms of behavior are not as clearly designated as “corruption”. 
These more ambiguous cases, which sometimes are called “grey corruption” following 
Heidenheimer’s (1970) famous typology (see Chapter 1, section 1.2), tend to be 
somewhat controversial and perceived by some as too petty to be what they consider 
actual forms of corruption. Choosing to focus exclusively on the act of bribery would 
arguably limit this study too much and unnecessarily, and would thereby exclude 
various types of embezzlement, collusion and other forms of “minor” malfeasance 
often associated with corruption. Corruption is, as we have seen in previous 
discussions, a considerably broader phenomenon than mere bribery and concerns 
several different aspects of civic morality. That is why this study chose to adopt a 
definition resembling the significantly broader and pre-modern view of corruption as 
“decay of the body politic” or “societal corruption”. 
Despite these remarks to the above-mentioned criticism, this study still generally 
agrees with the observation that the corruption tolerance index used here is somewhat 
too broad and cumbersome for the purpose of studying attitudes towards corruption 
across countries in a more detailed fashion, taking into account different dimensions 
of corruption such as public corruption. In lack of better alternatives, this study must 
make do with what it presently has at its disposal when it comes to worldwide surveys. 
There have been many fascinating case and area studies of corruption tolerance such 
as Lascoumes and Tomescu-Hatto’s (2008) study of attitudes in France or the multitude 
of studies that have emerged from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 
over the last couple of decades. However, we are still lacking detailed global surveys 
on corruption that enable statistical analyses of differences in public attitudes across 
both countries and time. Future waves of global studies such as the WVS should hence 
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strive to include a greater number of items that concern behaviors commonly thought 
of as (black) corruption, such as favoritism, nepotism, conflicts of interest, vote buying, 
etc., and behaviors that can be perceived as borderline (white and/or grey) corruption, 
such as lobbying or political appointments for non-political offices.128  
Furthermore, it would also be of great interest to have more attitudinal studies of 
so-called “corruption-free” environments such as the Nordic countries and other 
advanced democracies, especially with regard to various forms of grey corruption. Can 
we find similar ambiguities as was found in the French study concerning less clear-cut 
cases of what some perceive as corruption? Where do people and groups in these 
contexts draw the line between what is corrupt behavior and what is not? Do people 
perceive differences in the role of politicians on one hand and bureaucrats on the other 
when it comes to corruption? These are a few examples of the types of questions that 
future studies could and should attempt to answer. 
A fourth limitation is that this study is located too high on Giovanni Sartori’s “ladder 
of abstraction”, i.e. it is too broad or generalizing, in order to be able to take into account 
more specific conditions that may have had an impact on the phenomenon of interest. 
As we saw earlier, there is a relatively large variation across individual survey waves 
within the same country context in some cases. This unexplained variation could 
potentially be the result of political scandals, conflicts or some other recent events or 
developments that may have had an effect on public opinion. Similarly, the very broad 
objective indicators used in this study are not sensitive enough to be able to take into 
account the potential impacts of different dimensions of institutional performance or 
the relative performance of political systems across time. Citizens may in some cases 
perceive that states that have performed very poorly in the past perform comparatively 
better today, at least within some areas such as poverty alleviation, health service or 
security provision, even though they still lag very much behind the highly developed 
countries in general performance. Take for instance the case of Bangladesh, the country 
that demonstrates the lowest level of corruption tolerance according to the index used 
in this study.  
Previous studies have indicated a considerable gap between the by experts observed 
institutional trustworthiness and the public survey reported level of trust in public 
institutions in Bangladesh (Askvik & Jamil 2013). Bangladeshi citizens have tended to 
demonstrate a significantly higher trust in certain public institutions (especially 
parliament and central government) than would be predicted based on expert 
evaluations of institutional quality and comparisons with other developing countries. 
Naomi Hossain’s (2008) explanation for this observed gap is that there have been some 
fully legitimate and rational reasons for many Bangladeshi citizens, especially among 
the poor who constitute a very large proportion of the population of Bangladesh, to 
                                                 
128 The seventh wave of the World Values Survey (forthcoming) includes corruption as a new topic and nine separate 
items concerning this topic (WVS [2]). 
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trust the government who has made some good progress, particularly since the 1990s, 
in alleviating poverty and providing public goods that fill their more materialistic 
needs.  
Hossain’s (2008) interpretation of the gap, if correct, could potentially support the 
institutional performance- or “rotting fish” thesis: The relative change towards better 
policy performance has induced ordinary citizens to show a greater loyalty towards 
the central government. However, it is extremely difficult to control for the relative 
performance across time of individual countries in a large-N study such as this one that 
strives to utilize more objective performance indicators that are comparable across 
countries. Hence, this could at least partly explain why the expected association 
between institutional quality and corruption tolerance is so seemingly weak or non-
existing according to the results. In sum, relative performance across time or specific 
dimensions of institutional performance could matter more than general performance 
relative to other countries, at least with regard to institutional trust and in some 
contexts where poor citizens who espouse to more materialistic values have perceived 
some indications of a positive change in policy performance. 
A fifth limitation closely related to the previously discussed criticism concerning the 
high level of abstraction is that this study is unable to take into account potential 
intrastate variation (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka 2016, 248). Heywood (2018, 12), among 
others, argues that we should stop our “near exclusive focus on nation-states as our 
unit of analysis–and with it, the increasing production of rank indices measuring the 
amount of corruption in any one state compared with another”. The focus on nation-
states is perfectly understandable given their claim to sovereignty and legitimate 
authority, however, it is also quite problematic. Aksel Sundström and Daniel 
Stockemer (2015), for instance, observe in their study of the relationship between 
corruption perceptions and turnout across 170 European regions that France’s regions 
are located between the fiftieth and the eightieth percentiles in their relative corruption 
level across all regions. There is hence likely to be substantial variation in corruption 
tolerance across different regions within a state, such as for instance between the 
Southern and Northern regions/states of Italy or the United States, or between the 
former West and East Germany. Scholars should hence assert more effort into 
gathering cross-regional empirical data so that this variation can also be included in 
future multi-level studies. 
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5.3 Concluding remarks 
The aim of this dissertation has been to contribute to the relatively meager literature 
on what many scholars call “corruption tolerance”, or more specifically “low-level 
corruption tolerance”. This is done by on the one hand reviewing the arguments and 
conclusions and summarizing the findings of previous studies, and on the other hand, 
contributing with some empirical evidence on potential determinants of corruption 
tolerance.  
As we have seen, many studies have examined variations in the extent of corrupt 
behavior and various other types of uncivic behaviors such as tax evasion, but the 
willingness to take part in such acts does not automatically translate into a general 
acceptance of such behavior on the part of others or even themselves. People generally 
do not behave corruptly solely due to a certain type of psyche. To blame such behavior 
mainly on the moral depravation or greediness of the actors who take part in corrupt 
activities is, in the words of Gissur Erlingsson, Andreas Bergh, and Mats Sjölin (2008, 
600), “not intellectually satisfying”. Individuals may feel that they lack any real options 
and have no choice but to behave in a certain way, and consequently find various ways 
of justifying and explaining their own behavior, but this does mean that they perceive 
it as a legitimate way of pursuing personal interests. The same goes for norms of 
accountability: Individuals from societies where public monitoring is weak and 
enforcement is ineffective may feel a greater unwillingness to report bribery and other 
malfeasance, but this does not imply that they are in general more tolerant or accepting 
of such behavior (Zhang 2017). As many previous studies on human behavior have 
shown, incentives are often key due to the myopia or shortsightedness of human 
beings. 
The observations and evidence presented in this study in turn cast doubt on if we 
can truly even speak of a “cultural basis of corruption” and a link between indicators 
of governmental quality and mass attitudes towards malfeasance and uncivic behavior. 
The answer to the question “is there a cultural basis for corruption?” could be 
affirmative if we would choose to view the extent of inequality as a dimension or an 
indicator of political culture instead of a socio-economic indicator. This view could 
arguably be taken due to the earlier discussed stickiness of economic inequality. 
However, the relationship between the perceived corruption of public institutions and 
corruption tolerance is more ambiguous. Can we then really speak of an actual 
“tolerance” or should we instead find some other alternative term, such as “reluctant 
acceptance”, to characterize the situation in many societies caught in a high corruption 
equilibrium with poorly institutionalized public institutions? This study has no 
definitive answer here and it leaves it to others to attempt to answer this question. 
However, as we have seen in this study there seems to be some cases, although 
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relatively few, where one can truly speak of a higher tolerance of malfeasance and 
uncivic behavior. 
One major theme that has been explored in this dissertation concerns the 
relationship between forces of modernization and attitudes towards malfeasance and 
uncivic behavior involving free riding on the public good and abuse of public 
resources. This study would argue here, similarly as Huntington (1968), that corruption 
tolerance and especially corruption itself should not simply be seen as a symptom of 
dysfunctional societies and an inherent rottenness, but more as a (unfortunate) side 
effect of these previously mentioned modernization processes.  
Modernization inevitably leads to value change in broad layers of society, and some 
aspects of this value change can, as we have seen, be quite conducive to corruption, 
even though they are vital for further economic growth. The “spirit of capitalism” can 
be harnessed either in a way that is also beneficial for society as a whole or in a myopic 
way that is only beneficial for in-groups and potentially damaging for out-groups 
within a society. Public institutions play a key part in steering along which paths this 
spirit is channeled and for what purposes it is utilized. Fukuyama (2014) argues that 
clientelism, which is often associated with corruption, should be viewed as an early 
form of democratic participation in countries with a relatively poor and uneducated 
electorate and weak public bureaucracies that can be exploited by parties and 
individual politicians for clientelistic purposes. A well-resourced professional, merit-
based and autonomous public bureaucracy can better resist such and other more 
nefarious attempts by “political entrepreneurs” who may feel tempted to direct their 
entrepreneurial energy and self-interest towards corrupt ends. Countries with robust 
and efficient public institutions are hence better equipped to block all manner of 
corrupt influence even though the general opinion towards malfeasance becomes less 
harsh as societal incentive structures change.  
The empirical evidence presented in this study shows no obvious connection 
between perceived levels of corruption and government efficiency and the measure of 
corruption tolerance used in this study. Institutional quality is seemingly not sufficient 
to explain cross-country differences in corruption tolerance, and neither is socio-
economic development or modernization by themselves. However, there is one specific 
structural factor that seems to be to some degree related to a “higher-than-normal” 
corruption tolerance and a weak social capital endowment, namely economic 
inequality. High levels of inequality tend to signal a weak and corrupt public sector 
dominated by certain well-organized and wealthy private actors that are able to use 
their privileged access to block reforms that could increase equality and benefit society 
as a whole. The citizens in these kinds of societies sense this and become cynical 
towards the state, the political elites and even towards democracy itself as a political 
system “of the people, by the people, for the people”. 
140 
 
  
141 
 
Appendix 
Appendix table 1: Country-wave means (*=post-communist country) 
Country - wave 
Corruption 
Tolerance 
0-100 
GDP per 
capita, 
logged, 
base 10 
(V-Dem) 
Income 
inequality, 
Gini (V-
Dem + 
UNU-
WIDER) 
Control of 
Corruption 
1996-2015 
(WGI) 
Cumulative 
growth 
(annual %) of 
previous 5 
years (WGI) 
Duration of 
current 
democratic 
regime 
(since 1900) 
Albania* (3) Mean 66 7.57 28.0 -1.09 29.5 5 
N 860 999.00 999.0 999.00 999.0 999 
Std. 
Deviation 
30 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Albania* (4) Mean 45 7.79 28.9 -1.01 26.3 9 
N 961 1000.00 1000.0 1000.00 1000.0 1000 
Std. 
Deviation 
40 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Algeria (4) Mean 30 7.93 35.4 -0.97 16.2 0 
N 1192 1282.00 1282.0 1282.00 1282.0 1282 
Std. 
Deviation 
32 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Algeria (6) Mean 59 8.15 35.4 -0.55 13.9 0 
N 1033 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Azerbaijan* 
(3) 
Mean 46 7.87 39.4 -1.25 -75.9 0 
N 1749 2002.00 2002.0 2002.00 2002.0 2002 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Azerbaijan* 
(6) 
Mean 16 9.05 50.8 -1.11 84.6 0 
N 1002 1002.00 1002.0 1002.00 1002.0 1002 
Std. 
Deviation 
29 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Argentina (3) Mean 28 8.96 44.4 -0.21 33.9 12 
N 1056 1079.00 1079.0 1079.00 1079.0 1079 
Std. 
Deviation 
32 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Argentina (4) Mean 25 9.09 49.4 -0.18 20.5 16 
N 1222 1280.00 1280.0 1280.00 1280.0 1280 
Std. 
Deviation 
29 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Argentina (6) Mean 36 9.17 45.1 -0.50 13.2 30 
N 982 1030.00 1030.0 1030.00 1030.0 1030 
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Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Australia (3) Mean 29 9.77 30.9 1.89 11.7 94 
N 2029 2048.00 2048.0 2048.00 2048.0 2048 
Std. 
Deviation 
34 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Australia (5) Mean 31 10.06 31.5 2.10 16.9 104 
N 1389 1421.00 1421.0 1421.00 1421.0 1421 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Australia (6) Mean 27 10.14 29.3 2.08 13.6 111 
N 1462 1477.00 1477.0 1477.00 1477.0 1477 
Std. 
Deviation 
32 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Bangladesh 
(3) 
Mean 8 6.53 36.1 -0.73 22.6 5 
N 1432 1525.00 1525.0 1525.00 1525.0 1525 
Std. 
Deviation 
17 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Bangladesh 
(4) 
Mean 4 6.68 32.6 -0.44 24.8 11 
N 1493 1500.00 1500.0 1500.00 1500.0 1500 
Std. 
Deviation 
12 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Armenia* (3) Mean 54 8.00 36.6 -0.47 -32.4 0 
N 1893 2000.00 2000.0 2000.00 2000.0 2000 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Armenia* (6) Mean 25 9.21 32.5 -0.56 21.9 0 
N 1078 1100.00 1100.0 1100.00 1100.0 1100 
Std. 
Deviation 
34 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina* 
(4) 
Mean 22 8.06 28.1 -0.28 154.1 9 
N 1194 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
31 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Brazil (5) Mean 51 8.65 56.5 0.05 14.6 21 
N 1465 1500.00 1500.0 1500.00 1500.0 1500 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Brazil (6) Mean 31 8.77 53.9 -0.12 16.3 29 
N 1444 1486.00 1486.0 1486.00 1486.0 1486 
Std. 
Deviation 
34 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Bulgaria* (3) Mean 33 8.50 29.3 -0.78 -2.5 7 
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N 1023 1072.00 1072.0 1072.00 1072.0 1072 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Bulgaria* (5) Mean 41 8.85 30.9 0.10 26.8 15 
N 952 1001.00 1001.0 1001.00 1001.0 1001 
Std. 
Deviation 
40 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Belarus* (3) Mean 52 8.68 30.8 -0.93 -40.5 3 
N 1799 2092.00 2092.0 2092.00 2092.0 2092 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Belarus* (6) Mean 57 9.45 27.7 -0.64 36.8 0 
N 1522 1535.00 1535.0 1535.00 1535.0 1535 
Std. 
Deviation 
39 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Canada (4) Mean 28 9.93 32.4 2.24 17.7 99 
N 1902 1931.00 1931.0 1931.00 1931.0 1931 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Canada (5) Mean 31 10.08 33.0 1.85 12.9 105 
N 2118 2164.00 2164.0 2164.00 2164.0 2164 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Chile (3) Mean 38 8.97 50.0 1.45 39.5 6 
N 959 1000.00 1000.0 1000.00 1000.0 1000 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Chile (4) Mean 42 9.22 55.4 1.36 27.0 10 
N 1143 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Chile (5) Mean 49 9.35 54.6 1.37 23.4 16 
N 915 1000.00 1000.0 1000.00 1000.0 1000 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Chile (6) Mean 42 9.49 52.0 1.35 18.9 21 
N 959 1000.00 1000.0 1000.00 1000.0 1000 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
China (5) Mean 38 8.55 46.9 -0.56 53.3 0 
N 1462 1991.00 1991.0 1991.00 1991.0 1991 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
144 
 
China (6) Mean 53 8.90 39.0 -0.54 53.4 0 
N 1852 2300.00 2300.0 2300.00 2300.0 2300 
Std. 
Deviation 
39 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Taiwan (3) Mean 36 9.39 31.6 0.59 30.4 0 
N 757 780.00 780.0 780.00 780.0 780 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Taiwan (5) Mean 38 9.83 33.8 0.86 15.7 10 
N 1216 1227.00 1227.0 1227.00 1227.0 1227 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Taiwan (6) Mean 45 9.96 34.5 0.60 19.3 16 
N 1147 1238.00 1238.0 1238.00 1238.0 1238 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Colombia (3) Mean 35 8.54 59.2 -0.49 18.8 39 
N 2991 2996.00 2996.0 2996.00 2996.0 2996 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Colombia (6) Mean 41 8.83 53.6 -0.30 22.8 54 
N 1496 1512.00 1512.0 1512.00 1512.0 1512 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Croatia* (3) Mean 62 8.59 26.5 -0.82 -10.3 0 
N 1158 1196.00 1196.0 1196.00 1196.0 1196 
Std. 
Deviation 
34 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Czech 
Republic* (3) 
Mean 54 8.96 25.8 0.65 12.8 5 
N 1087 1147.00 1147.0 1147.00 1147.0 1147 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Dominican 
Republic (3) 
Mean 28 7.94 49.9 -0.10 26.4 30 
N 393 417.00 417.0 417.00 417.0 417 
Std. 
Deviation 
33 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Ecuador (6) Mean 45 8.51 48.7 -0.89 24.0 10 
N 1199 1202.00 1202.0 1202.00 1202.0 1202 
Std. 
Deviation 
40 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Estonia* (3) Mean 40 8.99 36.8 -0.06 -20.3 5 
N 951 1021.00 1021.0 1021.00 1021.0 1021 
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Std. 
Deviation 
33 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Estonia* (6) Mean 46 9.83 31.5 0.91 0.2 20 
N 1451 1533.00 1533.0 1533.00 1533.0 1533 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Finland (3) Mean 35 9.61 24.9 2.36 -1.8 79 
N 966 987.00 987.0 987.00 987.0 987 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Finland (5) Mean 40 9.99 26.6 2.53 15.8 88 
N 1012 1014.00 1014.0 1014.00 1014.0 1014 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
France (5) Mean 49 9.96 28.3 1.34 8.2 105 
N 993 1001.00 1001.0 1001.00 1001.0 1001 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Georgia* (3) Mean 45 7.79 40.0 -1.39 -103.1 0 
N 1949 2008.00 2008.0 2008.00 2008.0 2008 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Georgia* (5) Mean 25 8.36 39.8 -0.61 39.5 0 
N 1430 1500.00 1500.0 1500.00 1500.0 1500 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Georgia* (6) Mean 25 8.66 41.9 -0.22 19.5 10 
N 1196 1202.00 1202.0 1202.00 1202.0 1202 
Std. 
Deviation 
34 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Germany (3) Mean 43 9.72 28.9 1.99 5.9 7 
N 1998 2026.00 2026.0 2026.00 2026.0 2026 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Germany (5) Mean 37 9.87 28.7 1.86 2.9 16 
N 2016 2064.00 2064.0 2064.00 2064.0 2064 
Std. 
Deviation 
39 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Ghana (5) Mean 35 7.32 40.7 -0.22 27.6 10 
N 1473 1534.00 1534.0 1534.00 1534.0 1534 
Std. 
Deviation 
30 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Ghana (6) Mean 34 7.51 40.7 0.03 40.1 15 
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N 1552 1552.00 1552.0 1552.00 1552.0 1552 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Guatemala (5) Mean 54 8.32 49.0 -0.54 16.1 34 
N 992 1000.00 1000.0 1000.00 1000.0 1000 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Hungary* (5) Mean 45 8.99 30.0 0.65 14.5 19 
N 999 1007.00 1007.0 1007.00 1007.0 1007 
Std. 
Deviation 
39 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
India (3) Mean 20 7.25 31.5 -0.40 23.4 45 
N 1851 2040.00 2040.0 2040.00 2040.0 2040 
Std. 
Deviation 
33 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
India (4) Mean 19 7.47 28.4 -0.28 30.3 51 
N 1816 2002.00 2002.0 2002.00 2002.0 2002 
Std. 
Deviation 
33 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
India (5) Mean 37 7.73 37.2 -0.41 33.7 56 
N 1585 2001.00 2001.0 2001.00 2001.0 2001 
Std. 
Deviation 
41 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
India (6) Mean 79 8.06 34.7 -0.48 37.1 64 
N 1544 1581.00 1581.0 1581.00 1581.0 1581 
Std. 
Deviation 
28 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Indonesia (4) Mean 27 8.06 29.7 -1.08 5.1 2 
N 965 1000.00 1000.0 1000.00 1000.0 1000 
Std. 
Deviation 
29 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Indonesia (5) Mean 22 8.20 32.0 -0.89 23.6 7 
N 1936 2015.00 2015.0 2015.00 2015.0 2015 
Std. 
Deviation 
32 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Iran (4) Mean 16 8.32 44.1 -0.77 14.0 0 
N 2208 2532.00 2532.0 2532.00 2532.0 2532 
Std. 
Deviation 
25 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Iran (5) Mean 42 8.58 39.2 -0.42 29.1 0 
N 2602 2667.00 2667.0 2667.00 2667.0 2667 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
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Iraq (6) Mean 55 7.38 41.5 -1.39 26.9 0 
N 1139 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Italy (5) Mean 28 9.86 34.5 0.38 7.5 57 
N 993 1012.00 1012.0 1012.00 1012.0 1012 
Std. 
Deviation 
34 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Japan (3) Mean 24 9.87 24.9 1.05 10.8 43 
N 999 1054.00 1054.0 1054.00 1054.0 1054 
Std. 
Deviation 
31 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Japan (4) Mean 23 9.91 31.9 0.93 5.6 48 
N 1260 1362.00 1362.0 1362.00 1362.0 1362 
Std. 
Deviation 
31 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Japan (5) Mean 25 9.97 30.8 1.23 7.1 53 
N 1053 1096.00 1096.0 1096.00 1096.0 1096 
Std. 
Deviation 
31 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Japan (6) Mean 21 9.95 33.6 1.37 -1.8 58 
N 2237 2443.00 2443.0 2443.00 2443.0 2443 
Std. 
Deviation 
29 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Kazakhstan* 
(6) 
Mean 48 9.27 27.7 -0.88 31.4 0 
N 1500 1500.00 1500.0 1500.00 1500.0 1500 
Std. 
Deviation 
39 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Jordan (4) Mean 12 8.31 36.8 -0.01 16.0 0 
N 1175 1223.00 1223.0 1223.00 1223.0 1223 
Std. 
Deviation 
22 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Jordan (5) Mean 14 8.48 38.8 0.34 34.8 0 
N 1107 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
26 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Jordan (6) Mean 26 8.64 38.8 0.18 15.9 0 
N 1188 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
34 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
South Korea 
(5) 
Mean 41 9.78 31.6 0.34 28.6 17 
N 1196 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
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Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
South Korea 
(6) 
Mean 48 9.93 33.0 0.48 18.1 22 
N 1190 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Kyrgyzstan* 
(4) 
Mean 39 7.62 42.0 -0.48 16.5 0 
N 1031 1043.00 1043.0 1043.00 1043.0 1043 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Kyrgyzstan* 
(6) 
Mean 47 8.01 29.9 -1.23 22.4 0 
N 1488 1500.00 1500.0 1500.00 1500.0 1500 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Lebanon (6) Mean 57 8.40 51.1 -0.83 32.3 0 
N 1200 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
39 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Latvia* (3) Mean 61 8.60 27.0 -0.82 -48.6 3 
N 1130 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Lithuania* (3) Mean 47 8.59 33.6 -0.06 -36.4 5 
N 911 1009.00 1009.0 1009.00 1009.0 1009 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Malaysia (5) Mean 74 9.06 43.2 0.43 23.8 0 
N 1200 1201.00 1201.0 1201.00 1201.0 1201 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Malaysia (6) Mean 46 9.17 46.3 -0.03 22.5 0 
N 1300 1300.00 1300.0 1300.00 1300.0 1300 
Std. 
Deviation 
44 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Mali (5) Mean 44 6.85 40.1 -0.50 25.0 15 
N 1324 1534.00 1534.0 1534.00 1534.0 1534 
Std. 
Deviation 
42 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Mexico (3) Mean 49 8.75 55.1 -0.45 14.7 0 
N 2240 2364.00 2364.0 2364.00 2364.0 2364 
Std. 
Deviation 
41 0.00 0.0 0.00 5.2 0 
Mexico (4) Mean 42 8.82 51.0 -0.38 14.5 0 
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N 1263 1535.00 1535.0 1535.00 1535.0 1535 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Mexico (5) Mean 51 8.90 48.5 -0.29 8.2 5 
N 1452 1560.00 1560.0 1560.00 1560.0 1560 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Mexico (6) Mean 46 8.91 51.0 -0.30 9.0 12 
N 1975 2000.00 2000.0 2000.00 2000.0 2000 
Std. 
Deviation 
33 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Moldova* (3) Mean 51 8.18 40.1 -0.20 -79.6 5 
N 923 984.00 984.0 984.00 984.0 984 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Moldova* (4) Mean 68 7.71 41.1 -0.29 -0.1 11 
N 853 1008.00 1008.0 1008.00 1008.0 1008 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Moldova* (5) Mean 57 8.03 35.0 -0.99 35.4 15 
N 988 1046.00 1046.0 1046.00 1046.0 1046 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Morocco (4) Mean 9 7.94 39.5 0.41 21.1 0 
N 1146 1251.00 1251.0 1251.00 1251.0 1251 
Std. 
Deviation 
19 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Morocco (5) Mean 23 8.10 39.4 -0.08 24.8 0 
N 1162 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
32 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Morocco (6) Mean 23 8.28 39.4 -0.31 25.0 0 
N 998 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Netherlands 
(5) 
Mean 27 10.03 28.7 2.02 6.7 105 
N 1031 1050.00 1050.0 1050.00 1050.0 1050 
Std. 
Deviation 
34 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Netherlands 
(6) 
Mean 25 10.09 28.3 2.17 4.7 111 
N 1830 1902.00 1902.0 1902.00 1902.0 1902 
Std. 
Deviation 
31 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
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New Zealand 
(3) 
Mean 30 9.55 36.4 2.24 21.8 97 
N 1129 1201.00 1201.0 1201.00 1201.0 1201 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
New Zealand 
(5) 
Mean 31 9.81 33.5 2.45 20.9 103 
N 881 954.00 954.0 954.00 954.0 954 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
New Zealand 
(6) 
Mean 31 9.84 34.9 2.46 5.7 110 
N 804 841.00 841.0 841.00 841.0 841 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Nigeria (3) Mean 33 6.96 52.7 -1.15 15.5 0 
N 1979 1996.00 1996.0 1996.00 1996.0 1996 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Nigeria (4) Mean 40 6.94 49.1 -1.07 10.7 0 
N 2022 2022.00 2022.0 2022.00 2022.0 2022 
Std. 
Deviation 
40 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Nigeria (6) Mean 49 7.49 43.0 -0.98 36.0 0 
N 1759 1759.00 1759.0 1759.00 1759.0 1759 
Std. 
Deviation 
39 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Norway (3) Mean 32 9.90 24.5 2.28 18.6 96 
N 1120 1127.00 1127.0 1127.00 1127.0 1127 
Std. 
Deviation 
30 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Norway (5) Mean 42 10.20 28.3 1.97 11.3 107 
N 1015 1025.00 1025.0 1025.00 1025.0 1025 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Pakistan (4) Mean 13 7.52 31.4 -0.96 16.4 11 
N 1680 2000.00 2000.0 2000.00 2000.0 2000 
Std. 
Deviation 
24 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Pakistan (5) Mean 36 7.81 31.2 -1.04 13.6 4 
N 1200 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
39 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Peru (3) Mean 42 8.02 50.3 -0.17 26.6 10 
N 1108 1211.00 1211.0 1211.00 1211.0 1211 
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Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Peru (4) Mean 41 8.22 56.1 -0.23 13.1 0 
N 1432 1501.00 1501.0 1501.00 1501.0 1501 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Peru (6) Mean 53 8.59 47.4 -0.34 33.3 11 
N 1131 1210.00 1210.0 1210.00 1210.0 1210 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Philippines 
(4) 
Mean 64 7.73 48.6 -0.15 17.9 15 
N 1170 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
39 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Philippines 
(6) 
Mean 64 7.96 43.9 -0.77 23.2 26 
N 1196 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Poland* (5) Mean 39 9.02 35.4 0.11 16.5 16 
N 920 1000.00 1000.0 1000.00 1000.0 1000 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Poland* (6) Mean 38 9.25 33.4 0.37 22.6 23 
N 896 966.00 966.0 966.00 966.0 966 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Romania* (3) Mean 33 7.96 22.9 -0.22 11.6 7 
N 1181 1239.00 1239.0 1239.00 1239.0 1239 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Romania* (5) Mean 29 8.27 33.5 -0.26 27.1 14 
N 1628 1776.00 1776.0 1776.00 1776.0 1776 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Romania* (6) Mean 20 8.46 34.5 -0.27 8.6 21 
N 1432 1503.00 1503.0 1503.00 1503.0 1503 
Std. 
Deviation 
31 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Russian 
Federation* 
(3) 
Mean 43 8.66 48.2 -1.02 -43.8 3 
N 1732 2040.00 2040.0 2040.00 2040.0 2040 
Std. 
Deviation 
34 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Mean 45 8.82 40.9 -0.74 30.7 0 
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Russian 
Federation* 
(5) 
N 1802 2033.00 2033.0 2033.00 2033.0 2033 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Russian 
Federation* 
(6) 
Mean 55 9.03 39.7 -1.09 18.5 0 
N 2267 2500.00 2500.0 2500.00 2500.0 2500 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Rwanda (5) Mean 54 6.72 45.4 -0.48 41.4 0 
N 1451 1507.00 1507.0 1507.00 1507.0 1507 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Rwanda (6) Mean 59 6.93 45.4 0.14 40.3 0 
N 1527 1527.00 1527.0 1527.00 1527.0 1527 
Std. 
Deviation 
33 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Singapore 6) Mean 56 10.16 47.1 2.25 31.7 0 
N 1969 1972.00 1972.0 1972.00 1972.0 1972 
Std. 
Deviation 
42 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Slovakia* (3) Mean 64 8.80 19.5 0.22 26.7 5 
N 1067 1095.00 1095.0 1095.00 1095.0 1095 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Viet Nam (4) Mean 14 7.41 35.4 -0.40 34.8 0 
N 962 1000.00 1000.0 1000.00 1000.0 1000 
Std. 
Deviation 
26 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Viet Nam (5) Mean 26 7.73 37.2 -0.75 34.4 0 
N 1358 1495.00 1495.0 1495.00 1495.0 1495 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Slovenia* (5) Mean 47 9.65 24.8 1.02 18.1 14 
N 950 1037.00 1037.0 1037.00 1037.0 1037 
Std. 
Deviation 
39 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Slovenia* (6) Mean 35 9.76 24.8 1.02 9.2 20 
N 1032 1069.00 1069.0 1069.00 1069.0 1069 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
South Africa 
(3) 
Mean 32 8.17 59.3 0.76 4.4 2 
N 2789 2935.00 2935.0 2935.00 2935.0 2935 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
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South Africa 
(4) 
Mean 39 8.23 58.9 0.65 13.8 7 
N 2899 3000.00 3000.0 3000.00 3000.0 3000 
Std. 
Deviation 
40 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
South Africa 
(6) 
Mean 67 8.51 56.5 0.14 10.2 19 
N 3454 3531.00 3531.0 3531.00 3531.0 3531 
Std. 
Deviation 
42 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Zimbabwe (4) Mean 16 7.25 73.3 -0.65 12.0 0 
N 973 1002.00 1002.0 1002.00 1002.0 1002 
Std. 
Deviation 
26 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Zimbabwe (6) Mean 47 6.55 73.3 -1.32 18.6 0 
N 1500 1500.00 1500.0 1500.00 1500.0 1500 
Std. 
Deviation 
42 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Spain (3) Mean 28 9.41 34.2 1.05 8.6 18 
N 1134 1211.00 1211.0 1211.00 1211.0 1211 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Spain (4) Mean 36 9.58 33.3 1.37 17.9 23 
N 1157 1209.00 1209.0 1209.00 1209.0 1209 
Std. 
Deviation 
39 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Spain (5) Mean 38 9.73 32.3 1.34 17.2 30 
N 1139 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
40 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Spain (6) Mean 33 9.74 34.3 1.00 5.5 34 
N 1156 1189.00 1189.0 1189.00 1189.0 1189 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Sweden (3) Mean 44 9.71 24.9 2.31 3.8 85 
N 993 1009.00 1009.0 1009.00 1009.0 1009 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Sweden (5) Mean 45 10.04 24.9 2.20 13.2 95 
N 989 1003.00 1003.0 1003.00 1003.0 1003 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Sweden (6) Mean 41 10.08 26.8 2.29 8.3 100 
N 1127 1206.00 1206.0 1206.00 1206.0 1206 
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Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Switzerland 
(3) 
Mean 36 9.93 35.1 2.10 0.7 96 
N 1167 1212.00 1212.0 1212.00 1212.0 1212 
Std. 
Deviation 
33 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Switzerland 
(5) 
Mean 29 10.04 26.8 2.04 10.1 106 
N 1233 1241.00 1241.0 1241.00 1241.0 1241 
Std. 
Deviation 
32 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Thailand (5) Mean 77 8.96 42.5 -0.15 28.8 22 
N 1523 1534.00 1534.0 1534.00 1534.0 1534 
Std. 
Deviation 
34 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Thailand (6) Mean 37 9.08 40.3 -0.28 16.5 14 
N 1166 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Trinidad and 
Tobago (5) 
Mean 37 9.71 40.2 -0.13 40.6 44 
N 983 1002.00 1002.0 1002.00 1002.0 1002 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Trinidad and 
Tobago (6) 
Mean 20 9.97 40.2 -0.21 20.3 49 
N 970 999.00 999.0 999.00 999.0 999 
Std. 
Deviation 
31 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Tunisia (6) Mean 29 8.74 40.6 -0.11 12.8 0 
N 1071 1205.00 1205.0 1205.00 1205.0 1205 
Std. 
Deviation 
33 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Turkey (5) Mean 23 8.86 42.1 -0.17 37.7 43 
N 1327 1346.00 1346.0 1346.00 1346.0 1346 
Std. 
Deviation 
33 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Turkey (6) Mean 19 8.94 40.8 0.08 16.7 48 
N 1596 1605.00 1605.0 1605.00 1605.0 1605 
Std. 
Deviation 
30 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Uganda (4) Mean 36 6.58 44.0 -0.92 30.2 0 
N 996 1002.00 1002.0 1002.00 1002.0 1002 
Std. 
Deviation 
39 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Ukraine (3) Mean 53 8.35 32.7 -1.03 -67.4 5 
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N 2138 2811.00 2811.0 2811.00 2811.0 2811 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Ukraine (5) Mean 60 8.30 35.0 -0.89 38.6 15 
N 896 1000.00 1000.0 1000.00 1000.0 1000 
Std. 
Deviation 
41 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Ukraine (6) Mean 52 8.37 25.3 -1.01 6.9 20 
N 1500 1500.00 1500.0 1500.00 1500.0 1500 
Std. 
Deviation 
39 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Macedonia* 
(3) 
Mean 37 8.43 27.2 -0.96 -7.7 7 
N 839 995.00 995.0 995.00 995.0 995 
Std. 
Deviation 
37 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Macedonia* 
(4) 
Mean 32 8.44 28.1 -0.67 14.8 10 
N 949 1055.00 1055.0 1055.00 1055.0 1055 
Std. 
Deviation 
33 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Egypt (4) Mean 20 8.02 48.7 -0.25 26.0 0 
N 2963 3000.00 3000.0 3000.00 3000.0 3000 
Std. 
Deviation 
27 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Great Britain 
(5) 
Mean 38 10.06 35.8 1.96 14.3 104 
N 982 1041.00 1041.0 1041.00 1041.0 1041 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Tanzania (4) Mean 11 6.28 40.8 -0.97 21.4 0 
N 1130 1171.00 1171.0 1171.00 1171.0 1171 
Std. 
Deviation 
25 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
United States 
(3) 
Mean 23 10.07 39.5 1.57 12.0 94 
N 1500 1542.00 1542.0 1542.00 1542.0 1542 
Std. 
Deviation 
32 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
United States 
(4) 
Mean 36 10.20 40.7 1.55 19.4 98 
N 1195 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
United States 
(5) 
Mean 33 10.32 39.0 1.86 12.7 105 
N 1185 1249.00 1249.0 1249.00 1249.0 1249 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
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United States 
(6) 
Mean 32 10.31 46.4 1.26 3.9 110 
N 2171 2232.00 2232.0 2232.00 2232.0 2232 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Burkina Faso 
(5) 
Mean 43 6.96 39.5 -0.15 31.5 0 
N 1355 1534.00 1534.0 1534.00 1534.0 1534 
Std. 
Deviation 
42 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Uruguay (3) Mean 20 8.90 42.1 0.72 19.9 11 
N 968 1000.00 1000.0 1000.00 1000.0 1000 
Std. 
Deviation 
30 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Uruguay (5) Mean 35 9.00 46.4 0.83 1.8 21 
N 977 1000.00 1000.0 1000.00 1000.0 1000 
Std. 
Deviation 
40 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Uruguay (6) Mean 27 9.27 45.0 1.19 29.7 26 
N 962 1000.00 1000.0 1000.00 1000.0 1000 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Uzbekistan* 
(6) 
Mean 38 8.63 39.7 -1.22 42.8 0 
N 1497 1500.00 1500.0 1500.00 1500.0 1500 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Venezuela (3) Mean 30 9.11 40.2 -0.91 17.6 37 
N 1167 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Venezuela (4) Mean 36 9.09 47.0 -0.95 4.5 41 
N 1185 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Yemen (6) Mean 29 8.01 37.7 -1.02 6.1 0 
N 764 1000.00 1000.0 1000.00 1000.0 1000 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Zambia (5) Mean 61 6.48 54.6 -0.68 33.5 0 
N 1394 1500.00 1500.0 1500.00 1500.0 1500 
Std. 
Deviation 
40 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Serbia* (3) Mean 37 8.33 33.4 -1.03 -20.0 0 
N 1226 1280.00 1280.0 1280.00 1280.0 1280 
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Std. 
Deviation 
36 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Serbia* (4) Mean 32 8.53 28.2 -1.08 7.6 0 
N 1105 1200.00 1200.0 1200.00 1200.0 1200 
Std. 
Deviation 
35 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0 
Total Mean 38 8.67 39.4 0.10 14.7 25 
N 230143 242953.00 242953.0 242953.00 242953.0 242953 
Std. 
Deviation 
38 0.96 9.9 1.06 26.0 34 
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